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### *Recent African Discovery.*

THE controversies which are connected with the name of Mr. Stanley will be but passing, the undeniable results of his expedition will remain to us for ever. Whether he can or cannot justify his conduct on various occasions towards the natives of the countries he explored; whether a newspaper correspondent can be justified in forcing a passage through unwilling tribes; whether the Royal Geographical Society be more sinned against or sinning in his regard; these and other questions connected with them are capable of much argumentation, and may be capable of being clearly settled: but whether or no, they are beside the main fact and the main lesson of his story. He has made the greatest stride in discovery since Africa began to be an object of interest to explorers: he has not only found a channel the most likely that we know for future commerce: not only made known a hitherto unrecognized river as the greatest of the waters of the Continent, but moreover beyond his own findings he has shed a flood of light upon the findings of his predecessors, and bound their disjecta membra into a harmonious whole. Not only has he given to geography the Lualaba, Congo, or Livingstone, by whichever name it shall be known, but in so doing he has settled at last the problem of the Nile. So signal has been his service in this regard that Dr. Petermann,<sup>1</sup> paying the greatest compliment

<sup>1</sup> Mittheilungen, November 21, 1877. This writer goes very considerably out of his way to make a violent onslaught on the geographical contributions of Catholic missionaries. He winds it up by saying that a single German explorer, Henry Barth, has done more for the map of Africa than such missionaries in centuries. Even if the fact were true, we should hardly have thought it very surprising that a man who went to Africa expressly for the sake of geography should do more for it than those for whom it was but an incidental matter. Still less should we have expected to find their want of scientific precision denounced as "shameful," especially considering the deficiency of instruments with which they had to work. But, as we have intimated, the fact of Catholic deficiency is no fact at all. That a body of men who in America discovered the Mississippi, and so much else besides that Bancroft can write, "Not a stream was entered, not a promontory doubled, but a Jesuit led the way"—who in Asia constructed the map of the Continent now preserved in our Hydrographical

which apparently he can devise, dubs him the "Bismarck" of African discovery.

Our object therefore, in the few pages that follow, is to point out what we conceive to be the substantial value of Mr. Stanley's results. We do not propose to write the history of his wanderings, still less to examine the vexed questions to which we have alluded. Physical geography is our theme, and we propose to consider the lessons in its regard which have been so lately given to us.

To do this rightly we must first briefly recapitulate that work of his predecessors which he has completed, and see what the threads were which have been taken up and woven into the map of Africa as we know it now.

The history of African discovery hangs around the Nile. The ever receding fountains of that mysterious stream presented the first problem to be solved by the adventurous, and that solution we have just incidentally been given in the knowledge of that newest in the family of rivers which it has been the direct result of Mr. Stanley's labours to reveal.

As is well known, the puzzle of the Nile was twofold. First, whence did it come? Second, what caused its periodic inundation? Herodotus, at the dawn of history,<sup>2</sup> presents us with both questions, and with answers to each; but from his day to our own, no sufficient advance has been made to enable men certainly to say how far those answers might be true.

To the second of the questions in our day an answer had already been given, Mr. (now Sir Samuel) Baker having in the year 1861-2 proved beyond possibility of doubt that from the Nile tributaries of Abyssinia bearing down the waters of the rainy season in that country comes the overflow, but not the normal stream of the Nile.

The other and greater problem was less easily solved. In the first place, for the earlier seekers there was the question which to call the Nile. At Khartoum the river is found by the ascending explorer to branch into two: the Bahr-el-Azrek, or Blue River, on his left, and the White River, Bahr-el-Abiad,

Office, a map which on the authority of the late chief of that office is pronounced the foundation of all maps since; a body of men whom another great authority and most eminent member of the Royal Society declares to have done more for science, and notably geographical science, than any other body of men whatever,—that such a body should be so summarily put down as scientifically useless, may accord with the necessities of the German "Cultur-kampf," but does not accord with plain history.

<sup>2</sup> *Euterpe*, 19-29.



on the right. The former (one of the forementioned Abyssinian tributaries) has at the junction many specious claims to be the main river, and so in fact at first it was regarded. This river it was that Bruce explored and found (in 1770) to rise from certain springs or fountains, and boasted himself to be the discoverer of the Nile. Besides the fact, however, that the stream thus tracked was, as we shall see, but an affluent of the river, the same fountains had been visited, and the same exultation expressed a century and a half earlier by the Jesuit missionary Father Paez.<sup>3</sup>

Gradually, however, the belief grew that the White and not the Blue River must be regarded as the true Nile, and that its comparatively equable and stoneless stream would prove to flow, not from mountains, but from lakes.

This conjecture was verified. The great Victoria N'Yanza Lake, discovered by Burton and Speke in 1858, and more accurately surveyed by Speke and Grant in 1862 (both expeditions striking into the Continent from Zanzibar and the East), and the Albert N'Yanza, discovered by Baker in 1864, were proved to be reservoirs of the great river flowing out of the former and through the north-eastern extremity of the latter; the identity of this river with that of Egypt being rendered certain by Baker's course, who followed it up, and Speke and Grant's return down its valley.

The head waters of the Nile were thus pushed southwards at least beyond the Equator, the Victoria N'Yanza Lake extending fully  $2\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  south of the line. The only question which remained was whether or no this was the last of it.

It has been the fate of the Nile to have attributed to it as affluents pretty nearly all the great rivers of Africa. Geographers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries placed its heads as far south as what we now know to be the watershed of the Congo and Zambesi in  $10^{\circ}$  S. latitude or lower;<sup>4</sup> while in the west of the Continent even the long unsolved river that we now know to be the Niger was at one time suspected to find its way, in spite of the Sahara, to the Egyptian stream.

<sup>3</sup> In 1616.

<sup>4</sup> See, for instance, the map prefixed to Maffei's *History of the Society of Jesus* to explain the missions of the Order. This makes the Nile flow out of a lake corresponding pretty closely with one conjecturally marked by Stanley in lat.  $10^{\circ}$  S. long.  $25^{\circ}$  E.

So now, as knowledge advanced, fresh problems arose. On their way to the discovery of the N'Yanza, Captains Burton and Speke had found another great lake, the Tanganyika, which stretches from about latitude  $3^{\circ}$  S. almost to  $9^{\circ}$  S. Was this lake part of the Nile system? This was the question that naturally at once arose. If so, then the fountain head of the river was again receding into space.

The disposition at first seemed to be so to consider it. It was even thought not impossible that this lake of whose northern extremity the discoverers could speak only from hearsay, might prove to be a continuation of the Albert N'Yanza, of which Baker knew nothing except on the north. But leaving that question aside, it evidently might belong to the system of the Nile. The first explorers, as we have said, were unable to visit its northern part, that is, those waters which approached nearest to the Nile. They heard, however, that at this extremity there was a river, the Rusizi; but, strange comment on the value of hearsay evidence, could not get their informants to agree as to whether this stream ran out of the lake or into it. If it ran out northwards, the connection of the waters of Tanganyika with those of the N'Yanzas and the Nile would be pretty well established. And that it did so run, the hearsay evidence seemed strong. A party of Arab traders informed Speke, while making a voyage on Tanganyika, that the river flowing through Egypt issues from that lake, and an Arab merchant, who had no apparent reason for misrepresentation, made a similar statement to Burton, adding details so circumstantial as apparently to preclude mistake. When, however, the northern extremity was at last visited, by Livingstone and Stanley,<sup>5</sup> in 1871, the river was found to flow decidedly *in*.

A fresh water lake must necessarily, however, have an outlet somewhere, and the closing of its northern end did not necessarily shut Tanganyika out from the Nile system. In fact before the discovery which thus closed it had been made, the champions of the connexion had found a new string for their bow.

Dr. Livingstone, after his former explorations of the Zambesi river system, devoted his last years to the settlement of the problem of the Nile, in whose connexion with Tanganyika he was a warm believer. In the course of his researches he came (in 1869 and 1871) upon a great river, the Lualaba, according

<sup>5</sup> In his discovery of the Livingstone expedition.



to the natives, or Webb's river, as named by him, evidently connected with Tanganyika,<sup>6</sup> running from the Zambesi water-shed under various names at various stages (Tschambesi, Luapula, and Luvwi) towards the North. Wherever it went it must be a main feature in the physical geography, for at Nyangwé 4° south of the Line—the furthest point to which he was able to follow it—he found it to be “at least 3,000 yards broad and always deep,” though even this was “narrower than it is higher up.”<sup>7</sup>

Whither did this great stream flow? If into the Nile, then it must be by the way of the Albert N'Yanza—whose undefined southern extremity it might easily be conceived to meet. In such case the Victoria Lake and the river issuing therefrom would cease to appear as the waters of the true Nile, but must sink to a tributary rank.

If not to the Nile, then whither? Such a river could not disappear from the face of the earth, even in the centre of Africa, without leaving a trace behind. Besides the Nile to the North, no possible outlet in the whole coast of Africa could be suggested through which the Lualaba might find its way to the ocean except the Congo on the West.

That river, known as to its mouth since the early days of Portuguese discovery (1484), and traced upwards with infinite labour and disaster for some two hundred miles by Captain Tuckey in 1816, was in all else an unknown river. The extent of its basin was but dimly conjectured, and conjectures even so recent as those embodied in the map to Livingstone's last discoveries attribute to it no other connexions than the Zaire or Quango to the S.E.

There were several minor considerations in the problem of which the above were the main elements. Various travellers, chiefly German, in the Soudan and Northern Central Africa had brought to our knowledge with more or less of certainty the existence of untraced waters north of the Equator. Nachtigal in 1872-3 had heard of a great river flowing W. to W. by S. in lat. between 4° 13' and 4° 26' N. and long. 20° 45' to 23° E.—the “Bahr Kuta.” This information, as we have said, was however hearsay. Twenty years earlier Dr. Barth had heard

<sup>6</sup> That Tanganyika and the Lualaba were connected was never doubted, but it was long before the precise channel of connexion was discovered. Lieutenant Cameron seems (*pace* Mr. Stanley) to have settled this channel by his discovery of the head of the Lukuga river flowing *out* of the lake to the West.

<sup>7</sup> *Last Journals*, vol. ij. p. 111.

report of a great stream flowing much in the same direction, which he placed about lat.  $3^{\circ} 55'$  N. and long.  $22^{\circ} 20'$  to  $23^{\circ} 5'$  E.—the “River of Kubanda.”

And Schweinfurth, further to the E., in 1870 came upon the “Welle,” in nearly the same latitude, but the size of this stream (eight hundred feet in breadth) forbade it to be considered as more than an affluent of the river of which the others spoke. Could these various threads be woven together into the map of Africa?

But this was comparatively a side issue. The main question lay between the Congo and the Nile. If the Lualaba did not contribute to the Nile, and so immensely extend the area to be given to its system, then approaching so closely, as it evidently did to the N'Yanzas, it limited that system to their neighbourhood. And if the mighty waters rolled down by it should prove to pour eventually to the West, then the Congo must suddenly leap into the front rank of the rivers of the world.

Livingstone was a staunch believer in the Nile. Classical, and more especially Scriptural associations, made him anxious that his discoveries should turn out to be illustrative of the history of that “grand old” river. He would not he declared undergo the hardships that met him and run the risk of “being made black man's meat” for the sake of the Congo. But beyond Nyangwé he, as already said, could not trace it, and, in spite of the northward course<sup>8</sup> which he rightly assigned to it, his own observations seemed to disprove his theory.

First the volume of the Lualaba seemed enough to make three Niles, being at this point estimated to equal 124,000 cubic feet of water per second.

But more conclusive still the respective altitudes forbade the idea.<sup>9</sup> For if this river were connected with the Nile it must be, as we have said, through the Albert N'Yanza. But while that lake is 2,500 feet above the sea, Nyangwé is but 1,400.

Dr. Livingstone, isolated so long from the world scientific and otherwise, did not sufficiently know the data furnished by other discoveries than his own, and died near the source of the river which he had discovered and which it is proposed to call by his name.

<sup>8</sup> Cameron, who also failed to get further than Nyangwé, reported on the other hand that the Lualaba beyond that point flowed West. It now appears that this was wrong.

<sup>9</sup> Our figures are taken from Petermann's map in the volume of the *Mittheilungen* already referred to.

Such was the state of discovery and knowledge when Mr. Stanley undertook his great expedition, and under the authority of two penny papers, solved the problem which Sesostris, Cambyzes, Julius Cæsar, and Nero had attempted in vain.

He began with a subsidiary problem. Supposing the Victoria and not the Albert Lake to be the main connexion of the river, which of its tributaries could claim by its furthest course to furnish the true head? This honour he assigns to the "Alexandra Nile," whose head waters run up to the watershed of the Rusizi.

Then for the main question. To get to Nyangwé was comparatively easy, but how to get beyond? The difficulties could be no common ones that had forced Livingstone, after a year of effort, to give up the attempt, and since then had made Cameron, who started with equal determination to solve the problem, turn away to the South-west. In truth, the stories told at Nyangwé were quite sufficient to deter an explorer, or, what was equally bad, his followers. No one had ever been more than four days' journey down the stream, but they knew enough from report to prevent them from wishing to go. He would have to go for months through a forest impervious to light. There were dwarfs on the left bank, striped like zebras, using poisoned weapons and living upon elephant's flesh. On the right bank there were cannibals. Arab slave-hunters armed to the teeth had tried to penetrate and failed.

How Mr. Stanley undertook the hopeless task and carried it through: the thirty-two battles that he fought, the speeches that he made to keep up the heart of his followers, the losses that his force sustained, all this may be read in his own interesting and graphic story. For our purpose, concerned as we are purely with the substantial geographical results, it must be put aside to state briefly what through it all he found.

First as to the river itself. He found it to be the Congo; sailing down its mouth or journeying along its banks he traced it to the Atlantic. Running northwards across the Equator, then bending away first N.W. then W. (its northernmost being nearly as high as lat.  $2^{\circ}$  N.), finally it flows S.W. across the line again, and so to its mouth. It is a huge river; often ten miles broad, but full of islands. Its volume is estimated at 1,800,000 cubic feet per second. The area of its basin Stanley estimates at 860,000 square miles. Petermann would give it half as much again.

It is rich in tributaries, especially on its left or southern bank. Of these the chief, the Kasai (falling into it pretty near the Equator, and the meridian of  $20^{\circ}$  E.) is of a deep brown hue, its waters not mixing with the clear main stream for 130 miles, after which they suffice to tinge the whole united river with the colour of thin tea. The second tributary of importance is the Aruwimi, flowing in on the other bank. This river, probably the Welle of Schweinfurth, is in the midst of the fiercest cannibal region, and at its mouth occurred the great naval engagement which must be by this time familiar to all through the medium of the illustrated papers; where the great war canoe that led the hostile fleet was propelled by eighty paddlers, the paddles shod with iron and tipped with ivory, eight steersmen on a platform in the stern, and ten choice warriors with spears "at the ready" on another platform in the bow, while the chiefs "pranced up and down a planking that ran from stem to stern."

Between Nyangwé and the Line falls and cataracts occur, and towards the mouth above the Yellala Falls there is a series of sixty-three over which the river roars as it breaks through the narrow gate of the hills that bound the central basin of Africa. Here navigation will of course always be impossible, but from E. long.  $16^{\circ} 50'$  to E.  $25^{\circ} 50'$  the main stream is continuously navigable, thus affording an unlooked for high-road by which commerce may penetrate this long impenetrable Continent. The tributaries, whose course can only be guessed, must very materially enlarge the navigable waterway.<sup>10</sup>

Next as to the country, which is as unlike our traditional ideas of Africa's burning sands as can be well conceived. "Once above the lower falls," he says, "we have half Africa before us with no interruption, and not like the Lower Nile regions deserts of sand, but one vast populous plain teeming with life." The villages deserve rather the name of towns; fairs and markets are continual, and the natural products to supply them abundant. Ivory is a drug in the market, they use it to chop wood upon,

<sup>10</sup> The discoverer conjecturally calculates as follows: "The great river gives 110 miles below and 835 miles above the (lower) cataracts of navigable water, while the large affluents North and South traversing the basin will afford 1,200 miles and perhaps much more. The greatest affluent, the Ikelemba (Kasai) must be more than 1,000 miles in length: the Nkutu river is over 700; the Aruwimi must exceed 500, while there are four or five others which by their breadth I should judge to be navigable for great distances" (Letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, dated September 5, 1877).

for every sort of domestic utensil, to form pillars for houses, or entire temples for idols. After defeating the hostile fleet at the embouchure of the Aruwimi their village was sacked by the victors, and 18,000 dollars worth of ivory was picked up by them in a few minutes. Groves of the oil palm, too, cotton, indiarubber, ground nuts, sesamum, copal, both red and white, and all manner of riches besides are thick in that region which has hitherto been represented on the best maps by a blank white spot in the centre of Africa.

For two things Mr. Stanley pleads. The one, that the river shall be taken straightway under the protection of this country, as the only means of giving security to commerce. The other, that it shall be called the "Livingstone." His latter wish seems likely to be gratified, as already we observe that Messrs. Keith Johnstone so name it in their new map. And certainly it would not be unfitting so to perpetuate the memory of him who having discovered this youngest of African streams died in the belief that it was but the extremity of the oldest, even as Columbus probably went to his grave without knowing that he had discovered a new continent, and fancying that he had but reached the farthest limits of ancient Asia.

What are to be the results to Africa of this great discovery? Without result it cannot be, but how far will the savages so long left to themselves be the better for being opened up to civilization? Hitherto the region to the North has, it is true, been harried by slave-hunters, whose frequent presence sufficiently explains the reception which is accorded to any one who happens to be a stranger. But the great river has been as a moat defensive to those on its left bank, and even the slave-hunters have affected those with whom they have come in contact, by means of war and not by the more powerful means of peace. Can we look forward without anxiety to the gifts of peace which Christendom will bring? Shall we benefit them more than we have benefited the Red Man of America? Or shall we add the curse of fire-water and the vices of adventurers who ever flock to new lands to the ferocity and the ignorance of these noble savages? Assuredly it will be but this, unless civilization, true to its mission, carries with it the Gospel. Mr. Stanley hopes that those who bear this to these heathens will dispense with creeds and dogmas, and preach Christ alone. Surely it is but an edgeless sword with which he thus would arm us. To talk of Christ without being able to say who He

is, to ask people to believe without being able to tell them what, to expect to improve their condition by means of Christianity without laying down the doctrines of Christian law—this is the impotence to which so paradoxical a hope aspires. But this is practically the impotence also of that vague, undefined, unauthoritative message which except from the messengers of the one Church it is alone possible to hear. Shall her voice be heard along the banks of the great river? That to her may be left the task of first approaching these formidable tribes that dwell along the northern banks we are inclined to believe. That even the comparatively tamer southern population will be cautiously trusted by men whose life is precious to their families is also not improbable. It is time for Catholic zeal to be up and doing, for a greater field is opened to its efforts than has been since Vasco da Gama doubled the Cape and Columbus returned from the discovery of a world.


J. G.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since the above article was in type the following interesting and important statement has appeared in the *Paris Univers*. "In the Library of Lyons there is a terrestrial globe of two metres in diameter, the gem of that collection. It was the work of the religious of the Order of St. Francis, Fathers Gregory and Bonaventure, and was completed in the year 1701. A visitor must be struck dumb with astonishment to find that it depicts to the south of Darfour and Cardofan the mountains of Al-Kamar, those celebrated hills where the Nile springs, and in front of them the Albert and Victoria N'yanzas, recently discovered by travellers whose names all the world knows. . . . The third lake, Tanganyika, is likewise there as the source and reservoir of the Zambesi, the Congo, and all that network of rivers of which our newspapers are talking so much."

Unfortunately this article aims at being eloquent rather than exact, which makes it hard to gather what precisely may be the actual value of the globe in face of modern science. Tanganyika, for instance, cannot possibly be the source and reservoir of *both* Zambesi and Congo, as no known lake is connected with more than one river system, and none, in fact, except an obscure Norwegian tarn, is known to have more than one outlet. For the same reason it is singularly unfortunate to talk of this lake as the source and reservoir of a network of streams; for setting aside the fact that no system of rivers can possibly form a network, a lake can be the source of one single thread only in a system of rivers. At the same time the globe is represented as depicting these various waters with very great detail, *avec leurs îles, leurs affluents et leurs dégorgeoirs*.

If it be indeed a fact that such a globe, well-nigh two centuries old, makes the Congo spring anywhere near Tanganyika, the fact is as unexpected as it is interesting and important. The commentary on Dr. Petermann's remarks which such a fact must afford requires no comment.





**SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE RECENT AFRICAN DISCOVERY.**

GREEN RIVER TO HERRING RIVER RECEIVED VARIOUS DISCOVERIES





### *Prussian Rationalism.*

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A GREAT deal has been heard recently of ecclesiastical events in Germany with reference to the Catholic Church, but comparatively few persons are cognizant of the steady disintegration of the various Protestant communities in that country. It may not be an uninteresting subject to notice some startling events that have recently attracted attention in Berlin in connection with an Association entitled the "Protestantenverein." Most people in this country are aware that the present State Church in Prussia is a fusion of the old Lutheran and Calvinist bodies, and that this fusion was brought about not many years ago by an order from the sovereign backed by the power of the military. Numerous dissident sects exist, but not to so great an extent as in England. Indifference in religious matters has always predominated, but within the last few years it has assumed such alarming proportions that it has attracted the notice of those in high quarters. The fact is at length beginning to disclose itself that those laws which were purposely framed in the year 1872 for the destruction of the Catholic Church in Germany have not accomplished their purpose, but that they will prove very prejudicial to Protestantism. The masses of the people addicted to rationalistic theories have a supreme contempt for the National Church and ignore its teaching. They disparage Christianity altogether, and are therefore anxious to attack it in its most vital quarters. Hence their acquiescence in all laws that are directed against the Church, but in their anxiety to attack Catholicism, they forgot that such action would curtail the liberty of the subject, and would eventually prove detrimental to themselves.

The question that principally affected the Protestant community in general and the "Association of the Protestantenverein" in particular was, whether Protestant Germans should be allowed to exercise the right of private judgment (a right popularly supposed to be the birthright of the Reformation), or whether they should be tied down and fettered by any

kind of dogmatic teaching. The *Protestantenverein*, specially founded to assert the wishes of a Protestant people to exercise their own opinions unmolested by King, Council, or pastor, took its rise in the Grand Duchy of Baden at the time when Liberalism had made a breach in the ancient Concordat. A preparatory reunion took place at Frankfort in the year 1863, at which about one hundred Liberal Protestants assisted and drew up a series of statutes, in which they proclaimed the desirability of mixed education.

It received a definite organization in 1865 at Eisenach (where nearly five hundred persons met together from all parts of Germany), and each succeeding year it showed progressive advance in rationalistic tendencies.

The real object of the association being to found a new religion suitable for educated men and based on a reformation of doctrine, it was considered necessary to make the edifice as large as possible, by granting free admission to all and by preaching an equality of rights. Vague as these aspirations might be thought, they produced a considerable stir.

The first paragraph of the statutes of the *Protestantenverein* is as follows: "A German Protestant association is constituted upon the basis of Evangelical Christianity amongst Protestants who believe that it is necessary to regenerate the Church by a greater amount of liberty and by putting her more in harmony with modern civilization." It is difficult to ascertain the precise meaning of this phraseology. The words "Evangelical Christianity" should be clear and definite, but they are not.

According to Dr. Schenkel the point at issue was the construction to be put upon the words Evangelical Christianity. Christianity is, presumably the religion taught by Jesus Christ. It recognizes and proclaims an historical Christ, sent by God into the world to teach mankind; but Christianity of this sort is not the doctrine of the *Protestantenverein*. At a meeting held at Neustadt the question as to an historical Christ was discussed and negatived. "We are not in a condition," says Dr. Holtzman, "to express an opinion upon the person and signification of an historical Christ." According to Dr. Schenkel questions of this sort are reserved for the future. The *Protestantenverein* does not recognize Jesus Christ either as the myth of Strauss or the romantic personage he is asserted to be by Renan, or the true Son of God, but they believe the future will disclose Him.

Meanwhile everything is uncertainty and doubt. According to Dr. Schenkel the doctrine that Christ is true God and true Man is a logical contradiction; and yet this doctrine has been always considered as a fundamental truth of Christianity. According to Dr. Schenkel again, the notion of Three Divine Persons is irreconcilable with that of one personal God, and yet the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is also a fundamental truth of Christianity. Such is the Christianity of the *Protestantenverein*. One learned member of the Society, Dr. Hanne, declares that the Bible is purely human in origin, and that it is full of human faults and weakness, although he admits that it is the most respectable document of the Divine revelation. Another member denies the authenticity of the Gospel of St. John, another the whole four Gospels as myths of the second century, and another the whole history of the Apostles and the writings of St. Paul.

The *Protestantenverein* has therefore as much claim to the name of evangelical as it has to that of Christian. The Association was started to assist the reform of the Church, and to carry out the undertaking in an evangelical spirit, but no one was to be hindered from interpreting Holy Writ exactly as he thought fit. To limit scientific research and the liberty of doctrine by dogma of any sort was considered objectionable as tending to wound the evangelical conscience. The reform was to be carried out according to modern civilization; people were to teach and preach what each individual thought fit, the sole bond of unity being that a war of extermination was decreed against Catholicism.

So much for theory: let us now examine some of their acts. The parish is the chief religious centre. Admission into the councils of the Church or into synods rests with the authorities of the parish. It is their business to decide whether the person who seeks admission is a Christian or not.

The fact that such and such a person does not believe, does not practise his belief, does not care for ecclesiastical marriage or the baptism of children, is immaterial; the secular element, being the most numerous, has the right to decide without appeal. Whether the laity believe or not, is not a matter for consideration. Equality before the law is the foundation of the constitution of the State. Equality of the human mind before God must be also the foundation of religious liberty. Such an organization as this, to be logical, should have as a corollary the suppression of

all ecclesiastical authority in the bosom of the national Churches. In each petty German State there formerly existed, and to a certain extent there still exists, a regular religious authority, "the sovereign." The sovereign was at the same time Temporal Head and Chief Bishop.<sup>1</sup> The *Protestantenverein* declares this state of things to be contrary to the rights, the honour, and the liberty of German Protestantism, and is desirous that every one should be completely unfettered in the domain of religious teaching. Mixed marriages are highly approved of, and civil marriage and secular education form part of its programme. Herr Hartmann, the philosopher of the "unbewussten," has criticised the work of the Association in the following terms: "The position taken by these Liberal Protestants places them outside the pale of the Christian religion."

Fourteen years of incessant activity on the part of the "*Protestantenverein*" have made it complete master of the country. It enfolds entire districts in its vast embrace, and produces in every direction unbelief and insubordination. Its members may be found in the Chairs of Theology, amongst the leading preachers, amongst the labouring classes, amongst tradesmen in the legislative body and amongst the Cabinet Ministers, and even amongst the courtiers in the palace. Like a vast net it spreads its meshes in every direction. The synods are formed of its flesh and blood, and the parishes which are invested with the right of electing the Chiefs of the Church are implicitly obedient to its orders. If a minister is taxed with being reactionary, *i.e.*, insisting on the truths of a revealed religion, the *Protestantenverein* comes to the front, puts forward as an assistant for him a man imbued with modern views, gets him elected at the first vacancy, and makes life unendurable for the original offender. In the year 1876 the Association counted one hundred and forty-seven local committees, without including the numerous bodies indirectly affiliated with the central body at Berlin. Periodical conferences take place, and the Society can now boast of six publications, which appear at Berlin, Bremen, Breslau, Heidelberg, Elberfeld, and Munich.

Its leading organ is the *Protestant Ecclesiastical Journal*, which is popularly supposed to be under the control of Dr. Falck. By means of this formidable organization, by this strong courting of publicity, and by influential patronage, the *Protestanten-*

<sup>1</sup> Of course this only applies to the various States where Protestantism was the established religion.

verein has been able to realize the astounding progress of which it at present boasts, and to implant everywhere, as well amongst the lowest as amongst the highest classes in the country, the symbol of a "new religion," suitable to the wants and inclinations of modern society, an incoherent mass of natural theology and philosophical scepticism calculated to sap to their very foundations the highest order of the supernatural. An important part has been recently played by the Protestantverein in the appointment of a new pastor for the Church of St. James in Berlin. For a great number of years this parish, under the superintendence of Herr Bachmann, had been regarded as a model of perfect orthodoxy. The *Tageblatt* of May 15, 1877, proved this fact by the following remarks: "For many years the preaching at St. James' has been narrow and intolerant."

The majority of the people, confident in the sentiments of justice on the part of the council, hoped that M. Disselhorff, senior curate, would be elected, since he held the same views as the late pastor of the church and had been twenty-two years in the parish. But the council being almost entirely in the hands of the Liberal Protestants, those who were invited to preach competitive sermons were almost all selected from the members of the Protestantverein. Amongst these latter was a Herr Horsbach, who, though heart and soul devoted to the rationalistic school, had never yet propounded anything very anti-Christian. In three of his sermons the electors felt their Christian convictions considerably wounded, but the fourth produced a climax. The preacher took for his text a passage from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians, and in the course of his sermon used the following words:

The Apostle, in view of the divisions and quarrels which were even then wounding the young church, vigorously exhorted the faithful to be united. In our day the same necessity exists. It is not doubtless a question of establishing unity with those who have broken off every connection with the Church and accepted the yoke of Materialism. The question is whether it may not be possible to unite by a common bond those various fragments who have remained faithful to the Church. Some firmly attached to tradition believe that God is not bound by the laws of nature, and can by His own will depart from them. Others, in altogether repelling inexorable destiny, whether in recognizing a personal and living God or the contrary, pretend that established order constitutes a barrier to Divine power. Some regard the Bible as the actual Word of God, and believe that every word and every letter

was written under Divine inspiration; others give to science the duty of piercing through the skin of the material text and extracting from it the revealed truth, since the Bible, written by fallible men, contains much that is erroneous, and it is a notorious fact that the Gospels abound in legends and stories of mythology. The former proclaim Christ the Son of God in the sense expounded by the Creeds, and would believe that they had lost their Saviour if the Creeds were modified. The latter, on the contrary, do not recognize Christ as the true Son of God, and do not seem as if they would even admit Him as a Saviour, although they consider Him as a true Man. The Liberal is in error when he thinks that he can taunt every one who is orthodox with being an ally or a courtier of Rome, and the orthodox person is wrong when he thinks he can denounce any one who disagrees with him on such questions as being almost an infidel. God is my witness that I would not deny my convictions, and therefore I openly confess that I belong without reserve to the modern form of theology, to that form of philosophy which is purely human.

During the course of this sermon it was evident that many persons were dissatisfied, and towards the close a few rose from their seats and left the church, an example which was soon followed by some hundred of the auditors.

On being questioned afterwards the preacher confessed that he did not believe that our Blessed Lord was born of a Virgin. The whole affair caused a great sensation in Berlin, and the *Tageblatt*, one of the leading papers, contained the following article upon it: "We regard the incident that has just taken place as a brutal provocation on the part of the orthodox party which proves what we have always stated, that to satisfy its passions it does not recoil even before the profanation of holy places." The *Kreuzzeitung* on the contrary wrote as follows: "We deplore bitterly the attempt that has been made by the denial of the most sacred dogma to excite the mind of the Evangelicals, and we trust the authorities will turn their attention to it."

The first official protest came from the Church of St. James. On the feast of Pentecost the deacon attached to this church, Herr Laacke, mounted the pulpit and preached on the ordination oath, the text of the creeds, the liturgy and the catechism. He insisted strongly on the point that any one who rejected the Holy Spirit as the third Person of the Trinity ought to abstain from celebrating the feast of Pentecost, and ought to tear from his book of devotions all passages that contained an invocation of the Holy Ghost. This sermon was popularly interpreted as



being intended to be an answer to that of M. Hossbach, and to have been delivered with a wish to influence the election which was about to take place. It had, however, but little effect. The election was held, and M. Hossbach was nominated by a large majority of votes, although both the old curates of the church were included in the number of those who sought to obtain the post.

The evening after the election the Berlin Pastoral Conference was held, the ruling spirit of which body is inclined to the orthodox party. In opening the meeting the president made a warm appeal to union, and strongly insisted on the necessity of holding erect the flag of the Evangelical faith, and regretted he had to announce the fact that M. Hossbach had been nominated to the parish of St. James.<sup>2</sup> This inoffensive meeting was the prelude, and perhaps even the pretext, of a more significant demonstration which took place soon after. On the 6th of June the ecclesiastical district of Berlin and Cologne opened its synod under the presidency of M. Noël, and in presence of the chief Superintendent General M. Bruchner. The meeting was composed conformably to its rules of clergy and laity, which included the various religious parties, although the members of the *Protestantenverein* were in a decided majority. The question of the Church of St. James gave occasion for a very exciting discussion which finished by completely crushing the voice of the Evangelical party. The report read by the president as to the moral and religious condition of the district disclosed facts full of significance; it proved an increasing diminution in the number of baptisms and of religious marriages. Out of 5,875 births there were no more than 3,064 baptisms; 2,813 children had probably therefore never been baptized at all, out of which number 985 had died. It proved that the falling away from the State Church assumed every day larger proportions, and that the Methodists and Irvingites had made immense numbers of proselytes, especially in the parishes of the Evangelicals.

It proved that this desertion of the State Church of Prussia was to be seen at other places as well as at Berlin. A few months ago one of the papers stated that the number of persons

<sup>2</sup> Since the above was written, the papers announce that the appointment of M. Hossbach to St. James' Church has been cancelled, but that he has been allowed to retain his position as minister of another Protestant church in Berlin. This clearly shows that no real objection was felt in high quarters to his doctrinal teaching.

at Saalfeld who were deserting the National Evangelical Church was on the increase, and that large bodies of the peasants left it to become Baptists, Methodists, Free Protestants, &c. At Bremenheim, a village near Worms, quite recently the whole of the populace abandoned the State Church, and enrolled themselves as "Frei Protestanten." Without any form or ceremony they took possession of the church in the place, and adapted it to their new form of worship. In this way the work of disintegration goes on throughout Prussia. A Protestant Government takes possession of Catholic Churches to hand them over to the sect of Dollingerites, and these very Protestants are in turn ousted from their buildings for some more extreme form of heresy and unbelief.

The day after the election to the parish of St. James, the parishioners addressed two protests, one to the royal consistory and the other to the superior ecclesiastical body. Meanwhile a conflict of a similar kind had been waged in another direction between M. Hegel and M. Hermann, and an appeal had been lodged to the Emperor William. A letter written by this latter seemingly based upon the distinctive teaching of Christianity and an approval of the Creeds was made use of by the orthodox party to silence their opponents, upon which fresh inquiries were instigated, and it was considered necessary by the Rationalists to appeal from "royalty ill-informed as to the subjects in dispute to royalty correctly informed."

However praiseworthy in both these cases the desire of the Emperor William may have been, there is no doubt of his inability to stem the current of popular opinion which runs in the direction of pure paganism. Of what importance is it whether peace reigns or not in the hierarchical administration, or whether the Creeds are, or are not, recited in the offices of the Church, if a theology of Rationalism is to supplant the theology of the Gospels, if the churches are to be invaded by unbelievers, and if Christ is to be dethroned from His rightful place as the centre and life of Christianity. The natural consequence must be that people will turn with disgust from a religion which, whilst it is professedly Christian, in reality retains nothing of Christianity but the name. Here, as in other countries, Protestantism must submit to the inexorable law of its origin. The work of man, it must be destroyed by man. Already in Prussia and Switzerland the grave is dug, the shroud is prepared, and the Protestant clergy will sooner or later be compelled to assist at



the funeral. But when this extraordinary scene shall have been witnessed, what will remain ; where will German society seek for safety ? Who will relight the extinct torch of faith ? Who will replace in the minds of the people the sentiments of Christianity originally introduced into the country in the twelfth century ? In order that we may not be accused of partiality, let us hear what a Protestant journal edited in Frankfort has to say on the subject—

The Protestant has the right of searching in Holy Writ that which his reason can discover there, and the parish has also its right, the right of not allowing anything to be taught which is incompatible with its idea of intellectual culture. When orthodoxy appeals to the Creeds and written confessions, and reprimands liberal pastors, when it invokes the magisterial decision of a national Pontiff-King, it is no longer Protestant but Catholic—*i.e., because tradition, duties of obligation, hierarchical administration, personal decision, &c., are all things that are Catholic, or belong to Catholics. . . .* Therefore, to prevent its dissolution Protestantism is compelled in defiance of its principles to proclaim and practise ideas that are genuinely Catholic. It is only a question of time for the orthodox Protestant party to return to the Catholic faith from which it has been already separated.

The *Vossische Zeitung* writes in a similar strain—

The final result must be that those Protestants who are called orthodox should follow the example of the English Puseyites and enter the bosom of the Catholic Church where alone they can find security.

Truly indeed do these papers bear witness to the desolate condition in which the Protestants of Germany who regard Christianity as indisputably true are placed. The only possible future before them is absorption into the one fold of Christ, if they do not wish to drift insensibly to the desert waste of paganism. Such is the outcome of the teaching of Martin Luther after the space of three hundred years.

H. B.

## *Some Remarks on the Argument from Design.*

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### PART THE FIRST.

IT is not without reason that I have entitled this paper, "Some Remarks on the Argument from Design," and not simply "The Argument from Design." That argument itself I have no intention to draw out fully in the form of a proof. I wish to take merely a broad view of its position, and here and there to intersperse observations about a few points in detail, as occasion shall suggest. This declaration of my purpose must serve as excuse for a certain amount of discursiveness. Indeed, I expect at the end of my labours to find that I have written a number of paragraphs, suited rather to be inserted as notes to some imaginary text, than to stand together as text by themselves.

To begin with, it is quite needful to lop off from the main body of the argument certain excrescences that have been allowed to grow around it, some to the weakening of its powers, some to the utter extinction of its life. Nor can it always be said of these baneful growths "an enemy has done this." Friends frequently—over-zealous friends—friends lacking prudence or wisdom, have done harm where they thought to do good. No doubt of it, especially as concerns ancient times, the direct interference of the Deity has been needlessly called in to account for phenomena, of which Nature is quite competent to give her own account. Men have often been too knowing about the use of everything, and of its exact purpose in the Divine plans. A few words, therefore, about some of the chief obstacles thus thrown in the path of our argument.

And first be it remarked that the Argument from Design does not, as many suppose, commit its upholders to the defence of the position, that every contrivance in creation is the best possible, or even perfect in that minor degree which excludes palpable shortcomings. If men, even of the calibre of Leibnitz, have taught optimism, they have done so at the cost of philosophic consistency. Not only is this world not

the most perfect that could be, but the very notion of such a world is a contradiction in the mouth of a man who believes in an all-powerful God. A finite effect can never exhaust an infinite cause. The attempt of infinite power to produce absolutely the best world producible is like the attempt to name the highest number. Mention what number you like, and a bystander will overtop it for you by no greater effort than the addition of a single unit. But not only is thorough-paced optimism no part of our requirements; we do not need to uphold even that mitigated form of optimism, which we may style Utopianism, in the common understanding of that term, which often seems to be accompanied by a lurking idea that the word is spelt Eutopianism. Even the king who made the irreverent remark that, had his counsels been called in at the creation of the world he could have suggested decided improvements, is not, for this alone and of necessity, shut out from among the supporters of the Argument from Design. It is, then, a deplorable mistake to imagine that theists look upon this universe as the adequate expression and measure of its Maker's power. Theists hold nothing of the sort. They allow that the Argument from Design gives, at least as its first conclusion, the existence not of an all-powerful, but of a very powerful, Being. Afterwards, this conclusion has to be pushed further. Such being the state of the case, we beg leave to decline, as indecisive of the point in controversy, discussions about things like the short-comings of the human eye. Helmholtz has said that if an optician were to send him an instrument as defective as man's eye, he would return the article to the maker as a piece of bad workmanship. If those who flout this remark in our faces<sup>1</sup> as an objection against creative design, happen to know an optician who can furnish them with a better pair of eyes than what they have got, by all means let them apply. But

<sup>1</sup> The poor eye is a constant subject of observation. There is a coolness of assertion in a remark of Professor Huxley's, especially when it is taken into account that what he says is hardly reconcilable with his own admissions in the same volume. His words are absolute: "The teleology which supposed that the eye of the higher vertebrate was made, with the precise structure it exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal to see, has received its death-blow." Another piece of scientific dogmatism is the confident prediction of a great future for the eye. It has developed so wonderfully, we are told, from the condition of a mere blind sac, that it is sure, in time, to overcome all its defects. The truth is, there is not an atom of proof that the eye will ever make the slightest advance on its present state. And as to its origin, was it weak-mindedness of Newton to say: "Was the eye contrived without skill in optics, and the ear without knowledge of sound?"

meantime, even in the triumph of their new acquisition, they will have to remember that God is not exactly their optician, obsequious to their orders, and that unless they can show valid reason why God was bound to give them eyes more perfect, they are raising no solid objection against the system they attack. No doubt God could have remedied the want of achromatism if He had thought proper, and that without waiting till men had invented achromatic lenses. But by what title is a wise and powerful God bound so to act, under pain of blurring and blotting out all evidence of Himself in his own works?

A second fallacy to be got rid of is the notion that we are obliged to show a most rigid, niggardly economy throughout the universe. Not a seed must be wasted, not a life produced beyond what the earth can support. The world must be built on the cheapest, utilitarian principles. Now in point of fact there does reign a manifest economy of materials and of forces throughout the machinery of our universe, so that mathematicians have been able to apply to not a few of Nature's workings their formula for what is styled "the law of parsimony," or "of least action." But waiving this, we can afford to allow that there is what may be called a prodigality in Nature's household. The fallacy is to judge the Framer of the world on principles borrowed, without adaptation, from the idea of some earthly builder who runs up his structures by contract. Not so was the universe fashioned. God's means are in a subordinate degree also His ends. He created not only for what we call use, but also for beauty. The *useful* is a very vague term, as political economists find out, or as some of them, to the detriment of their system, do *not* find out, when they come to lay down the dividing line between useful products and non-useful. But giving to the word *useful* its vulgar meaning, whereby it is distinguished from what is ornamental, we may say that the useful is not the sole end God proposes to Himself. Summer flowers are not ordained solely as a means to the reproduction of plants through the seed. The flower has its own end as truly as the seed has its end, and the plant again its end. God's work to Himself is not absolutely without purposes gained, even though

Full many a flower is born to blush unseen  
And waste its fragrance on the desert air.

Really, it is hard to conceive what sort of a world they would devise who are such sticklers for what may be called cosmic

economy. Then again, what might be prodigality in us need not straightway be prodigality in God. We often may incur the sin of prodigality because, where means are limited, our profusion is our neighbour's scarcity; or at any rate, we are acting as misbecomes those who are not supreme, independent masters of the things they use. But in God's regard these conditions are changed. Him it may even become to be somewhat lavish in the expenditure of materials, as it becomes a king not to spare every dispensable square inch in the amplitude of his robes.

So much even adversaries may, perhaps easily, be brought to allow. But a graver difficulty, which we will call the third, remains behind, one which seems to have struck J. S. Mill so forcibly, and to which special prominence has been given lately by the special attention called to it on the part of the Darwinian theory. How defend the wide prevalence of struggle witnessed throughout the course of nature. There is an aspect from which nature may seem a great battlefield, on which existence can be maintained only by the ruthless destruction of other existences. In the first place answer may be made that, if the above is one aspect of nature, it is not the only, still less the main, aspect. To say simply that nature is at strife with herself, is, as the general statement of the case, very unfair. If called upon to pronounce nature unqualifiedly, a harmony or a discord, every honest mind must embrace the former term as the truer. The remark of a German critic on this head is just: "If," he says, "the representation of the struggle for life, as the fundamental character of the organic world, is really Darwin's discovery, this is a very low, one-sided view of the case, and utterly unworthy of a great naturalist." But still there is left the difficulty, that the world is not a pure harmony but, at best, a *concordia discors*. This objection does nothing less than open out the whole question on the origin of evil. On a subject so vast it is impossible, and indeed out of place, to enter now. It will be enough to map out some rough sketch of a road that may be followed by one who is searching, amid the orderly phenomena of nature, for the cause of this "reign of law." At the same time be it well kept in mind that, as to the justifiableness of many of the steps proposed, their legality will come under discussion hereafter, not here. Indeed to them the rest of this paper will mainly relate. At present I am merely outlining a route, with the one sole object of suggesting

a possible way of getting to the other side of the obstacle raised by the admixture of evil with good in the plan of the universe. The practicability of the route itself in other respects is not yet in question. Before setting out, the investigator must know that no competent apologist of theism tries to make believe, that he knows, in detail, the justifying purpose God has in view in the permission of each individual evil. Such pretended acquaintance with the Creator's counsels would be downright presumption. The solution of the problem, if found, must be a solution on general principles; it must be on the assured ground that the King of kings literally "can do no evil." This premised, the first step in the onward direction is to get on the favourable side for looking at things; to realize generously all the good that there is in the universe. Incontrovertibly, if this world is any one's handiwork, it is a work, as we say, for the author to be proud of. Reader, if the work were yours, would you be ashamed to own it? Would you fear the charge of being wanting either in goodness or else in power? No, no! I think your character would stand at least as high then as it does now.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the amount of evil in the world, good certainly predominates. It is cosmos rather than chaos. Leave aside the evil, then, for the present, and try to track out the source whence so much good has flown. Several considerations counsel this procedure; among others the fact that good, if not self-existent, must have a cause; but evil may have no other than a negative origin—defective action somewhere or other. It may be well for an army to know where provisions come from, when it will be quite a useless inquiry to ask where starvation comes from. Does then the harmony of the universe, so far as it is a harmony and when it is taken all in all, point to the existence first of *contrivance*; next of an *intelligent contriver*, whose presence is certainly inferrible wherever their is contrivance properly so called; and lastly of a *single* intelligent contriver? Is there evidenced purpose enough, is there evidenced unity of purpose enough, to bear out such a conclusion? If so, some of the contriver's attributes start to light at once.<sup>3</sup> Clearly he is wise and powerful—wiser and more

<sup>2</sup> At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the very fact of God's absolute nature, which makes Him His own master, His own centre, His own end in all respects, prevents anything like a complete parallel between the morality of the Creator and the morality of the creature.

<sup>3</sup> It ought to be borne in mind that the primary use of the Argument from Design is to give spontaneously to the mind a general notion of God, not to prove rigorously the exact nature of God.



powerful than the greatest of men. He is a Being at least in some respects very perfect. Can, then, one who is so superhumanly perfect be at the same time so inhumanly wicked that by some strange antinomy in his nature he is almost as intensely malevolent as he is powerful? Of our fellow-mortals when we know individuals to be in some things exceedingly good to us, we are slow to draw the conclusion that they are at the same time acting with excessive cruelty towards us, even though appearances be against a favourable construction of their conduct. As long as there are obvious possible excuses, by them we hold; if there are only dubious excuses, even at them we catch; nay, we are even willing to believe excuses where no faint shadow of an excuse is cast before our eyes. And herein we are not unreasonable. Now if the Ruler of the Universe is manifestly good to us, we require strong proof, very strong proof, before we can credit that he is to us wantonly cruel likewise. Moreover, induction goes to show that some consistency of nature is a condition of a thing's existing at all. We cannot believe in the possibility of a man, who is at once extremely virtuous and extremely vicious, and that too concerning precisely the same specific objects. If a novelist were to take the worst features of the misanthropist Nero, and the best features of the philanthropist Howard, and attribute both to a gentleman called Nero Howard, the critics would cry, preposterous! There may be anomalies of character; there may be characters in part good and in part bad; but there is a limit to the composition of conflicting elements, to the meeting of extremes.

But, perhaps, it is not the good will, but the power that is wanting to the Author of the Universe. At any rate we have no sufficient reason for the assertion that his power is limited by the effects we see. On the contrary, there is a *prima facie* presumption that he who has done so much could do more. Certainly there would be something unaccountable in a Supreme Being who could put in order just precisely the present amount of orderly materials, and just precisely to the extent to which order now prevails, but could go no further. What should we say of one who was described to us as able to construct exactly four flies, three dogs, two horses, and a single man, but utterly unable to produce another organism, or to make any improvement upon what he had actually produced? Our remark would be, a marvellously arbitrary

limitation of power! Considerations such as these may give us a presumption that the Governor of the world has not stopped short exactly at the bounding lines of his absolute capabilities; and the presumption thus started may be pushed onward to the point of conviction by a searching analysis of what is entailed in the very essence of a great, primal, uncaused cause of all the order we see around us. So much I suggest by way of outline, fully conscious how many details remain to be filled in before the whole is complete. It is enough if the negative has been established, that the imperfect order of the universe is not such as to be proof conclusive of the want either of will or of power on the part of its Ordainer. And if we further admit the notion that this world may not be a final state<sup>4</sup> but a state of transition and trial, the imperfections of nature become still less valid as objections against an all-perfect Ruler. For any one who will open his eyes to see, a flood of light is shed on the whole difficulty by the words of St. Paul: "I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed to us. For the expectation of creatures waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God." The Apostle personifies all nature; he represents her as watching with outstretched neck (*ἀποκαρδοκία*) for the great day of manifestation, when God's faithful children shall be proclaimed inheritors of the good things in store for them. "The creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him that made it subject in hope. For the creation itself shall likewise be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the sons of God." That is, the whole world is now subject, "not willingly," to vicissitude, to decay, to the bondage of serving man's needs; but its deliverance also, along with that of men, is being worked out; it too shall share in the triumph of the resurrection, when there shall be a new earth and a new heaven. Meantime till the day of deliverance, "every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain. And not only it, but ourselves also who have the first fruits of the

<sup>4</sup> I leave out all mention of the Fall, because although *de facto* we are subject to our present miseries only on account of sin, and not because of God's original ordination, yet it is a divinely certain truth that we might have been created in the condition in which we now are, with this sole exception that then our state would have been free from the imputation of an hereditary taint. It is a pity to hear Christians talk as though the present order of providence were wholly unjustifiable except on the score of Adam's sin.



Spirit, we groan within ourselves waiting for the adoption of the sons of God, the redemption of our body. For we are saved by hope; but hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, how doth he hope for it?"<sup>5</sup>

We are not out of the preliminaries yet. A fourth stone of stumbling to be moved out of the way before the path is clear is the assumption, that people taking up our position ought to be able to show the purpose of everything in creation. Some few years ago, a prominent occasion was seized to make an attack on teleology from the fact, that a certain part of the intestinal canal, called the vermiform process, has baffled the skill of physiologists to find out any use that it serves, while it has been found to be a source of undoubted danger. The conclusion drawn was that, were the human frame the work of an intelligent Designer, he would not have cumbered our bodies with something that does no good and may do serious harm. It is an obvious and sufficient answer to say, that it does not follow no purpose is served, because none has been discovered. If a man is to be allowed to keep no organs but those of which physiology can assign with certainty the exact functions, human life would be simplified away pretty effectually. But even if the worst came to the worst, and it could be shown that an organism would be the better for the omission of one of its parts, even then the enemy would not be altogether master of the field. As it is, however, there is no fear of things coming to this pass. He is a very presumptuous or a very ignorant man, who will take upon him to say, that any part of the animal frame is absolutely without a purpose. If an opponent wishes to prove only that an organism is capable of higher perfection, we grant him that much without proof; but at the same time, he must excuse our caution in believing his suggested improvements to be always real improvements. And thus much must suffice on a point, in raising which I fear the charge of setting up a straw-man only to knock him down. Such is not my case. The instance I have adduced is a type of objections, not a few, made against the position which I am trying to do something to defend.

Fifthly and lastly on the list of preliminaries I place a short paragraph to deprecate, as at least waste of time, certain forms of minutiae-pressing or of hypercriticism, which only distract the mind from the main issue. Instances of what I mean cannot

<sup>5</sup> Rom. viii. 18.

well be grouped under a single class, but an example will bring out, more or less, the general idea. Nearly all substances in passing from a liquid to a solid state become heavier, volume for volume, than they were in their previous condition. If water followed the usual law, ice, as fast as formed, would sink below the surface, and so whole masses of water would become large blocks of ice,—vaster than the summer sun could thaw. In consequence our climate would grow colder and colder, and we should be exposed to more inconveniences than it is pleasant to contemplate, not to say endure. Hence some have seen in this uncommon property of water a token of beneficent design. Professor Tyndall's rejoinder is, that the property is not strictly unique; bismuth, for instance, shows the same phenomenon. Of course, this is not an altogether pointless answer; it would avail something against a person who had asserted, that water formed absolutely a single exception to a rule otherwise universal. But still it leaves the Argument from Design substantially what it was before. When some particular object *de facto* is gained, it matters little in the evidence for contrivance, whether the object be gained by the use of one out of three or four substances not conforming to the ordinary law of the class to which they belong, or whether it is gained by the use of some substance that is simply alone in its exceptional character.<sup>6</sup> Besides, the whole question soon gets sunk beneath a weight of details and becomes one of those not directly vital points which may be raised in unlimited numbers; which tend rather to hamper the discussion than to bring it to a decisive issue, and which, therefore, had better be set aside in favour of some less intricate method of inquiry.

And now as to the argument itself drawn from the evidences of design in the world. The extrinsic grounds for allowing its cogency may claim to come first under consideration. By extrinsic grounds, as distinguished from the intrinsic force of the reasoning estimated simply as a piece of reasoning, I mean the grounds of authority—of an authority such that, however odious the name, no one can decry it as a mere engine of tyranny for extorting blind assent. The judgments of men best qualified to represent the intelligence of their kind have a right to a

<sup>6</sup> I have tried to use words that do not assume the very thing to be proved. But, as the Duke of Argyll well points out, it is simply impossible to describe natural phenomena without the use of teleological language, which accordingly anti-teleologists use wholesale, and without scruple. Terms suiting their ideas have yet to be invented.

hearing in any debated question. Making the appeal, then, to the consensus of mankind, we may assert fearlessly that if the Argument from Design is a fallacy, it is an instance of a detected error of universal reason standing alone in the history of earth's rational inhabitants. For the case is one where the mind had no excuse for judging amiss. It is a matter in which the intellects of antiquity had as good means of finding out the truth as we have. They may have been at a disadvantage as to questions like the geocentric conception of the universe, and as to several other questions of physical science; but as to the question whether this orderly creation gives testimony to its Creator, in all essential points, the men of old were as able to pronounce as we are. The problem is one of pure reason; and in the investigations of pure reason the intellect of man may gain a few accidental advantages in the course of ages, but substantial progress in perceptive power it makes none. Modern materialism has added a little to the number of guises it can put on; it has gained a little in system or coherence; but the vital force of materialism is neither more nor less than it was two thousand years ago. In the last analysis it is always the same old principles which the theist affirms and the atheist denies, either party affirming or denying for substantially the same reasons now as of old. And as concerns the Argument from Design, I hope to show later that what modern discovery has done, at the most, is this: in certain cases it has thrown the starting-point of the argument one step back from what was deemed the old point of departure. The stage at which the action of the first cause was supposed to stop, in some instances, has been found pushed forward a little too far; while the reasons for believing in such action at an earlier stage remain as strong as ever. The case is of this sort. A person hearing an organ play inferred the action of an intelligent player. Later on he discovered that the organ was an automaton. His first conclusion was not radically wrong. Pretty much the same was the change wrought on the Argument from Design, for instance, by Newton's discovery that our solar system was an automaton. Some of the weaker brethren took alarm at his announcements and began to cry Atheist. But the great, God-reverencing man himself was not a whit shaken in his creed; on the contrary, his convictions as to the Deity, were intensified. He says, "*Deum cognoscimus . . . per sapientissimas et optimas rerum structuras et causas finales. . . . Et hæc de Deo, de quo*

utique ex phenomenis discere ad philosophiam naturalem pertinēt."

And now having vindicated for past ages a right to a hearing, I return to their testimony as to the validity of the Argument from Design. It is needless to attempt a representative list of great names that have lent their support. The enumeration would embrace the ablest spokesmen of every tribe and nation and tongue. The Deists of the last century, with Voltaire and Diderot at their head, are as strong in their declarations as the reputed father of modern philosophy when he declares, that he "would sooner believe all the fables of the Talmud than that the universal frame is without a mind." "Is it not," says Bayle, "the most inconceivable of all inconceivable things, to assert that a nature which feels nothing, which knows nothing, yet of itself conforms perfectly to eternal laws; that it has an activity which never goes beyond due bounds, and that out of all the powers with which it is endowed, there are none which do not discharge their functions with the completest regularity. Can we imagine laws that have not been established by an intelligent cause? laws regularly put into operation by one who knows nothing of them and did not introduce them into the world? Here, metaphysically speaking, you come across the weakest point in atheism. The objection cannot be got over." So far the rationalist; and if I end by adding to his name the name of the great Napoléon as a witness in the same behalf, it is not because Napoleon was a rationalist, but because his reasoning power was of a calibre sufficient to carry weight with it, while he himself can hardly be thought a man likely to have spoken as the timid slave of authority. Indeed, against none of the few men whose evidence I have called in, can the charge be brought that they were not men likely to take—their own view of things, and to take it vigorously.

The question of authority must not be left without a word as to the teaching of Scripture and the Fathers. Both witnesses uphold the Argument from Design; to what extent I will say presently. As an example, in the thirteenth chapter of the Book of Wisdom atheists are severely rebuked, because from his works they do not recognize the Artificer, and because from created beauty they do not rise to the knowledge of uncreated beauty. The Fathers are too copious and explicit to need quotation. As a single sample we have St. Chrysostom declaring that "the universal harmony of things cries with a voice

clearer than any trumpet;" and that "all things are arranged in an abiding order, which proclaims the greatness and the beauty of the Creator." The sum of the teaching of revelation is, that upon every intelligent creature, honestly using the faculties God has given him, the order of the universe urges the conclusion that there is some wise, powerful, governing Being, whose work this world is. Such is the verdict of spontaneous, unprejudiced nature. The mind may indeed sophisticate itself so as to mistrust its own rational instincts, just as it may sophisticate itself into a thousand doubts, as, for example whether the tree, under the woodman's axe, feels the blows—feels them after some fashion, if not as we feel. True, the tree has no nervous system; but what do we know of nerve-matter to make its presence the test of sensation? Besides, there may be nerve-matter beyond the microscopic limit. Then again, the lowest animals seem to be without nerves; and who shall say for certain—for certain, remember—for dead certain, beyond possibility of misgiving, that these protozoa do not feel? Therefore, "O Woodman, spare the tree!" O man, spare the common sense of your own species! Against scepticism the Argument from Design is not proof. But give it all reasonable allowances, and it is God's revealed teaching that it is enough for honest conviction. Not that in strict philosophy the argument must be all-sufficing in itself, so that it need not call in for its completion other arguments, or cannot be driven back on principles more primitive than its own immediate ground-work. This point should be carefully noted. Neither Scripture nor the Fathers speak of the philosophical analysis of arguments. They simply assert that the order of the universe bears in conclusively, upon any man using all his faculties aright, the general conviction that there is a God. Compare the argument from conscience. This argument presupposes or implies a confused knowledge of God. It cannot validly be founded on conscience regarded as the dictate of pure reason or on Kant's "categorical imperative." Not unsimilarly the argument of which we now treat. It certainly involves notions which, in strict philosophy, may be analyzed back into truths more primitive. But it calls for no previous admissions which the human mind ought not in fairness readily to make. Last analyses are not necessarily taken into account in the spontaneous, practical judgments of the mass of mankind. How many loyal subjects of our Queen push to its last analysis their belief in the duty of obedience?

How many could give a philosophic basis for their obligation? Yet who will say that for such as these no obligation exists?

The Argument from Design, then, is valid as giving obvious spontaneous conviction to the bulk of our kind, brought up according to the ordinary scheme of God's providence. If carried to its last analysis—and it is quite able to stand the test—the argument may certainly be resolved into the most primitive metaphysical principles.<sup>7</sup> But this hunting down to earth, though possible, permissible, and even praiseworthy as a mental exercise, is not needful for practical purposes. The natural outfit of the mind will at once supply what is requisite, without having to go back to examine the most fundamental of the principles on which it judges of truth. Again, what the spontaneous conviction of the mind leads to, is not God known according to that more perfect knowledge which is given by further and more subtle analysis, but God known according to a broad presentment of him as Lord of the Universe, which is a vastly different thing from God regarded as the Unknowable.

The question of authority having been touched upon, there is left for our consideration the intrinsic worth of the Argument from Design. It is contended that, just as in the various human works that meet our eye, whenever we see a clear case of the adaptation of means to ends we infer an intelligent workman; so from the contrivance visible throughout the universe we have a right to infer an intelligent Artificer. The stock example, familiar to teleologist and anti-teleologist, is that of a watch, on examining which, it is urged, every reasoning man, whether he found out the use of the mechanism or not, would unhesitatingly pronounce that it had a contriver. Against the force of this example Hume objected that we had experience of the making of watches, and therefore had a right, in their case, to draw our inference; but that we had never seen anything like the construction of a world, and hence could have no right to argue as if we had. Since the days of Hume this objection has been much improved: a great deal of its crudeness has been got rid of, whilst whatever force was in it has been brought out to the full. Much toil has been spent on the endeavour to establish the law of empiricism—that our conclusions cannot

<sup>7</sup> By this process the Argument from Design may easily be driven back upon the argument for a First Cause. As to ultimate principles, it is one thing not explicitly to mention them, another to renounce their aid in express words. Those English writers who say that not the existence of matter, but only the order found in matter, proves anything, commit argumentative suicide.



lawfully transcend the order of experience. This principle, pushed to its logical limit, would be the death-blow to all science. It would reduce us to the position of mere recorders of sequences and co-existences. We could claim only to catalogue bygone and present facts, with some power of conjecturing the future. To save us from such intellectual destruction the law of the Uniformity of Nature has been postulated. This postulate, according to Dr. Bain, is "the ultimate major premiss of all induction." "We can give no reason," he adds, "no evidence for this uniformity, and consequently the course seems to be to adopt this as the finishing postulate." Unfortunately for the theory it is meant to bolster up, the very assumption, as an assumption, is purchased at a greater sacrifice of philosophic continuity in the chain of reasoning, than if at the outset we were allowed to push our knowledge beyond the bare facts of experience into the region of universal propositions. But this is breaking ground in a field too vast for present exploration. In a paper which is busied merely with reviewing the general position of the Argument from Design, it would be too great a distraction from the main subject to let the mind wander off into a long disquisition on the untenableness of empiricism, and on the weakness of the crutches, at which it here and there grasps convulsively, in order to stay its tottering steps, which, all aids notwithstanding, do not succeed in making much progress. The refutation of this error lies in the establishment of man's power to rise from experience above experience, up to the knowledge of necessary, universal truths, and to recognize these as necessary and universal. The subject has of late years been treated in the *Dublin Review* sufficiently at large, and sufficiently beyond controversion, as those have shown who have attempted a rejoinder.

Nevertheless, space may be found here for a few words about a popular statement of the difficulty there is in getting outside the realm of experience. Professor Huxley tells an apologue about a certain death-watch shut up within a clock. The death-watch must needs set to work speculating about the final cause of the mechanism laid open to its view. Its conclusion is that the clock was made to tick. Moral: Men shut up in a world of sense should not pretend to know anything outside of their own narrow encasement. Now, as the Professor's death-watch is set up as a type of the human intellect, it must be supposed to have faculties corresponding in range with those of the human intel-

lect. It is unfair to set up a lower standard as a test of a higher. It is foolish to judge rational men by gross, palpable blunders, invented specially for the occasion, and attributed to some half-witted creature of Professor Huxley's own devising. If the death-watch in the clock is to tell us anything about man in this world, we must argue about it as about a man put in the same position with the death-watch. Moreover, the man must be allowed to reason according to the full power of human reasoning. He must not be made to draw conclusions which no man of average intelligence would draw. What, then, would a clock-encased man say if, ejecting the death-watch as no fit representative, he were to speak for himself? He would say that he had no right to infer that the clock was made to tick, unless he could show two things: first, he must satisfy himself that ticking was an object, either desirable in itself—for its musical value perhaps!—or else desirable as a means to some end, for example, to beat seconds to an astronomer taking the transit of a star. And secondly, he must find out that ticking is not only desirable, but is precisely the thing desired in the individual instance. The death-watch neglecting these two points of inquiry, loses all claim to stand as a type of a rational man; it shows us only an instance of how illogically conclusions can be jumped at, to illustrate which process Mr. Huxley need not have borrowed an example of any death-watch. If he wished to do anything to his purpose, it was his business, not to frame examples which assumed everything and proved nothing, but manfully to meet the arguments of teleologists.<sup>7</sup> He would find, on examination, that his opponents do not argue as he pretends. They are most careful to give their reasons why they say God made the world; why they say He made it for such and such a purpose; why this purpose must be so and so, and cannot be anything else. With no sort of fairness, then, can their mode of argumentation be parodied by that of a death-watch, which concluded a clock was made to tick, simply for lack of any other final cause to assign. Amid all the resources of clap-trap, none is more effectual than this appeal to inapt comparisons. Hence its constant use. It might well advertise, "The largest

<sup>7</sup> Mr. Huxley's conclusion follows rigorously from his own doctrine, but is very abhorrent to Christian ideas. He says that there seems no reply "to the not irrational question, why trouble oneself about matters which are out of our reach, when the working of the mechanism itself, which is of infinite practical importance, affords scope for all our energies."

circulation in the world." Popular audiences see the absurdity brought out by the illustration ; but what they do not see is, that the illustration sheds no light on the case it is supposed to make clear. And so the masses are gulled, and gulled most mischievously, by those who ought to know better. Not that there is any wish to imply that Professor Huxley did not believe his own argument : but he might have seen reason for disbelieving it.

The alleged self-evolving power of the universe, in the bearings of this hypothesis on the argument from design, comes next under consideration. But the discussion of so wide a subject must be kept over for a second paper.

J. R.

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*On the Accession of Leo XIII.*

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EPIGRAM AFTER S. MALACHI.  
—

THROUGH the Cross on Cross of Pius,  
As through Mary's Dolours Seven,  
Lo ! from Death what Life emerges,  
Joy from Anguish, Light from Heaven !

C. K.

## Alfred the Great.

### PART THE SIXTH.

IN the partition of his revenues Alfred makes provision, though not by name, for other monasteries besides those of Athelney and Shaftesbury. It is likely that his example proved contagious, and that it was without loss of time followed up by Ethelred in Mercia and by wealthy Thegns in Wessex. His good queen, Alswitha, who died soon after him,<sup>1</sup> founded a convent at Winchester, dedicated to our Lady, and in its hallowed shelter spent her brief term of widowhood and closed her eyes in peace. It may be presumed that this *Abbey of Saint Mary*, or Nunnaminster, as it was sometimes called, was erected by Alswitha at her own expense, for the nuns of Shaftesbury seemed to assert a more special claim to the King's paternal care than their sisters of Winchester. Alfred's granddaughter, Saint Eadburga, also died at Winchester, but her sacred relics, entire or in part, were afterwards translated to Pershore.<sup>2</sup> Plegmund solemnized the opening (*enceniavit*) of a high tower lately raised "in honour of the Mother of God, Mary," in the city of Winchester, probably forming part of the Convent.<sup>3</sup> When once the King had given a fresh start to the craving for knowledge, and had made the idea of religious life familiar to the minds of men, each year would add strength to the movement. Learning creates learning; works of piety lead to vocations, and with the demand for houses of study and prayer the supply keeps pace. Sorrow for many wasted years often, when life is closing in, takes the shape of a desire to procure a vicarious service of God. The dying man is anxious to promote in others that practice of virtue which he himself has so long neglected. There have been, no doubt, cases of unwarrantable

<sup>1</sup> The date is variously given. Hoveden, 903; *Annals of Winchcombe*, 905; *Register of Hyde*, 909; *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, 903 and 905, both occurring in the same MS.

<sup>2</sup> Dugdale's *Monasticon*, vol. ii. p. 410.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 451.

interference, but if particular instances be set aside, it is not to the avarice of priests and monks, who wring from tortured consciences in the dread hour of approaching death rich offerings to the House of God, that the English Church owed the great wealth which once was hers. The free impulse of Catholic faith is cause enough. One who believes in Heaven and Hell, waiting for his summons to the judgment-seat, hardly needs to be told to redeem his sins with alms.

The preliminaries had now been attended to. The kingdom was prepared for defence. The cause of education was made over to competent champions.<sup>4</sup> The worship of God was restored to its place of dignity in the land. From the care of gathering learned men together and endowing sanctuaries, Alfred turned the full power of his intensely practical and methodical genius to the consideration of the various measures to be adopted for the improvement of the social condition of his people. Property and life were insecure, the roads and forests were infested by robbers; delinquents easily escaped, and honest men if poor could not find redress. All this must be changed. But as before the King began with himself. Good order must reign in his own household, and his own daily life must be subjected to severe control before he made laws for the good ordering of his kingdom. His own revenues must be administered with the most rigid fidelity as money held in trust from God, before he called upon others to be true to their engagements. Like the king too good for earth, whom St. Ignatius puts before us in his parable of the Kingdom of Christ, Alfred was always ready to do more than he made others do.

The more he meditated on the work that lay before him, the more it must have grown beneath his gaze, opening out on every side large fields of peaceful enterprize, till he might well feel that even a long life would not enable him to accomplish his designs. He could not promise himself a long life counted in years, but, if he never wasted a moment, he could put a lifetime of hard work into every year he had to live.<sup>5</sup> This, then, it would seem, he resolved to do. A

<sup>4</sup> "*Gratiæ Deo omnipotenti sint quod nunc tandem aliqui in sede sint qui docere queunt*" (Alfred's Preface to his translation of the Pastoral of St. Gregory. Wise's edition of Asser).

<sup>5</sup> "*Consummatus in brevi explevit tempora multa*" (Sap. iv. 13). *Tempus instantè operando redimentes in æternam ingredi requiem festinemus*" (Oratio Eccles. in festo S. Stanislai).

keen appreciation of the value of time, the avarice of saints, is most marked in men who are employed in works of supernatural charity. To them each moment has an eternal value, for their ears are attentive to the chiming of a ghostly clock which others cannot hear. Alfred was working as a Christian King for the true welfare of his subjects, and the salvation of innumerable souls depended upon the use which he made of his opportunities. To the common crowd it might be vigilance enough to keep in mind the larger divisions of the day, by reference to the position of the sun, or the increase and diminution of light. Alfred could not be content with this. The minutes were registered by angels then as carefully as now for better for worse, but watchmakers were yet unborn. Even sun-dials were curiosities of science, and water-clocks had not been seen north of the Alps. Alfred, perhaps, had never heard of either the one or the other. A thousand years ago an English king was stopped at the outset of his grand reforms for want of some simple way of measuring time. Every villager within hail of a church steeple can tell the hour more accurately now than Alfred helped by all his learned men in the days of which we speak. Necessity is the mother of invention. It occurred to Alfred that a lighted candle goes on steadily burning inch by inch till it burns itself away, and he knew of no reason in the nature of things why, with impartial treatment, one inch of wax should not occupy as much time in melting as another. Asser shall relate the course of this useful meditation.

"These things, then, having been duly regulated by the said King, mindful of that sentence of Holy Writ, 'He that would give an alms ought to begin from himself,' he considered carefully what service of mind and body he might render to God, for he was desirous to make to God an offering of no less moment in this sort than in external goods. Indeed, he bound himself by a solemn promise to devote to God one half of his service in mind and body, by day and night, with full consent and with all his strength as far as his limited power permitted; but because he could never apportion the hours of the night by reason of the darkness, and very frequently was unable to divide even the day-time accurately in rainy weather or when the sky was overclouded, he tried to devise some certain method whereby, relying on the mercy of God, he might be able without any hindrance to keep till death unchangeably the tenor of his vow.



"After he had pondered the thing for some time he chanced at length upon a happy thought, and forthwith bade his chaplains bring unto him a quantity of wax. They brought it. Then he directed them to weigh it carefully against a number of pennies, and when it reached the weight of seventy-two pennies he told them to make it into six candles of precisely equal weight, marked off into twelve inches of length. The six candles so fashioned burned without intermission through twenty-four hours for a day and night before the sacred relics of many saints of God which he had with him always everywhere. It happened, however, now and again that the candles did not last through the whole day and night till the hour came round again at which they had been lighted the evening before, because they were compelled to burn more quickly and to finish their course before the appointed time by the violence of the wind which sometimes blew all day and night through the windows and doors of the churches, and through the stonework and the boarding, or through many chinks and crevices where the walls were thin, and through the feeble shelter of tent coverings. He therefore sought some means by which to exclude the current of air, and having thought of an ingenious expedient he caused a lantern to be made of wood and horn skilfully adjusted, for white horn scraped very thin is as transparent as glass. This lantern, then, as we have said, was wonderfully made in wood and horn, and a candle placed in it by night shone unmolested by the wind with undiminished light, for by his orders even the moveable piece at the side of the lantern was made of horn. With the help of this clever contrivance six candles, lighted one after another, continued burning at the same rate without interruption for twenty-four hours, and when these were all finished another set succeeded."<sup>6</sup>

Having thus disposed of a really great difficulty, Alfred

<sup>6</sup> *Asser, prope finem.* Unless it is to be supposed that these inclosures of stone and wood and textile fabric, so uncomfortably pervious to the winds of heaven, were all component parts of the same edifice, and that the plural, *ecclesiarum*, is employed only to make the remark less definite in its local application, there is in this passage one more proof of the constant change of royal residence. In the interval, probably not very long, between the first "happy thought" of the candle-clock and its ultimate encasing in translucent horn, the King had subjected his invention to rude experiment in more than one church and in dwelling-houses of divers degrees of solidity from a palace to a tent. But in the church and in Alfred's own room the candles not only marked time and gave light, but bore witness besides to an English King's deep Catholic reverence for the relics of saints.

proceeded to systematize his work. Half his time he dedicated to the service of God, and he did so because, as it is expressly said, he knew from Scripture that God makes a generous return to His servants, and because he wished to outdo his predecessors. By comparing his division of time with his similar division of income, we shall find that the hours devoted to God in this more special way might be employed in any occupation connected with the honour of the spouse of Christ, at home and abroad, or the relief of Christ's poor, without respect of nationality.

Yet, while he thus counted works of charity among his sacred duties, he gave no scanty portion of his day to the direct worship of God. Every day, when his infirmities permitted it, he was present at the Adorable Sacrifice. His good brother Ethelred at Ashdown had taught him a lesson in this regard which he remembered to his dying day. He had been remarkable even from his boyhood for his assiduity in prayer, and, as life went forward to eternity, a pious solicitude to secure the guidance and blessing of Heaven upon his responsible labours gained more complete possession of his mind. His biographer says he did not confine himself within the limits of the time which formed the matter of his vow, but that he endeavoured to extend the consecrated portion of the day, as far as his ailments and the necessities of his position left him free.<sup>7</sup> The account of his employment of time is henceforth necessarily merged in the history of his life.

It would seem from the words used by Asser (*spondit, votum, devoverat*) that Alfred really made a vow to consecrate half his time to God. If he reserved the right to dispose of the other half, this does not mean that he acknowledged no further responsibility. Even the unconsecrated half of his day was destined to be employed, though less immediately, in good works done for God. A third of his time<sup>8</sup> he spent in sleep and refreshment, and all the rest, whether consecrated by vow or not, he wished to spend usefully.

After the solemn consecration of half his time Alfred proceeded to the solemn consecration of half his wealth.

"Moreover moved by pious meditation he promised to give to God with devotion and fidelity, making the offering with his

<sup>7</sup> "*His ita ordinabiliter per omnia digestis, dimidiam, sicut Deo devoverat, servitii sui partem custodire cupiens: et eo amplius augere, in quantum possibilitas, aut suppetentia, immo etiam infirmitas permitteret*" (Asser).

<sup>8</sup> William of Malmesbury.

whole heart, the half of all yearly revenues obtained without injustice or oppression ; and as far as human discernment avails for good guidance and dutiful observance, he strove to fulfil his promise accurately and prudently. But in order to obey with his usual exactness the injunction contained in another passage of Holy Writ: 'If thou offerest aright, but dost not divide aright, thou sinnest;' he considered how he might make a meet division of that which he had freely consecrated to God ; and, as Solomon saith: 'The King's heart is in the hand of the Lord,' signifying thereby the King's purpose, he formed his purpose by Divine inspiration, and commanded his ministers in the first instance to divide into two equal parts his yearly income from whatever source derived."

One of these parts was destined to promote the worship of God and the spiritual welfare of the people, the other was to be at the service of the King for all temporal concerns. The temporal interests which claim the attention of civil rulers are more various, the spiritual interests are more important. The most ethereal zeal for souls cannot do the good it proposes in this valley of tears without subsidies of a very earthly kind. Alfred seems to have recognized at once the uselessness of trying to adjust with nice proportion incommensurable claims, and therefore made the bold division from the first—half to Heaven and half to earth.

The consecrated half was marked off by the King's orders into four subdivisions.

The first portion was set aside for the poor of all nations who came to ask relief from the King. "Here too, as far as human discernment permitted the observance, he was mindful of the principle laid down by the great and holy Pope Gregory when, directly treating of distribution of alms, he says: '(Give) not little to whom much (is due), nor much to whom little; not nothing to whom something, nor something to whom nothing.'"

The second part was to be spent upon the two monasteries of Athelney and Shaftesbury and "all who were serving God therein." They were the houses of his predilection. If he had not loved them as God loves His children, not for what they were, but for what he hoped to make them, the attempted murder of Abbot John narrated above would have broken his heart.

The third part was for the support of his *Collegio dei nobili*.

The fourth part he reserved for the aid of the remaining

monasteries in Wessex and for those in Mercia. The King's bounty also reached to the furthest confines of the island and beyond, supporting, in some kind of rotation, the churches with their congregations in Britain, Cornwall, Gaul, Armorica, Northumbria,<sup>9</sup> nay, even sometimes in Ireland. The distribution of the fourth part of the spiritual section of his revenues Alfred left to be regulated in its further details according to emergency, but he resolved to continue his generous donations to more distant claimants, "as long as life and prosperity remained."

In the appointment of the secular half of all his revenue Alfred showed the same comprehensive care. All wants were forestalled. All departments of the public service had a share in the King's thoughts. He made three subdivisions. The first of these was for the maintenance of his fighting men and the nobles of his Court who were engaged in various offices of trust. He secured the services of the most considerable men in the kingdom by making attendance at Court compatible with home duties. It was in this view, as it seems fair to suppose, that he organized his system of relays. The courtier nobles were formed into three diplomatic bodies, each of which resided at Court in turn, so that every nobleman employed in the service of the Crown was able to spend eight months in the year in all the freedom and glory of his own country house.<sup>10</sup> Government officials were paid according to a carefully graduated scale, in which both the nature of the service and the rank of the person who rendered it were taken into account.

Alfred assigned the second portion of the terrestrial half of his revenues to the payment of his workmen, of whom he had "an almost innumerable host gathered from many nations and trained, in all arts of building known on earth"<sup>11</sup> at that epoch.

Alfred considered that he had thus abundantly provided for all the claims which could be urged by plea of justice, and in the

<sup>9</sup> The order in which the names occur may be indicative of the amount of intercourse between the countries. Northumbria in this hypothesis must have been very effectually severed for the time being from West Saxon supremacy, and Ireland was divided from England by a wider sea than Armorica.

<sup>10</sup> The houses even of great nobles at this date were of wood. It is probable that Alfred began the change. Even he did not dispense with the use of wood in constructing the exterior walls of houses, but he combined it with stone. He also substituted stone fortifications for earthworks. All things go round in a circle (Eccl. i. 9), and earthworks, more scientifically thrown together, are in honour once again.

<sup>11</sup> "*Propemodum innumerabiles habebat in omni terreno edificio edoctos*" (Asser).

proposed employment of the remaining third part of the money intended for mundane uses he followed only the free impulse of his royal generosity. Every stranger who sought the shores of hospitable England was to find a welcome ;

For stranger is a holy name.

The King's bounty was for all of every nation, from far and near, whether they asked for a largess or not ; and although he observed due proportion in his gifts, it was impossible not to see that he gave with joy in his heart, knowing that "The Lord loveth a cheerful giver."

Now, although it be true that a copy of a man's good resolutions does not constitute a fair history of his life, unless we are also told that he faithfully observed what he piously proposed, yet for once it may be reasonable to make an exception. Alfred was for many years the observed of all observers, and if his practice had fallen much below his profession, he would not have escaped criticism, so that in his case the absence of all hostile comment or friendly excuse may be accepted as amounting to a positive approval. His carefully elaborated system of expenditure deserves a little examination, for it throws much light both on his own character and on the manners and customs of England in the ninth century.

Every paragraph reveals the presence of that earnestness of faith which gives not only higher worth, but life and force and unity, to the workings of a noble nature. Religious enthusiasm, the care of the poor, unselfish devotion to duty, unflagging industry, kind interest in all things human are here so loudly asserted that if Alfred had been less well known he might have incurred the charge of hypocrisy or ostentation.

Each greater resolution is based upon some scriptural text. It may, indeed, be true that the selection is the work of his clerical biographer, yet it is far more likely that the idea of seeking in the Bible a special warrant for every fresh proposal is Alfred's own ; for, as has been related, he had carried about with him from the days of his youth a little book of sacred sentences, and had been helped by Asser to increase the store ; and it will be seen that his "Dooms" were redolent of the Mosaic jurisprudence.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Alfred loved the Bible : that is beyond dispute. Did he ever in prophetic mood, ranging the long dark years, catch the bright dawning of those halcyon days when every village churl and working man might have a copy of the Word of God in his own possession, and, free from all tyranny of Rome's infallible interpretation,

The living temples of God, the poor, in Alfred's estimation take precedence of all other claimants. They must have the necessities of life before money is spent in adding splendour to the solemnities of Divine Worship. To stay a famine Saints will sell the gold vessels of the sanctuary.<sup>13</sup> Such a friend of the poor was Alfred, that he might be considered, we are told, almost their only friend in all the kingdom, and it was mainly the desire to save them from oppression which made him watch so jealously over the conduct of his judges.<sup>14</sup> Poverty is not a crime in any code which derives its spirit from the law of Christ Who was poor and in labours from His youth.<sup>15</sup> In Alfred's time, and for centuries afterwards, although there were often distress and starvation following in the wake of bloody wars, *pauperism* as a state of life was unknown. This ought to be insisted on in every attempt to compare those times with these. If in these later days there has been granted to our favoured island a larger immunity from the miseries of war than in former ages, yet peace too often has a different law for rich and poor. Those whose sufferings are most hard to bear are also those of whom the world hears least. The cry of pain is stifled on the spot. Homeless children, and starving wretches in garrets, and oppressed needle-women, are not learned enough to write the history of their own experiences. A kind soul here and there takes up their cause in the true spirit of Christian charity and succeeds in rousing a little transient comparison, but ordinarily those who need relief meet with scant courtesy from parish officers. At times some dreadful tale breaks upon gentle ears like a revelation from a lower world, but those who write in newspapers and magazines and novels are not the paupers and the beggars speaking of what they with their own eyes have seen and in their own skin have felt. As in the fable, there might be a different picture if the lion could be the painter; for

might have as good a right as any lord or bishop in the land to draw forth a religion for himself according to his own sweet will from the pure source of doctrine undefiled? To Alfred it would not have seemed a blessed vision of peace, but a melancholy dream of a kingdom divided against itself. Before the angel of printing (*aterne an albus?*) came with his message to mankind, that is to say, for much more than a thousand years of Christianity, private interpretation of Scripture was physically impossible to the mass of the people. *Ergo fides ex auditu* (Rom. x. 17).

<sup>13</sup> *Ad egenos alendos sacram suppellectilem vendidit* (Off. S. Joan Gualbert, xii. Julii).

<sup>14</sup> "*Tediosus examinande in judiciis veritatis arbiter existerat: et in hoc maxime propter pauperum curam quibus die noctuque, inter cetera presentis vite debita, mirabiliter incumbibat*" (Asser).

<sup>15</sup> Psalm lxxxvii. 16.



those to whom life at its best is one long weary struggle for bread are not a few stray victims of imprudence and sin, but they form a large part of the population of England. If these classes had possession of the public ear through the daily press there might be less jubilant self-congratulation about the happiness of these more favoured days. The Germans say of us now that England is heaven for the rich, purgatory for the middle-classes, and hell for the poor. That could not have been said in the old days when rich monks looked upon themselves as debtors to the poor, and the different classes in the country were not separated by an impassable gulf: when honest poverty was not considered a social degradation, because the conditions of human society had not yet become sufficiently artificial to permit the presence of a numerous band of able-bodied men unable to find employment even when willing to work.

Mention has already been made<sup>16</sup> of the school which Alfred formed. It is not clear where he established it, and the question is not without difficulty. His own studies were prosecuted under circumstances which only such earnestness as his could make compatible with deeper thought. He must have carried one or other of his tutors with him as he moved his residence from place to place. Probably Asser was his most constant attendant, for he would, in the then state of Wessex, be able to do more for the restoration of religion by helping the King in his schemes of improvement than by too strict an adherence to the ordinary law of episcopal residence, and Alfred could easily have procured from Rome any dispensation which might be needed. John, the Old Saxon, was promoted early to the charge of Athelney, and it is certain that Alfred's school was not established in that sequestered spot. Grimbald probably was not installed at Winchester till the time of Alfred's son and successor. Although all the learning of these learned men was not needed for the instruction of the sons of Alfred's thegns, yet the King would, beyond all doubt, desire to place the supreme management of their studies in experienced hands, and no one was better qualified for such a post than Grimbald, fresh from the schools of France. In a tradition of doubtful date, worthless in its details, but perhaps based upon some real occurrence, Grimbald's name, as we have seen, comes to us associated with an educational movement at Oxford. May

<sup>16</sup> *The MONTH*, October, 1877, p. 206.

it not be that Alfred's school of boys was the foundation in fact of Grimbald's certainly mythical Oxford University? If the site of the public school cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, its existence is certain.

In his account of Alfred's children Asser says that Ethelwerd, the youngest, was placed under the care of masters at school to be educated along with nearly all the noble children of the kingdom, and many also who were not of noble birth. The boys were taught to read Latin as well as Saxon, and to write, in order, it is gravely added, that as much learning as possible might be instilled into their tender minds before they were ready for more manly occupations, such as hunting and other pursuits suited to noblemen.<sup>17</sup> Yet it is not to be supposed that little Ethelwerd enjoyed a monopoly of learning, for his elder brothers and sisters, though they remained always in the atmosphere of the Court, were by no means allowed to pass their time in illiterate idleness. Excepting that they learned no more Latin than was required for reading the Psalms, they were subjected to much the same discipline at home as their brother at school. Saxon books were familiar to them, and they applied themselves specially to the study of Saxon poems. Asser deems it worthy of remark that at a later date (895), when he penned his narrative, the exemplary Prince Edward and his sister Ælfhryth, who had won the love and admiration of all by their humility and gentleness and ready submission to their father, were not satisfied with knowing how to read, but actually made a practice of reading. Of Alfred's celebrated school nothing more is heard after his death. Since he himself informs us in his Preface to the Pastoral that it was his desire that the sons of all freemen of independent means should be instructed in the English language, and, when they could be spared from other occupations for a sufficient time, should go forward to the study of Latin, it seems clear that, if this was the principal, it was not the only, school which he established. Men capable of teaching English and the art of writing would soon be found for all the larger hamlets. To know Alfred's wishes in such a matter is nearly the same thing as to know his acts, for he had only to say the word and perhaps also to pay the money, and the deed was done.

<sup>17</sup> "In qua schola utriusque lingue libri, Latine scilicet et Saxonice assidue leguntur, scriptioni quoque vocabant, ita ut antequam aptas humanis artibus vires haberent, venatorie scilicet, et ceteris artibus, quæ nobilibus conveniunt, in liberalibus artibus studiosi et ingeniosi viderentur" (Asser; Edit. Monum. Hist. Brit. p. 485).

The last of the subdivisions of good works which according to Alfred's way of thinking belonged to the direct service of God, displays a breadth of sympathy not at all wonderful if we consider that he had never heard of the theory of an insular church, one of many sisters, equal and independent. It had not been at that time discovered that the keys of the kingdom had been given to each earthly sovereign to administer within the precincts of his own dominions, and that the great principle of "England for the English" held good in the spiritual not less than in the temporal concerns of the realm. All the Pope's children were Alfred's brothers and sisters, and he sent them substantial proofs of his Catholic charity.

"And Marinus the Pope then sent *Lignum Domini*<sup>18</sup> to King Alfred, and that same year (883) Sighelm<sup>19</sup> and Æthelstane carried to Rome the alms which the King had vowed to send thither, and also to India to St. Thomas and to St. Bartholomew when they had sate down against the army at London; and there, thanks be to God, they largely obtained the object of their prayer after the vow."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Dr. Giles appears to think that, because he himself does not believe in the virtue of relics, therefore Alfred did not. The proofs are against him. An unworthy sneer at what all Catholics hold in reverence takes the place of argument. "That a King of so enlightened a mind would attach little importance to the worthless bit of wood, which derived all its value from a falsehood, may be easily conceived, but the exemption from tribute for the English school was a more substantial gift, and that it was granted at the King's urgent request is in unison with every other feature of his enlarged and thoughtful mind" (*The Life and Times of Alfred the Great*, p. 304. 1848). Alfred burnt candles, as we have seen, before the bones of saints, however shocking that might be to Dr. Giles.

<sup>19</sup> The Chronicle says, simply, *Sighelm*; William of Malmesbury says *Bishop Sighelm*; Florence of Worcester says *Bishop Swithelm*, and calls him the immediate successor of Asser in the see of Sherborne. In a document of the year 875 the name Sighelm is found appertaining to a "minister regis," and a "Sighelmus comes" was killed by the Danes in the year 905. On the other hand, no Bishop Swithelm of Sherborne appears in any authentic list, and Bishop Sighelm holds not the first but the fourth place after Asser. It seems probable that Florence inserted the title of "bishop" by an easy confusion of the ealdorman with his episcopal namesake of a few years later, and that thus the bearers of the royal bounty to India were, as on occasion of the remittances to Rome in 887 and 888, distinguished laymen (See *Monum. Hist. Britannica*, p. 560, note).

<sup>20</sup> *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, an. 883. Henry of Huntingdon, as Dr. Giles notices, helps us to interpret this passage of the Chronicle. The vow was not made in the year 883, but when the Danes "wintered" at London, an expression which carries us back to events already related in the Chronicle (878—881), instead of indicating a siege of London in the year 883. "*Alfredus autem misit elemosynam suam Romæ et etiam in Indiam ad S. Thomam secundum votum quod fecerat quando hostilis exercitus hiemavit apud Londoniam*" (Hen. Huntend. an. 883). This collation of texts only rectifies the date, but does not explain the allusion contained in the words "sate down against the army," which seem, as Dr. Giles well observes, to point to some siege of which there is no other mention.

The despatch of presents to Rome was nothing new or singular. Frequent mention is made of missions of this nature in the Saxon Chronicle, and in terms which seem to imply that it was almost a yearly occurrence.<sup>21</sup> But an embassy to the distant East was no ordinary undertaking. By the shrine of St. Bartholomew is probably meant the Island of Cyprus, where the Apostle was put to death in the persecution under Nero, and where his sacred body was found in the time of the Emperor Zeno.<sup>22</sup> India in much later times was a name of very vague significance, as "Indian" still must be confessed to be. Cyprus even now would fall under the general designation of "the East." In the ninth century any country on the farther side of Italy would be known in this island only to learned men, or "school children fresh from their geography."

By the Church of St. Thomas<sup>23</sup> is undoubtedly meant the shrine of Meliapor on the Coromandel coast, which tradition persistently points out as close to the scene of his martyrdom.<sup>24</sup>

The envoys reached that distant shore, if there be faith in the Saxon Chronicle, and according to another history, they were well received, and returned bearing gems and spices.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> See Pauli. Wright's Translation, p. 246. In the Chronicle, under date 889, we read—"In this year there was no journey to Rome, except that King Ælfred sent two couriers with letters."

<sup>22</sup> Roman Breviary. Office of the Saint for the 11th of June.

<sup>23</sup> "According to Alfred's own deliberate conviction, and that of his contemporaries, St. Thomas had himself preached the Gospel among the Indians, and the Church founded by him still existed although surrounded and oppressed by the heathen of all nations" (Pauli. Wright's Translation, p. 244). That belief current in Alfred's time is founded on a respectable tradition, the credibility of which has never been successfully combated.

<sup>24</sup> "Maffei (*Hist. Indica*, t. ii. p. 37) relates how the Apostle was said to have predicted that when the sea reached a certain stone cross which he had erected, which was then ten leagues from the shore, white men would come from the most distant parts of the earth to revive the religion which he had preached in India. The sea gained upon the land for centuries along that coast, and reached the stone at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese. . . . One of the first orders issued to the Governor of India by King John of Portugal, on coming to the throne in 1521, had been to search for the relics of the Apostle and show them due honour. The constant and universal tradition of the country pointed out the spot. Maffei, in another part of his history (t. viii. p. 157), gives a detailed account of the discovery of the body of St. Thomas, which was found with a staff, the lance which had been the instrument of his martyrdom, and a little vessel containing some blood. The relics were afterwards removed to Goa, but at the time of the visit of Francis Xavier they were still in the church at Meliapor" (*Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier*. By H. J. Coleridge, vol. i. p. 296).

<sup>25</sup> "*Inde rediens, exoticos splendoris gemmarum et liquores aromatum, quorum illa humus ferax est, reportavit.*"—William of Malmesbury.

Why are we left without information about the journey, the country, the people? Every word would be a precious pearl, but nothing more will it ever be granted to human curiosity to know of England's first acquaintance with India. Many greater historical events than this, which are enduring still in their effects, have never been described. Many a daring deed has left absolutely no trace in written records. What is known is a very small part of what has been done and thought.

All that we know is nothing can be known.

The future is not more hidden from our knowledge than the great mass of human experience in past centuries. The history of a few great names, sometimes capriciously selected, is not the history of mankind, yet it is the only history that has been written, and complaints are useless. At least we know enough of that old embassy to India to be able to contrast it favourably with English expeditions of a later date. Well would it be for England if her treatment of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had been actuated by some little portion of Alfred's zeal for the cause of Christ. When it was in her power to bring the name of Jesus to the knowledge of hundreds of millions she preferred to make the worship of false gods a source of revenue.<sup>26</sup> Instead of seeking to evangelize her subjects she raised obstructions in the path of the Gospel.<sup>27</sup> Yet it is crime enough for a visitation of the anger of the Most High if men raised up for a great purpose are unfaithful to their trust, if glorious opportunities, not granted twice, are wasted *Væ mihi si non evangelizavero*. It is possible to find excuses in the necessities of self-defence for England's Indian policy of successive annexation, but no excuse valid in the eyes of God will ever be found for her cheerful acquiescence in idolatry. The last consideration which ever troubled the minds of the Directors of the East India Company was the propagation of Christianity, and the soldiers who made the name of England respected were scarcely ever seen to bend their knee in prayer, and seldom showed by word or sign that they believed in a God in Heaven.

As Alfred cared for others, so others cared for him. Abel, Patriarch of Jerusalem, sent him presents.<sup>28</sup> His name had

<sup>26</sup> The fact is not disputed.

<sup>27</sup> "For a Christian people," said Mr. Russell, in the *Times*, April 12, 1859, "we did very odd things in India" (Consult Marshall's *Christian Missions*, vol. i. ch. iii. sec. 2).

<sup>28</sup> Asser.

long been known in Rome and France. Foreigners who had experienced the warmth of his English welcome would be sure to send glowing accounts to their friends of the hospitality of a King who devoted a considerable portion of his income to their entertainment. The son of Ethelwulf had, from his childhood, the eyes of Sovereign Pontiffs upon him, watching his career with deep interest, and the fame of his warlike deeds only served to render more illustrious his simple faith and that filial submission to the Head of the Church, of which, even in the meagre outlines of the Saxon Chronicle, so many practical proofs appear.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> But, it is objected, Rome has not canonized Alfred. This cannot be for deficiency of virtue: seek we some other cause. "It seems remarkable," says Dr. Giles, "that no notice was taken of his career by those who were so amply benefited by his virtues, and it cannot be superfluous to inquire why he was not canonized in an age when this was the highest honour that the head of Christendom could bestow. Many indications have been left us that the life and actions of King Alfred were not in harmony with the sentiments which have always prevailed at the Court of Rome." Immediately subjoined with approval is an extract from Spelman: "The King," says Spelman, "walked with too much knowledge and understanding, and was not so easy to be led by them as his father was, and though in spiritual matters he revered the Pope (according to the doctrine of the times) as universal vicar, yet he understood not the inferences that were afterwards built upon that foundation, but exercised his regal authority absolutely, for which cause they seem to have declined striving with him, and therefore, though it had happened that all the bishoprics of West Saxony, viz., Winchester, Cornwall, Sherborne, Wells, and Cridda, were for three whole years vacant, and only under the care of the Archbishop of Canterbury until the time of the King's death, yet we hear of no offence taken therefore at Rome; but when after his death they continued so long vacant in his son Edward's time, the first news of dissatisfaction that he heard thereof was a curse and an excommunication" (Spelman, p. 230. Malmesbury, an. 904). "That the tendency of the Roman Court and doctrines," continues Dr. Giles, "was against the dissemination of learning in general, would be an assertion as uncharitable as it is untrue, but it would be difficult to defend the ecclesiastical system of the middle ages from a charge not so sweeping, but based on a better foundation than the former. The Roman Court never tolerated even learning or virtue itself if it in any way opposed their own favourite notions. It becomes therefore a matter of the greatest probability that some of the reforms and ameliorations which Alfred introduced, especially as regards the numerous translations from the Latin into the Anglo-Saxon tongue, generally made by his command, would meet with coldness if not with censure, but certainly not with approbation from the lips of the Sovereign Pontiff. Many of these translations were in their subjects closely connected with the Scriptures, which the Romanists have never but by compulsion allowed to be communicated to the vulgar by means of versions in the vernacular tongue." In this passage, as in a previous citation from the same author, assumption takes the place of argument. From the undenied fact that Alfred was not canonized, the inference is drawn that he was not in favour at Rome. "Many indications" of incompatibility of temper are said to be forthcoming. These are reduced to two. The first indication is an amusing one. The Court of Rome refrained from excommunicating him (Spelman, l.c.). It would not have occurred to us, if we had not been told, that excommunication was a mark of pontifical approval. The second indication is that Alfred's translations had a distinctly Scriptural tendency. Poor Alfred! How could Rome,



A little incident of the year 891 may help to show the spirit of the age. Respectful mention is made of three Irishmen whose voyage would now be ascribed to mental aberration rather than to a laudable spirit of adventure, or any proper impulse of religion.

"And three Scots came to King Ælfred in a boat without any oars from Ireland, whence they had stolen away, because they desired for the love of God to be in a state of pilgrimage, they recked not where. The boat in which they came was made of two hides and a half, and they took with them provisions sufficient for seven days; and then about the seventh day they came on shore in Cornwall, and soon after went to King Ælfred. Thus they were named: Dubslane, and Macbeth, and Mac-linnum. And Swifne, the best teacher among the Scots, died."<sup>30</sup>

Alfred, instead of putting them into a cage or strait-jackets, seems to have treated them with honour,<sup>31</sup> and they went on their way rejoicing to Rome, intending to pass thence to Jerusalem. In the following year a comet appeared, as all the old historians take care to inform us.

"And that same year (892) after Easter, about Rogation week or before, the star appeared which in Latin is called *cometa*; some men say in English that it is a hairy star, because a long radiance streams from it, sometimes on the one side and sometimes on each side."

which hates all vernacular Bibles, canonize such an offender? But the difficulty remains. Why was not Alfred canonized? If it be a difficulty, it must go without solution, for the *data* upon which to found an answer are entirely wanting, and can never now without a special revelation be ascertained. All very good men are not saints, and all saints are not canonized. Perhaps Alfred was not canonized because he was not a saint, perhaps for some other reason. We have abundant evidence that he was a very good man, but no evidence at all that he was a saint. To work habitually for the glory of God, to live in a state of grace from year's end to year's end, to say many prayers and to say them well, is not necessarily to be a saint. God often permits many smaller faults, incompatible with sanctity strictly so called, to coexist with exalted virtue, in order that the greater sin of self-complacency may be kept away. There may, or there may not, have been in Alfred's daily life acts of impatience, arbitrary judgments, too great absorption in external work, wilful distraction in prayer, and very many minor blemishes which, if we knew them all, need not alter our verdict upon his virtuous life, but might show why he was not saluted as a saint. If his own subjects had known him to be a saint, Rome would have acquiesced in their judgment or there would have been some record of the difference of opinion.

<sup>30</sup> *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, an. 891. Ethelwerd declares that *Magilmumen* (Mac-linnum) was a learned man: "*Artibus frondens, littera doctus, magister insignis Scottorum*." Yet he does not hint that much learning had driven him mad. Perhaps he is confounding Mac-linnum with Swifne, whom he does not mention.

<sup>31</sup> This seems the sense of the corrupt passage in Ethelwerd (*Mon. Hist. Brit.* p. 517): "*In quorum aduocatum cum rege pariter sinclitus ouat*." Ethelwerd alone mentions Rome and Jerusalem.

## *On Government.*

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### PART THE FIRST CONTINUED.—ON THE NATURALLY TYRANNICAL TENDENCY OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

IN the former chapter, having pointed out what are the Seven chief Objects for which the State was established, I discussed that object which lies at the foundation of all the others, viz., the Good of the Governed. I now proceed to consider in order the remainder of those enumerated, and it will be convenient to take the second and third objects together under one head.

**II. and III. EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.** We have already remarked that external relations include the idea of property, because they suppose boundaries and the right to preserve them, which is nothing but property. In order of time property preceded the State. Because it was, among other intentions, for mutual assistance in producing and protecting property, that men were, in the first instance, content to abandon some part of their natural freedom, and to become subject to laws not yet enacted. But in the order of ideas, the State preceded property; because man, being framed to live in large communities, the creation of the State was inevitable and absolutely necessary to the full development of human nature, and because the whole precedes the part. A man is not made of pieces, as a carpenter makes a box, nor is the State constructed out of the ideas which it includes. It is a whole, embracing not only human members, but, in addition, all those conditions which are necessary to the civil life, as the family, common territory, private property, government, and whatever else is essential to the existence of a State, all being bound together by one supreme idea, which is neither family, nor territory, nor property, nor government, but which gives, or rather which is life, and energy, and the power of action, making the whole an independent entity. It is constituted with these ideas and conditions, but not constructed nor built up out of them: as the form of a man without life is no man, although he has limbs and features

and proportions, and all else of which man is composed except life. Now a community of men without property, both public and private, is not a State in any sense. But as property must be subject to laws, the making of the laws of property must be vested, with certain limitations in the government of the State, and the first limitation is the natural law. Now labour is a necessary condition of human existence, and therefore (by the natural law) the right of property in the fruit of labour, whence it follows that the right of the State over private property is very far from absolute. To give the State such a right absolutely would be to destroy one of the necessary conditions of existence. But the State has *some* right over property. As perfect individual freedom ceases with the foundation of the State, which though it immediately acquires jurisdiction over the person, yet has no right to all his freedom, that is, to reduce the virtuous citizen to bondage; so, though a complete right of property ceases for the individual at the same moment, yet the State has no right of confiscation, that is, of seizing the whole; except, indeed, for crime. But it has the right of taxation for the common good; and it has in addition the right to establish laws for the acquisition, the retention, and the transmission of property; otherwise a law of contracts would be impossible, and internal order would be destroyed by incessant feuds. Now some of these laws must be just in themselves, others more or less arbitrary or conventional; and the justice of the latter depends in great measure on their notoriety. Thus the right in established communities to possess land, that is to hold it in perpetuity, and the mode of possession, are conventional: but the right to the produce after cultivation is just in itself. The right to bequeath property by will is just in itself; but the general mode in which it may be left is conventional, and is to be decided by the State. The Statute of Limitations is certainly not just in the abstract; but in some countries it acquires a kind of justice by notoriety. Prescription gives a right not altogether natural nor altogether conventional. But a retrospective law, whose effect shall be to deprive owners of possessions obtained under old-established laws, is simply unjust. Under the Roman law if a man stole a sheet of parchment, and put upon it a valuable writing, the real owner could not reclaim possession, but only the value of the stolen sheet. Under the English law, if a man build a valuable house on a waste and barren piece of land, not his own, the house is no longer his, it vests in the owner of the

soil without compensation to the builder, who cannot even remove the materials. And English lawyers not only see no injustice in the law, but are surprised that it should not commend itself as perfectly just to any man of common sense. In Italy at the present day a kind of intermediate law prevails, half way, as it were, between the Roman and the English. It may be illustrated thus: A dealer bought from a noble a picture of apparently no great value at its seeming worth. On being cleaned, the picture proved to be, as the buyer had suspected, a valuable old master. The seller reclaimed the picture at the price he had received. The law awarded him the picture, but made him pay the dealer well for the discovery. There is a certain justice in all these laws. But to apply the law of one country to property acquired in another, under the law of the other, would be altogether unjust. No pretence of public benefit could justify a wrong so patent.

Again as to taxation: the costs of the Government of the State must be defrayed; but there can be no right to lay unequal burdens; that is to say, although inequality is inevitable, the Government is bound to use all diligence to lessen it to the utmost. For example, the hereditary wealth of one man might pay half the cost of a great war. But there is no right to confiscate such property, except for crime legally proved, under pretence of the national advantage. Prescription gives him his estate, and such confiscation would be robbery. On the other hand, the right to hold land at all permanently, and the mode of tenure being, in its inception, conventional, circumstances may easily arise wherein the State has a right of interference; I do not say of confiscation, but of interference for the benefit of the community at large, which would be altogether unwarranted in regard to property of any other description.

It is maintained by some that no man should be taxed without his own consent. On that principle no tax could be levied; certainly the wealthy man would not consent to confiscation. But, it is replied, he must be bound by the majority. One may ask in return: On what principle must he? Compulsion and consent are irreconcilable terms. The custom of a country may be alleged in answer. But if consent be needed, custom is excluded. The truth is, the right of taxation is inherent in the Government or State, on the principle that whatever is lawful in itself, is so in all its necessary consequences. And since a Government is necessary to the existence of society, and since it cannot be supported free of

cost, there must be a right to raise the cost ; and, the Government being for the benefit of all, all are bound to contribute ; and where no court of appeal exists between the Government or State and the individual, in disputes on taxation, the decision of the State must be absolute, though justice demands that, in the levy, due proportion be observed and oppression of any class avoided. The State has no doubt a right, speaking generally, to institute a system of decision by majorities, as being the most convenient form of legislation. But no system is permissible which violates the natural law. And confiscation, which does violate it, may be as easily effected by a majority, as by an absolute Sovereign, or by an aristocratical minority. I am anxious to bring shame into the hearts of those who demand universal suffrage, yet applaud the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, legally acquired and held by prescription, in trust, not only for the present, but for future generations ; not for men only but for minors also, and for women too, whom no government ever dared to poll before seizing church property. But it may be said, that we are treating of rights under all conditions of society, schismatical, heretical, pagan, as well as Christian ; that the obligation to maintain purity of worship must modify the duties of Governments ; and that this difficulty requires elucidation. The point will be discussed in its proper place. Meantime, it is plain from what has been said, that the right of the State to legislate in regard to property, though far from absolute, nevertheless opens a very wide door for interference on many pretexts to which an appearance of justice may easily be imparted. So far then as to external relations and the rights of property.

IV. We come now to INTERNAL ORDER. This has been spoken of as one of the essential objects of the State's foundation, because internal order must have been maintained even had man not lost his first innocence. Now the most important subject, in this connection, upon which the authority of the State can be employed, is to settle questions relating to marriage. Because in the analysis of the State's composition, it is from the conjunction of families that the State is formed and marriage is the foundation of the family. To this subject I shall confine myself under this head. Education would find a natural place in this division. But we have already said enough about education in a previous section.

We have seen that the acquisition of private property is a necessary condition of the State's existence, and that, therefore, the State has a right to regulate the modes of its acquisition and transmission. But experience shows that many men die intestate. The State, then, *must* lay down rules for the disposal of property so left, and it may regulate the appointment of all property among heirs. But this involves the right to declare the degree of heirship in which surviving relations stand. Now heirship is a bodily relation, and springs, in most countries,<sup>1</sup> from marriage: whence it follows that the State has the prerogative of defining the civil status of such union. Otherwise, confusion would arise on important questions relating to property. But confusion is opposed to order. Moreover, were it possible to leave such questions in doubt, the result would be prejudicial to the State in several ways; first, a great incentive to the acquisition and accumulation of property would be removed, whereas one of the greatest natural securities which the State has for its own permanence and stability, is the interest on the side of order which the amassing of wealth gives to individuals; secondly, the advantage derivable to the poor from the gathering together of large properties in various centres throughout the land, for distribution at all times, and especially in times of distress and want, would be lost:<sup>2</sup> and no bulwark would remain between the Government and the discontent of the many, to lessen and break its force, which would become overwhelming in such crisis, and besides the incentive being indefinitely weakened, families would continually be left unprovided for on the death of the head, and so would become a burden on the rest of the community. These are inconveniences, to use no stronger term, which the State is bound to provide against beforehand. But were the State without jurisdiction in the regulation of marriage one sees not how they could be avoided. Nor does the fact of marriage being chiefly of a religious character overturn the principle laid down. Because it in no way precludes the State from getting light from religion; and moreover, though no false religion can give the light, yet marriage being common to the whole race, the civil right to regulate it cannot be infringed where the true religion does

<sup>1</sup> In some countries heirship by adoption exists. A notorious example will occur to many readers in connection with the late Nana Sahib.

<sup>2</sup> This remark is not intended as in contradiction to the principles laid down in the *Dublin Review* for January, 1878, on Christian Charity and Political Economy.



not exist. But the ideas of property, of marriage, and of the State were essential to man's existence here on earth, and they are strictly natural ideas. The right of the State to regulate marriage and property was therefore, if we may speak of succession, in the order of ideas, anterior to the right of control which religion possesses. It may then be taken as established that both in the pagan and in the Christian State there is a civil jurisdiction over marriage. Were it otherwise, we should encounter a difficulty which appears to me insuperable: that of having to decide at what point to draw the line between Christian and un-Christian States. Because the Christian organization having always asserted the duty of obedience to the civil power, even though pagan, it cannot deny that duty to heretical or schismatical Governments. But marriage must be subject to law in every kind of society. And if the right on one side, and the duty on the other, were to cease as a government became Christian, the question would arise at what point does the cessation occur? And in case of heresy taking possession of a nation at what precise moment, if ever, does the civil government regain its right as against that of organized Christianity?

But the power to regulate includes the power to prohibit. It would be absurd to grant to the State a mere declaratory faculty. Because to do so would be to visit the ill consequences of illegal marriages upon the very persons whom it was intended to protect. If the penalty of an illegal marriage merely affected the succession of property, the inducement to remain within the law might easily become powerless to prevent one of the above inconveniences. But the State must be competent to provide against any possible amount of abuse, for it must be able to defend itself. This being so, it has the right to decree personal penalties for infractions of its marriage laws. And this, again, throws the ready means of a tyrannical exercise of power, apparently justifiable, into the hands of the civil executive. In ancient times the civil ruler and the priesthood were members of one class alone; and this union of functions and interests led to great and unavoidable abuses. Even under a Christian *régime*, where the functions are separated, and where religion occupies an independent position towards the State, we are seeking for legitimate restraints upon the action of the latter. If this be so now, if in these latter days, with the experience of many ages for our guide, we have still

to cast about to find out practical barriers against the tyranny of governments, how much more must this be the case where the control of consciences is lodged in the same class, and almost in the same persons, who have also command of the material power of the State. Under no ancient government was there the pretence even of popular liberty such as obtains in the most despotic country of modern Europe : if we except Russia, where the union of powers is in full vigour, or, perhaps, it were more correct to say, where the established religion is a mere department of the State. In those days, although the government might be said to be in the hands of the people, the word conveyed a very different meaning from its present signification. Then it did not extend much below what we now call the middle class : it excluded a large proportion of what it is now understood to include. When *we* speak of the people, we do not indeed shut out the middle class ; but it is not they whom we have prominently before our minds ; we mean, chiefly, lower and generally more dependent classes ; whereas neither the Athenian Demos nor the Roman Plebs embraced the vast body of slaves, of freedmen, of the outlying inhabitants of Attica, or of great classes of provincials. The bulk of the inhabitants were in inferior positions, and could with great difficulty rise from their lower level ; and, till they could so rise, they were without political and almost without social rights. The laws of marriage threw obstacles in the way of a fusion of classes such as do not at present exist, and the right to make marriage laws under the circumstances cannot be impugned. Marriage was a civil contract, and notwithstanding a certain solemnity, including, on some occasions, sacrifices to the gods, the rite was looked upon as a matter of State concern ; and under the Empire its neglect was visited with penalties. In both the Roman and Athenian Republics, questions of heirship arising from different modes of marriage occupied a prominent place in the civil codes ; and in other parts of Greece, it concerned not only inheritance, but even the disposal of the widow. Now these or similar questions arise in every form of society, schismatical and heretical, as well as pagan and Christian, and they must of necessity be settled one way or other. But except in countries where the Christian is the basis of the civil law, the latter must needs be paramount. If, therefore, obedience to the civil ruler be a matter of conscience, the duty of the individual

must be uniform under all forms of government. It is only when the civil power oversteps the positive commands of God that the right of resistance arises. On the subject of resistance we shall have to speak in the chapter on checks. We will now proceed to the next division.

#### V. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL.

On this subject a very few words will suffice. It is a truism to say that breaches of the peace, whether committed on a large scale, as by other States, or by individuals, are acts of violence. Now violence can only be met by force, so that the State must be able to oppose an adequate force to that which commences the attack. For this ability to be real, the State must be independent of the will of Citizens for the time being, because sufficient force might not offer itself voluntarily; nevertheless, ample force must be had, and the ability to obtain it must be no matter of doubt. The State, then, must have the most absolute right, for this purpose, to command both property and person in fair proportion, and to compel the citizen to become a soldier. The civilian must become subject to military discipline—in other words, he must, whether he will or no, give up his personal liberty. For what period, the State has to determine. It is only by the exercise of this power, tyrannical as it appears and as it may be made, that the freedom of the State itself, and of the individual within the State, can be secured. There is no freedom without personal sacrifice. It is a principle which runs through life. All individuality worthy of the name, all dignity, all success, all power spring out of, and are mixed up with, and are inseparable from sacrifice. Nobility, leadership, privilege are the guerdon of sacrifice, without which there is no reward. Freedom is a plant which flourishes not but in exposure, open to wind and cold. The louder the storm the more firmly does it root itself. Hence it is literally true that the home of freedom is on the mountains and on the ocean. Men whose lives are spent in continual conflict with the forces of nature are not easily subdued, for their daily habit is one of sacrifice. But the smiling luxurious plain relaxes vigour and invites cupidity, for the daily habit is one of ease. Scarcely will a city delightfully reposed become imperial; witness Naples, Palermo, Damascus. Constantinople was born imperial; Athens was imperial in the world of mind, but with all her beauty of situation she was a maritime power. On the other hand, neither Rome, nor Carthage, nor Alexandria,

nor Babylon, in ancient times; nor London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Vienna, nor Moscow in modern have much natural beauty to recommend their sites. Mexico was built upon piles with incredible labour; New York and many of the American seaboard cities were founded in the midst of hardship. Since, then, sacrifice is essential to the greatness both of men and nations, the right of the State to a power liable to the despotic abuse we are considering is not even in the nature of a disadvantage. We shall have much to say on this subject in the next chapter.

VI. DEFENCE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. After religion the dearest right of which the individual can demand the defence at the hands of the State, is the possession of his reputation before the world, subject of course to his own good conduct. Because, upon reputation depends not only his means of subsistence, but also that peace of mind the loss of which is more intolerable than that of goods or even of life. But in addition to his reputation every man has a right to demand defence against abuse. Nor is it from actual violence alone that he requires protection, but also from whatever is a direct temptation to violence on his own part, as threats, gross provocation, and the like. Now the State's obligation in this matter arises both from the individual right to protection and from the duty of maintaining the general peace. Among the greatest provocations which it is possible to offer a right-minded man would be to cast some vile imputations on his parents. A smaller amount of this kind of provocation should rightly be held to justify forcible resistance than if it were merely directed to the man himself. But the greatest provocation of all should be the utterance of blasphemy against God. The citizen to whom such language should be addressed would have very grave cause of complaint against the government which failed to protect him against such incitement. The man who would not resent deliberate attacks of this kind must be lost to every feeling of religion, and, like the one who could utter them, unfit to be regarded as a citizen at all. Even in pagan countries the same principle holds good, for, as before remarked, the authority of the pagan State is derived from God and His Attributes, however distorted men's views of them may have become. And for the pagan State to allow blasphemy of the national gods would be to abandon the moral grounds of its supremacy, and

to fall back entirely upon force. It is, then, evident that the State has the right, nay, is bound, to put restraint upon the words, on the conversation of its subjects, not merely on the grounds previously discussed in the first chapter, but as the defender of the rights of every man to live in peace ; but where there are threats and violent provocation there is no peace. Here again a wide door is opened for the tyrannical application of a just right of interference with the liberty of the subject. It is obvious some very powerful protection must be found if the citizen is permanently to enjoy anything worth the name of liberty. This will become still more apparent in the section now following, on the punishment of offences.

VII. PUNISHMENT OF OFFENCES. The objects of punishment are four : (1) The vindication of authority ; (2) Retribution on the head of the offender ; (3) Prevention of future delinquency ; (4) Reformation of the criminal. No government, human or divine, could subsist without vindicating its authority whenever the occasion should arise. The moment authority ceases government ceases too. The State then must vindicate its authority, otherwise it lapses into anarchy, the very idea of Government being destroyed. The duty of the State then to those under its protection combines with its right and its instinct of self-preservation, and compels it to punish breaches of the law by virtue of which it is a State. Because except by the infliction of punishment there is no way of vindicating authority. But punishment must be according to law, else it would be at the arbitrary will of the ruler, whereas no authority is arbitrary ; on the contrary, all authority is subject to law. Even Divine authority is exercised only according to the great universal law which has been established by the will of God. And in like manner the authority of the State is exerted only in conformity with the laws which the State has enacted. Now punishments must be proportioned to offences. A mere protest against, or a slight penalty for, a grave crime would be neither vindication of authority nor prevention of greater delinquencies ; nor would either amount to retribution on the offender. But the very name of punishment implies retribution, and justice demands that the vengeance taken shall be neither excessive nor altogether inadequate. There is no need of proof ; the universal consent of mankind confirms what I say, and even those who, on a curious misinterpretation of a well-known text

in Scripture, deny the right of the State to take revenge, do not hesitate to mete out in their own minds the penalties proper to be exacted for crimes of greater or lesser magnitude, and this not on the ground of prevention, but simply as being deserved by the person himself, and on the plea of just proportion to the offence. Now the right to inflict all other punishments is included in that to inflict the penalty of death. I shall not here defend this right in the case of violence against individuals, because although there may be some *appearance*, there is nothing like the *reality* of defending in Christian times the old *lex talionis*. But there are crimes greater than murder; such, for example, as rebellion against a just government. This crime is, in principle, directed against the life of every peaceable citizen, and it actually causes much bloodshed. Self-preservation, it is obvious, requires adequate means of defence, and these must be superior to those used in the assault. But in the attack death is inflicted; in the defence, therefore, death must be judged lawful, and this not merely in the heat of conflict; for such rebellion as we are contemplating is a conspiracy in cold blood against the lives of all, and its perpetrators cannot, more than others, claim after defeat exemption from punishment proportioned to the enormity.

I do not know if any code of laws can be found which does not regard offenders as debtors to the injured party. The idea is the very rationale of a most important portion of any system of Divine worship. Indian austerities and those of Christian saints, sacrifices Pagan and Jewish, the stupendous Sacrifice of Calvary repeated and renewed in its unbloody form on every altar throughout the Christian world would have no meaning but for the consciousness and assertion of a debt owing to an offended God. And so exactly is this idea reflected and reproduced in civil laws that in some of the most celebrated codes personal punishments have been, and are now, commutable by fines on a scale according with the injury done, and this even where the personal penalty has been outrageously cruel. In the crime of rebellion the offence is, *par excellence*, against society at large, and against the government especially as representing society. Here, therefore, the executive, with whatever safeguards the administration of justice may be surrounded, becomes, in fact, judge in its own cause, and this plainly gives occasion to aggressive action on its part. Still this is no reason for diminishing the weight of punishment to be suffered. For were



the highest crime against the State freed from its proportionate chastisement it would soon come to be held that the punishment decreed to the next in rank was excessive, and thus the whole range would be lowered, and so gradually every penalty would be made incommensurate with the offence, unreasonably light in comparison with the crime.

As regards prevention, it will be enough to remark that the punishment, whose severity bears the nearest approach to the enormity of the wrong, will be most effective in this direction. Of course, the same material crime will often be of very different moral turpitude in different states of society. And on the other hand, the same infliction would be far more harsh under one physical condition than under another; thus, a personal chastisement at which a Tartar might smile, and which to an ordinary European would be just endurable, would, when inflicted on the nervous frame of a Hindoo, be barbarously cruel. Hence the impossibility of laying down rules or establishing a code which should be of universal application. Nor are we concerned here with such details. The principle we have to keep in view is this, that while the State holds in its hands the power of punishment, it likewise has the unquestionable and necessary prerogative to fix the amount and command the infliction.

We have now reviewed, concisely and in order, the seven main objects for which the civil government exists. We have seen how the first great principle of government, viz., that it is for the benefit of the governed demands, on the part of those to whom it is intrusted and as occasions arise, interference with family arrangements, with parental authority, and with individual action, in matters of Divine worship, and the education of the family. Such interference has frequently been exercised in a manner altogether incompatible with that true freedom which belongs to all, and which no government has the right or even the power to alienate, since it is inherent in human nature. There are many persons, who upon the theory not only of the separableness, but, as it would seem, of the absolute separation of things religious from things secular, of the service of God from the daily conduct of life, in a word, of the Church from the State; there are, I say, many persons who would reject without hesitation, if nakedly stated, the proposition above laid down, as to the duty of the State in regard to purity of worship and education. They could not, however, call in question the syllogism by which the argument

is enforced, and they must, I think, admit the absurdity of denying its soundness as above applied. They could only allege a practical difficulty *a priori*, viz., that since, according to another theory of theirs, which I have combated,<sup>3</sup> it is impossible to know what is true and what is false in religion, the alleged duty of the State is an impossibility, and therefore no duty at all. But they cannot deny that the benefit of the governed is the first duty of government; nor that the civil power must act upon *some* theory of religion; they must admit that there can be no duty to act upon an erroneous theory, while to act on the true is of the very first importance and an unquestionable obligation. They are therefore placed in the dilemma of being compelled to abandon either their own theory of the uncertainty of religious truth, or the proposition that the ruler's duty is to seek and pursue the good of the governed, unless indeed they deny the primary importance of religion itself, and this few men would have the hardihood to do.

We say, then, that on the one hand this principle of the right and the duty of the civil government to interfere with, and in a certain degree to control the religion of subjects is a fundamental principle and one without which society could not continue; and on the other, that the unanswerableness of this truth places in the hands of the State a power which may be, and often has been, used in a very tyrannical manner. The same remark applies equally to the other subjects we have discussed. And the conclusion seems inevitable, that powers for the possession of which such incontrovertible reasons—as they appear to me—can be brought forward, have a natural tendency to be despotically employed.

But men are by no means agreed as to what check or system of checks efficient, and therefore sound and lawful in principle, can be brought to bear in defence of the individual against the tyrannical employment of acknowledged rights by unscrupulous rulers. Contentions arising from the abuse of power on the one hand, or from unreasonable impatience of control on the other, or from ambition on both, give rise to discussions, in the course of which principles, crudely enunciated, and either not worthy the name, or only true in the limited sense referred to in the beginning of the first chapter, are put forward as absolute: thence a vast amount of ill-will and discontent are

<sup>3</sup> *Essays in Religion and Literature*, Second Series, pp. 209 seq.

fomented, ending in violence. In no department of life is the power of ideas manifested more rapidly than in politics. In this branch they seem to seize hold of the popular mind, and to drive men forward to their consummation with a kind of madness. In other divisions, their growth, though equally sure is less sudden. There is, therefore, in politics a peculiar necessity for all men, both rulers and people, to be thoroughly grounded in those principles upon which all civil government is based, and on which alone civil society can continue to exist. If it be true, as it is without doubt, that there has probably never been a civil government, in which human selfishness has not led to gross tyranny; it is equally so, that there has probably never been a people which has not emulated the example of usurping rulers. Turbulent demagogues are ever to be found who, under pretence of reforming abuses real or supposed, in particular governments, propound principles which aim at the root of all government. The multitude are furnished with ideas flattering to their vanity and plausible in themselves, and the result is discord and violence. Whence it appears that defence is needed against the people as well as against the government. Some controlling power is wanted, able to curb both parties. Now, wherever this power lies, it must be admitted that, as the idea of control implies superiority on the part of the controller, if the controlling power be *one* it must be above both State and people. But if it be said that the State receives its power from the people, I reply: the idea of government, as we saw in the early part of the first chapter, and as is self-evident, implies that of one thing, person, or power governing, and of another thing, person, or power governed; of a superior and an inferior in the particular relation to each other of superiority and inferiority. To say, therefore, that the people who are governed are the source of the power by which they are governed, is a contradiction in terms and an absurdity on its very face. And if it be argued that the power is delegated by the people, and absolute under certain stipulations while it lasts, but that it can be recalled at the will of the delegators, I reply again: a servant who has jurisdiction only during the master's pleasure, however great his temporary power over others, to his master remains a servant still, an inferior, one governed and therefore no ruler. His master is the last court of appeal. But since those powers only can be delegated

which the delegator possesses by right, it follows, that were the people the source of power the last appeal would be from the people to the people, which is absurd;<sup>4</sup> the idea of control would be excluded, and there would be no check on the naturally tyrannical tendency of the government; nor on the changeableness of the people, unless it could be shown that the multitude is less corrupt, less selfish, less easily deluded, more far-seeing, wiser and better than the units of whom it is composed, which again is an absurd supposition. Moreover, except in those extreme cases of abuse which must be admitted in stating a principle, but which are practically of very rare occurrence indeed, an appeal to the people as against the government is in fact nothing but an appeal to violence. In these extreme exceptional cases, the physical force which would, in ordinary times, be simple violence, passes out of that category and becomes lawful resistance. But in all other circumstances it retains its character of violence and cannot therefore be admissible. For tyranny is violence, so that on the theory of the sovereignty of the people, the controlling, that is the superior, power would be only greater violence. Whereas violence is the breach of the law and justice, and therefore of the fundamental principles, so far as the violence goes, of all government. Whence it follows, that to lay down this superior violence as a fundamental principle is to destroy every other principle on which the idea of government rests, and is again absurd.

Whether a supernatural power exists above all other governments, what part conscience must play over both rulers and people, and how conscience can be brought to bear effectively on either unless some regulator, some informer of conscience be found, will be considered in a future chapter. Meantime, I may remark that I object to be compelled to take my stand upon logical absurdities such as the above, or to admit that what is really logically true can be practically false.

E. L.

<sup>4</sup> See *Essays in Religion and Literature*, First Series, pp. 332, seq.

*The Douay Diaries.<sup>1</sup>*

WHEN the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster placed under the care of the Fathers of the Oratory at Brompton the extensive collection of early historical documents of which his Eminence is the official custodian, he at the same time expressed a wish that the more important of these papers should be published. No time has been lost in complying with this request; and the first instalment of this valuable series is now before us.

The Catholic College at Douay was founded in the year 1569 by Cardinal Allen, and was intended to supply a succession of missionaries who should preserve the faith in England. The Registers of that College furnish the larger portion of the matter now published. The information which they contain is of the highest interest and value, forming in fact a journal of the chief events which took place within the walls of that establishment. We have here before us the names, real and assumed, of the students, their parentage, their previous history and the social condition of their family; when, where, and by whom they were admitted to Holy Orders, and how they were subsequently employed. Naturally, a large portion of those who became priests went upon the English Mission—that post of danger and therefore of honour, and then we have the record of their imprisonment, sufferings and martyrdom. Interspersed with these more formal entries come notices of a miscellaneous kind, events which interested the chronicler; for example, the arrival and departure of the numerous Englishmen who made the College a pleasant place of call on their way to and from Rome; news of what was passing in England (which, despite its heresy and schism, never ceased to be dear to the noble band of exiles for the faith), and the miscellaneous odds and ends of information which fall under no special head, but which are

<sup>1</sup> *The First and Second Diaries of the English College, Douay, and an Appendix of unpublished documents, edited by Fathers of the Congregation of the London Oratory: with an Historical Introduction by T. F. Knox, D.D., Priest of the same Congregation. 4to. London, 1878.*

of great value in themselves, and so precious to the biographer, the genealogist and the antiquarian.

The history of these Douay Diaries is sufficiently curious to be here noticed. In the year 1716 a careful search for them made by the Rector in the College showed that at that time seven volumes were in existence, the earliest beginning in 1569, and the last extending to 1695. A volume was begun in 1715, which ends May 2, 1778. These Diaries were kept at Douay until the outbreak of the great French Revolution. The havoc which at that time ensued must have been enormous. We have no trustworthy account of what the College then possessed in plate, vestments, relics and books, but the collections could not but have been very extensive and very precious. For more than two centuries Douay had been the centre of English Catholic interests on the Continent. It lay in a position which made it easy of access, it was on the highroad between Calais and Paris, and its hospitality was conducted on a scale of princely liberality. Almost every household of wealth or position in the Island might reckon among its alumni some one or more of their name and kindred. Bound together with the College of Douay by the strong bond of the community of suffering, these men did not come to it empty-handed. As a necessary result it became the depository of much which was too precious to be left in the old family mansions in Kent, Yorkshire, or Norfolk. There, under the administration of Cecil or Walsingham, it was liable at any moment to spoliation or destruction. If intrinsically valuable it might be carried off by the Topcliffe of the day; if precious as a work of art, or simply from a religious point of view, it could scarce escape destruction as "a Popish trinket," or such like "trumpery."<sup>2</sup> It is much to be regretted, we repeat, that no authentic description, or inventory of these lost treasures is extant. Notices only of a few have come down to us. During the reign of the late Emperor Napoleon, however, a considerable portion of the silver plate was recovered; but unfortunately it is that which was used in the College Hall (not in the Chapel), is very modern, and of no artistic value. It had been buried in the cellar. Some of the drinking cups were sent to Ushaw College, the representative of the secular College of Douay, the traditions

<sup>2</sup> Among the "trumpery" left by Queen Mary at Newhall, in Essex, which was seized by the Earl of Oxford in 1561, was a cross with Mary and John, of copper, gilt; ashes, and a decyphering rod (R.O. *Dom. Eliz.* xvi. 50).



of which it perpetuates in the hospitality which it extends to all by whom it is visited. It is believed (but upon no satisfactory evidence) that the plate belonging to the chapel had been discovered a short time previously, and had been carried away and melted down by the finders.

But it is time that we return to what we have to say about the library. Its fate is thus described by a writer in the *Catholic Magazine* of 1831:<sup>3</sup> "Our valuable library has met with a cruel fate. For some months after our arrest it had been plundered at discretion by those who had been appointed to take care of it. By order of the magistrates, waggon-loads of books were conveyed from the library to the arsenal, to make military cartridges. Folio volumes of firm paper, regardless of their contents, were preferred for this barbarous purpose. . . . Many rare and curious volumes, and the whole treasury of our inestimable manuscripts, consisting of original letters and correspondence with Rome and England, authentic memoirs and other precious documents, which had been deposited here as in a place of safety, out of the reach of that persecution which had raged so long in our own country, were dissipated and destroyed. It was from this abundant source that Dodd derived his best materials for the *History of English Catholics* since the Reformation; and Bishop Challoner for his curious and authentic *Memoirs of the Missionary Priests*."

Although the Diaries had escaped this lamentable destruction, and had been brought into England, their perils had not yet ended. In 1835 or 1836, the Rev. F. Tuite, Vicar-General to Bishop Griffiths, Vicar Apostolic of the London District, lent the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Diaries to Canon Tierney, for the edition of Dodd's *Church History*, which he was then preparing. Tierney had never seen the First and Second Diaries, and imagined that they were no longer in existence. The Sixth Diary (from 1676 to 1692) is still missing. But besides these, here mentioned, Tierney in his edition of Dodd<sup>4</sup> gives a long extract from "The Rheims Diary for 1579 and 1580, a MS. belonging to the Dean and Chapter," no trace of which now remains. It is much to be hoped that the publication of these notices may lead to its discovery, and its restoration to its proper place of deposit.

So much, then, for the Douay Registers; but in addition to the two given in the present volume, the Fathers of the Oratory

<sup>3</sup> Vol. i. p. 459.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. ii. p. 166, note 1.

have enriched their publication by an Appendix of letters and papers, about eighty-five in number. These have been derived from the Archives of the See of Westminster and of the old English Chapter, from the Public Record Office of London, from the Archives of the English College at Rome, and from the Secret Archives of the Vatican. Among these occur several letters addressed to Edmund Campian, now for the first time printed, which deserve a more extended notice than we are at this time able to give them. We cannot pass over, however, without notice, an important letter written by Dr. Barret, Rector of the English College at Douay, dated in September, 1596, and addressed to Father Parsons, then in Spain. It records the estimate in which the Jesuit Fathers of the English College at Rome were held at this period, notwithstanding the obloquy to which they had been exposed; and states, clearly and temperately, what would be the probable result should the care of that College be withdrawn from their direction. The feuds, which for long had disturbed the peace of the College had now reached such a height that the Society was anxious to free itself from the government of such a turbulent community. The Pope seemed to be willing to sanction this act of resignation; but nothing had as yet been definitely settled. Barret was at Rome at this juncture, and sought an interview with the Holy Father, which was granted. He tells us what occurred on the occasion. Having thanked His Holiness for the interest which he had taken in the affairs of Douay, he spoke of the English College at Rome. Not only would that College, he said, not only would all the Seminaries founded for the conversion of England, but the entire English Church, also, would be exposed to great and manifest danger unless a speedy remedy were provided. The danger was this. Wearied with the troubles and insults to which the Society had of late been exposed by the turbulent spirits in the English College at Rome, the Father General was about to supplicate His Holiness to accept his resignation and free him from such an irksome responsibility. But if this resignation should be accepted, continued the Rector of Douay, before long the Roman College would either cease to exist, or (what is worse) would become an abode for rebels. If the Fathers left it, they would be immediately followed by all the dutiful and the obedient. Henceforth no well-disposed subjects would come from England; and even here in Rome, altar would be raised against altar. That the evil-minded should be expelled would not cause so

great a scandal as to permit the virtuous to take their departure. Among the Catholics in England the result would be most fatal. Throughout all their sufferings they were sustained by this one great consolation, that the Colleges under the charge of the Society were still open for the education of their children. At Seville there were seventy English students, as many at Valladolid, and at St. Omer's (all Jesuit Colleges) there were forty. Douay was a secular College; but Douay had always been upon the most kindly terms with the Society, without the help of which (in the opinion of the speaker, himself the Rector of that College,) it could not continue to exist. In conclusion, speaking in the name, not only of all the Fathers interested in the English Mission, but also of all the Catholics in that realm, of all the other Colleges who are on terms of union with the Fathers, of all the martyrs (more than one hundred in number) who had come forth from the Colleges of Rome and Rheims, and of the whole English Church, Dr. Barret entreated His Holiness not to sacrifice the true interests of the Roman College to the knot of turbulent youngsters<sup>6</sup> with whom this disturbance had originated. The Pope listened attentively, and entered into some conversation with the Rector of Douay, who, before he left the presence of His Holiness, assured him that in what he had ventured to say he had expressed the general feeling of the entire Church of England as well as his own, that he had spoken nothing but the truth, and had obeyed the dictates of his own conscience. The Pope took time to deliberate, and the Roman College remained under the direction of the Society until the year 1773.

The early fortunes of this College, intimately connected with Allen's kindred foundations of Douay and Rheims, have been traced by Dr. Knox with much accuracy. By the aid of the authorities which he has thus brought together we are enabled to dispel much of the obscurity which has prevailed on this subject, and to refute some unfounded assertions which have too readily been accepted. Existing documents reveal the following facts.

When the English College was founded at Rome, a colony of twenty-six students was sent thither from Douay to form its first community. The superintendence of the studies of these young men was intrusted to two Fathers of the Society, "by the command of the Pope and at the request of the protector,

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Barret thus describes the ringleader: "This Benet is the greatest dissembler and most perilous fellow in a community that ever I knew."

Cardinal Moroni."<sup>6</sup> About the same time Maurice Clenock, a native of Wales, was appointed to be Rector of the Seminary, an unfortunate choice, and the source of much evil, as appeared afterwards. The assistance of the Jesuit Fathers which had thus been secured was so pleasing to Allen that, by a letter dated at Rheims, October 26, 1578,<sup>7</sup> he thanked the Father General in the warmest terms for having permitted the Fathers of the Society to manage and teach the College; and he hoped that this arrangement might be permanent. For some little time all worked well. In February, 1579, the number of students had mounted up to forty-two, with the fair prospect of a steady increase. But the new Rector permitted national rivalries and jealousies to spring up between the Welsh and English inmates,<sup>8</sup> and he favoured the former at the expense of the latter. To govern a College which contained members of these two nations required the greatest prudence and impartiality, and Clenock was deficient in both these qualities. The result was an open insurrection, and the College appeared to be upon the brink of ruin. To avert such a calamity the Pope gave over the entire management to the Jesuit Fathers. Allen heartily approved of the arrangement; his only dread being that "the begun good work would be forsaken both of the Jesuits and ourselves." But Father Agazzari, the first Rector appointed under the new administration, was a man gifted with much tact and temper, and by his skill and moderation averted the impending calamity. He stood high in public estimation, not only in the Society, but throughout the whole of Europe. He enjoyed the confidence of St. Charles Borromeo, who interested himself in the affairs of the College while Agazzari was its Rector.<sup>9</sup> An attempt had been made—as ungenerous as untrue—to create the impression that Stapleton did not approve of this change in the government of the College, a charge from which that eminent theologian vindicates himself in the following passage, taken from a letter written by him to Parsons.<sup>10</sup> "I am very glad that the troubles and dissensions in the College of our nation there are now ended and appeased, no doubt by your prudent and laborious endeavour. The opinion

<sup>6</sup> Greg. Martin to E. Campian, Rome, May 21, 1578. App. 316. According to Dodd, ii. 170, these two Fathers were, at that juncture, "hugely necessary."

<sup>7</sup> Dodd, iii. App. 374.

<sup>8</sup> The English in the College were thirty-three or more, in number to seven Welshmen. Introd. p. lvii.

<sup>9</sup> App. 339, 340.

<sup>10</sup> App. 392, 393.

that I ever favoured these factions, or should favour them if I came thither, may evidently be convinced by two letters by me written at the request of Father Gibbons and others here, one to Card. Caietan, Protector, a year since and more, another to His Holiness the last winter, subscribed by divers others. Not only I never liked, but have always utterly disliked and condemned, such unquiet heads against their Superiors, and namely against the Society, to whom all our country Catholic youths are so highly beholding. And in that sense, especially for the credit and advancement of the Society, to which is conjoined the wealth and advancement of the Catholic religion as well abroad as especially at home, you shall always find me." But Agazzari shall express his own motives and feelings upon the occasion. In a letter to Allen, June 13, 1579, he writes in the following terms. "Although we took upon ourselves this burden very unwillingly, now, however, that it has been laid upon our Society by holy obedience, we can none of us do otherwise than further it with all diligence, the more so since we have most certain hope that God's honour will in a short time be greatly increased by this College."

Stripped then of misstatements and misunderstandings, the story is a simple one and is easily summed up. The Father General accepted the government of the College at the first in virtue of holy obedience, and by so doing he saved it from ruin. Upon the same principle the Society continued to hold it. When the attempt was made to change the arrangement of the foundation the General raised no difficulties, and would gladly have been freed from the annoyances to which it exposed the community; the Pope, however, withheld his consent, and the Society continued in possession.

The next volume of the Oratorian Series will be composed of narratives concerning the English martyrs, principally in the form of letters written by fellow-prisoners, or eye-witnesses of the execution. A volume containing a complete collection of Cardinal Allen's letters, edited and inedited, is also in contemplation. Of these, at least seventy, which have not hitherto been printed, are known to be in existence. It is also proposed to publish the Third Diary of the College at Douay, extending from 1598 to 1633; and should the missing volume relative to the College at Rheims be recovered, that also doubtless will find its place in the Series. The present volume is handsomely printed, and is edited with that learning and care for which the name of Father Knox is a sufficient security.

*Proconsulate of Cicero under the Republic.*

PART THE SECOND.

WE can well imagine the inhabitants of Cilicia, more especially of its plains and seaport towns, the philosophers and students of the schools of Tarsus, receiving with feelings of relief and mutual congratulation the news that so renowned and humane a man as Cicero was coming to take the reins of command from the avaricious grasp of Appius Claudius. Of the rule of Lentulus they had a more pleasing recollection, but Claudius had succeeded him, and had governed after the worst type of Roman oppression and despotism. The general nature and effects of such a rule are drawn out for us in dark and deep but not untruthful lines in this Proconsul's year of office. Appius Claudius was a man of talent and education, but above all he was a patrician, in every trait of character and principle of action moulded upon and determined to maintain each fault and foible of his order. In his province all the excesses and extortions of his subordinates were fully countenanced and improved upon by his own rapacity, and Cicero could venture in his confidence to his bosom friend Atticus, to depict the sad traces of this barbarity which everywhere met his eye. "Appius," he says, "has visited the country with fire and sword, he has oppressed it in every way. Even after the miserable inhabitants had sold their houses and their lands, they have been forced to negotiate loans in Rome at ruinous interest. From towns which seemed utterly insolvent he has found an ingenious method of extracting payment sooner or later. He delegated part of his administrative authority to such merchants or publicans as had both debts to recover from them and business to carry on in them, and he placed these over them as prefects. Not satisfied with this first abuse of power, he supplied these improvised prefects with troops, in order that they might enforce payment of their claims by the point of the sword." No wonder that, horror-stricken at the sights of want



and misery around him, he wrote : " I find this province ruined, destroyed past recovery, the payment of taxes made impossible, money due to the State already eaten up, the population groaning in its despair. A monster, and not a man has passed through it ; he has filled it with blood, exhausted its strength, and now hands it over to me in a state of dissolution." Yet this was but one case out of many.

The injuries which Roman administration had so lately heaped upon Cilicia it followed up by the refined insult, embodied in the custom according to which speeches of the grossest adulation were expected to be addressed to the retiring Proconsul by the successor in office, whom his inhumanity had horrified, as well as by the victims of his misrule, who loathed and hated both him and the government which had sent him. The same hand and pen that wrote what we have read above dared not forbear to express to Claudius profound grief at his being deprived through envy of a triumph which ought to have been as certain as it was well merited, and also to congratulate him in terms of fulsome admiration and affection on being acquitted of all fault during his recent government. While in its turn the pillaged and outraged province must needs at their own fresh expense send lying and abject deputations to Rome, that there, in presence of the people and the Senate, they might pass a public eulogium on the brigand who had devastated their country. Nay, the self-respect of one town had been so crushed out, that it professed to desire to raise a monument in honour of this " monster," and then meanly accused Cicero of opposing its magnanimous design. Thus did the Republic rob her subjects of their honour and conscience as well as of their money and their lives. Another danger in addition, that of famine, menaced the Cilicians, for deliverance from which they may have looked forward to the arrival of Cicero with less confidence of help. Their country was in perilous neighbourhood to the wild Parthian hordes, that roamed the vast districts of Asia, just beyond the ridge of the Amanus, and now, adding all the insolence of victory to their previous exasperation at being forced into war by Crassus, boldly threatened to force their way through the mountain barrier, and carry fresh devastation over this doubly-afflicted Roman province.

But let us regard with closer eye the province which awaited the coming of Cicero. Its official centre was Cilicia proper, but

it extended also over Phrygia, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, Isauria, and the island of Cyprus, and comprised nearly the whole of the southern parts of Asia Minor. Cilicia itself lay nestled in the eastern corner of the peninsula, bounded on the north by the range of Mount Taurus, while Amanus divided it from Syria on the east; and as it stretched along the Mediterranean, above the isle of Cyprus, it formed an entirely maritime district. Limited as the country was, it possessed two distinct features. Inland were rocky heights and wild ravines, that harboured a sturdy but lawless race of freebooters, who, in despair of drawing a livelihood from the barren regions which they inhabited, had taken to a piratical life, and swept the seas. Between the foot, however, of their mountains and the coast were fertile, wide-spreading plains, well protected from the north, and warmed by the rays of the eastern sun. Flourishing towns had lined the shores, or were pleasantly situated on the rivers, which flowed down from Taurus, and irrigated the level fields. Of these the chief was Tarsus, the seat of famous schools of science and philosophy. Even in Cicero's time, the remains of populous cities, of many magnificent temples, of harbours once crowded with vessels, of halls and academies, and of well-made roads bore witness to the peace, the happiness, and the prosperity that formerly abounded there. But Cilicia had become a Roman province since those days, and all was changed. It is true that the Republic, finding its commerce completely intercepted by the Cilician pirates, had assailed and crushed them from every possible point of attack, but Roman occupation had only exchanged the pirate of the sea for land sharks of a far more tenacious and deadly character. However ready his distant province was to welcome Cicero, he showed no signs of reciprocating this kindly feeling. Several years had elapsed since the right was his to claim the dignity of a proconsulship, but he neither ambitioned it, nor felt either the need or greed of money, which led so many to grasp and abuse the office for the sake of gain. As he had been loath to accept this charge, and quitted the capital with unwillingness, so on his way the Proconsul caught at every excuse for delay. He waited at Brundisium for Pomptinus, one of his lieutenants, before he would leave Italy; he lingered at Athens and Ephesus, where he received an ovation, and he did not reach Laodicea, one of the leading cities of his jurisdiction, until the 1st of August, three months after he had marched

forth from Rome. At this date his Government commenced by making preparations for his military campaign, as he intended to devote the winter to civil affairs. On his advance to the camp at Iconium, in Lycaonia, about the 24th of August, two pieces of bad news awaited him. The defeat and death of Crassus, together with the slaughter of twenty thousand of his army prepared Cicero for the intelligence that the Parthians had now crossed the Euphrates in large numbers and were advancing through Syria to invade the Roman territory. This report rendered his second discovery doubly trying. Of the two legions promised him by the Senate, the insolent and treacherous machinations of Claudius had stolen from him the three best cohorts, and had left him a miserably insufficient army of 12,000 foot and 2,600 horse, composed for the most part of discontented, mutinous, and ill-paid soldiers. Fortunately for him, these were reinforced by auxiliary troops from the neighbouring states, and especially from Deiotarus, King of Galatia, who remained a staunch ally of the Romans, and to whom Cicero sent his son and nephew on a visit in acknowledgement.

With so inconsiderable a force at his command, the friends of the Proconsul, having no proof before them of his military talents, however skilled he had shown himself in political tactics and bold in confronting men like Verres and Catiline before the Senate, felt very doubtful of his success in military strategy or on the field of battle. Cicero himself had no share in such apprehensions, nor was he alarmed even by the fresh rumour that the King of Armenia would very likely join Pacorus, his brother-in-law, the son of the Parthian monarch, and invade Cappadocia. He began at once to manifest great energy and prudence, and abandoning his first design of staying to check an improbable attempt of the Parthians to break into Cilicia through the defiles of the Amanus, he, in concert with his generals, decided on marching forward into the open plains of Cappadocia, where they touched on the frontier of Cilicia, and where he had all the benefits of a strong position, from the proximity of Mount Taurus and of the fortified town of Cybistra. Such a manœuvre would not only bar the way into Cilicia, but would enable him to keep a watchful eye over the movements of certain allied princes who were doubtfully inclined. Whether the Proconsul took the initiative in these arrangements or not, he deserves all the merit of consenting to and carrying them

out. During his stay of only five days at Cybistra, by a piece of clever diplomacy, without losing a life, or even employing a single soldier, Cicero complied with a request of Pompey and Brutus, through the Senate, that he should provide for the security of the person and government of Ariobarzanes, King of Cappadocia. That monarch's father had been slain by the treachery of his subjects, and there was grave reason to suspect that a similar fate awaited himself. The history of both these allies of the Republic reveals the true motives of the favour and solicitude which it deigned to extend to them. The hostility of Mithridates, King of Pontus, and of Nicomedes of Bithynia, had driven the father to Rome in search not only of military aid but also of heavy loans of money, for the poverty of his kingdom was so great as to supply the point of the proverb in Horace :

*Mancipiis locuples eget aeris Cappadocum rex.*

Brutus and Pompey became his creditors, and it was the extreme closeness, tenderness, and precariousness of this tie which had led the two men, whose friendship Cicero so greatly courted, to show an unwonted zeal in securing for the younger Ariobarzanes the possession of his father's throne. This was imperilled by Archelaus, grand priest of the temple of Bellona at Comana, and by virtue of his office, a kind of subordinate ruler, second only to the King himself. Youth, temperament, and ample military resources, all favoured an attempt at rebellion.

Ariobarzanes came in person to the Roman camp, and Cicero then assured him that he was ready to assist with his troops and authority any measures he thought conducive to the safety and quiet of his kingdom. In all gratitude and sincerity the King declined this offer, as not foreseeing any danger near at hand. Early next morning, however, he returned in the wildest grief and alarm, for during the night reflection on the gracious promises of protection, so loudly made by the Proconsul, unbound many tongues which fear had kept mute, and led to the confession of a plot already ripe for action, by which the King was to be dethroned, and his brother, Ariarathes, crowned in his place. With tears Ariobarzanes now implored that some troops might be left with him for his defence, but Cicero replied that, under the present alarm of the Parthian war, his duty to the Republic absolutely forbade his lessening

the number of his army by a single man; and then, as he himself narrates, "turning to the friends of Ariobarzanes, already well approved during the reigns of his father and uncle, I reminded them of the fate of the last King, and bound them to help the King, their master, with their counsels, and to make their very bodies a rampart for his protection. The Prince himself I told to act the King by showing a proper concern for his own life, that, knowing who were guilty, he must make example of some and extend pardon to the rest; and that he might turn to account the presence of my army as a means of inspiring courage in his subjects, though not of attacking the persons of his enemies, since, the decree of the Senate being known, every one now felt certain that, in case of necessity, its orders would be obeyed to the letter." The tact and oratory of Cicero prevailed. The King was fully reinstated in his authority, and Archelaus, who owed his position to Pompey, acknowledged the obligations under which he lay, and left the country. Cicero's next act towards the King places him before us in by no means so favourable a light. Beggared as he knew the poor monarch to be, chiefly through the importunity of Pompey's agents, he did not blush to press him with the claims of Brutus, till he had squeezed and wrung some twenty thousand pounds out of his bankrupt exchequer; and, though he felt how disgraceful to all concerned the position of affairs really was, he took credit to himself, when writing to Atticus, for his management, virtue, and forbearance in the matter. As regards himself, he was indeed most generous and disinterested, and at once refused the gold which Ariobarzanes urged him to accept in return for the valuable service that he had rendered.

We may here mention other money transactions to which Cicero in part lent his name and the influence of his office. He not only acted as a tool to Pompey in forcing payment of money owed to him by several towns and families in Bithynia, but he so far gave in to the exorbitant interest demanded by Brutus, through his creatures Scaptius and Martinius, from a certain town in the fair isle of Cyprus as to leave the case undecided, and forbid the townspeople to deliver themselves from future obligation by depositing the principal of their debt in the temple. Neither his friendship, however, with Brutus or even with Atticus, nor his respect for the decree of the Senate authorizing the demand, could induce him to grant any further countenance to so disgraceful a violation of all law and justice.

Towards the middle of September, the Proconsul heard from two different sources that Pacorus, son of the King of Parthia, had crossed the Euphrates at the head of a large body of cavalry, and choosing an unexpected route had spread consternation far and wide through Syria. Moreover, Caius Cassius, Provisional Governor of Syria, had thrown himself with a few troops into the town of Antioch and was now blockaded by the Parthians; while a portion of the enemy's cavalry had penetrated into Cilicia, though they had fortunately been cut in pieces by one of those squadrons which the prudence of Cicero left behind for the protection of that district. As it was evident that Pacorus had turned aside from the plains of Cappadocia and would try to force a passage through the mountains into Cilicia, the camp at Cybistra was broken up, and the Roman army marched in all haste, by way of Mount Taurus, to occupy the passes of the Amanus. The situation was critical, and fearlessness and promptitude alike must be displayed to maintain the prestige of the great Republic. It was not only against the enemy that these had to be directed. The disaffected were in some places taking up arms, and even amongst the friendly populations there was a growing uneasiness and dread lest previous disasters should be repeated. Arriving only in October at his capital of Tarsus, Cicero left it again for Mopsuesta, and was preparing to lay out his little army to the best advantage amongst the narrow defiles, when glad tidings reached him that the quickness of his movements had so far discouraged the Parthians as to weaken their attack on Cassius, who in his turn had repelled them and followed up the pursuit with great slaughter; the Proconsul of Syria had also arrived to take possession of his province. This crisis, however, once over, Cicero felt that the result was not what he had wanted, he complained that he been deprived of a great triumph; and, forgetting that an encounter with the Parthians might have ended in his defeat, he unreasonably quarrelled with so able a general as Cassius, and after granting him at first only qualified praise, finished by wholly withdrawing even this.

Though all danger from the Parthians was at an end, the Proconsul resolved not to dismiss his army until he had accomplished something of moment. He knew that the fierce brigands scattered through the mountains surrounding his position—a race which had never submitted to the Roman power—were now only awaiting the news of a sudden check to rush



down into the plains and carry devastation before them; he could not, therefore, render better service than by seizing his present opportunity of exterminating such troublesome neighbours. But they must first be drawn down from their impregnable fortresses and rocky hiding-places, and forced to do battle in the open country. He therefore drew off his troops, on pretence of marching to the distant parts of Cilicia; but after a day's journey, left his baggage behind, and stole back during the night with the utmost celerity. The old and infallible stratagem succeeded once more. Nothing doubting but that they would soon see the Parthians in pursuit, the mountaineers hastened down to annihilate the Roman army, when to their surprise they found it drawn up in three divisions beneath the slopes of the mountain ready to receive them. Turning round, they made for the nearest villages, but they were soon surrounded, and though they made a brave resistance, were easily cut to pieces. The Proconsul himself, at the head of one division, took six strong forts and burned many more; but Erana, the capital of the mountain, heroically defied all attack from break of day to four in the afternoon. During the evening of that day, the 13th of October, Cicero was proclaimed *Imperator* by his soldiers on the field of battle, having achieved a success which they deemed worthy of this title, and which he announced in somewhat grandiloquent terms to all his friends. After delaying for five days at the foot of the Amanus, in order to demolish every stronghold which could at all threaten his province, he marched further on to besiege Pindenissum, a highland fortress of the Eleuthero-Cilicians, whose boast was that they had never been subject even to the kings of that country, and would acknowledge neither superior nor master. Pindenissum was strongly built on the summit of a steep and rugged hill, and the eye of Quintus, the Proconsul's brother, practised, as it was, by three years' service under Cæsar in Gaul, at once saw that the only chance of success was to invest the town on every side, and employ all the engines then used in sieges. The gallantry of the defence was worthy of the natural strength of the position, and though the attack was pushed on by Cicero, or more probably by his brother, with all imaginable energy, it took six weeks to reduce the garrison to the necessity of surrendering at discretion, after walls and houses had been half burnt and battered down. This success cost the Romans dear in the number of soldiers killed or wounded; all the plunder

was given up to the army, and the inhabitants were sold for slaves, bringing in a sum of nearly a hundred thousand pounds. Throughout the whole country the effect of these successes was so intimidating, that it enabled Cicero to send his army into winter quarters, under the command of his brother, Quintus.

We turn now to consider the Proconsul's exercise of his civil jurisdiction, and the thought that after so devastating a rule as that of Appius, the different populations of the province had to wait till the end of December for any real alleviation of their condition, suggests the conclusion that little time enough was reserved for the principal duties of his office, and that the Republic showed little care for the real interests of its subjects when it left the same man to defend them as general, and to rule over them as proconsul. We have many proofs of the humanity and affectionateness of Cicero's natural disposition in the warmth of feeling evidently reciprocated between himself and the members of his own family, his friends, too, both far and near, and even his slaves and dependents. In his own personal administration of his province no one could be more conscientious, more anxious to render justice to all, more afraid of being himself a burden to any of his subjects. He returned to the simplicity and rectitude of the earliest provincial governors; and, as on arriving he had refused to lay any charge or exact any revenues for the expenses of a single member or department of his government, so he addressed himself, at the commencement of the month of February, to regulate the affairs of the province with an earnest desire to rule justly and paternally. He passed through Lycaonia, Isauria, and Pamphylia, from Laodicea he returned into Cilicia, sending Quintus Volusius to administer justice in his stead to the inhabitants of the island of Cyprus; and, throughout the remainder of the year, he did not deviate in a single instance from his fixed purpose of exercising his jurisdiction fairly towards all who brought their complaints before him, whether they were citizens or magistrates. He corrected all abuses of power, and made those magistrates disgorge who had fraudulently enriched themselves; he also allowed the Cilicians to choose native judges, and regulate their differences according to their original laws and customs. As far as he possibly could in his own person he removed all the proud ceremonial and costly display of office in order to mitigate rather than aggravate the realities of the tyranny which oppressed the people, and by walking for some

time each day in front either of his house or of his tent, he gave every one an opportunity of free access to him. We wish we could stop at this point of the praise due to his personal example, and the use which he made of his personal influence; but on his proconsulship there must ever remain these two blots—first, his neglect of one whole line of his duty as a governor, and secondly, his leaving untouched the radical abuses of Roman administration by the patronage which he gave to the publicans, in spite of their continued acts of injustice and oppression.

It was owing partly to the absence of full heart or interest in the duties of an office which kept him at a distance from Rome, partly to the idea of administration prevalent under the Republic, that Cicero made no attempt to promote the material and abiding prosperity of his province. Like every other proconsul he was content simply to hand on its territorial limits intact, to settle the disputes that arose, and pronounce judgment in the causes brought forward during his year of office; and, as the last yet main point, to be vigilant and firm in drawing from his district the fullest possible revenue for the Roman people. But neither in his letters from Asia Minor, nor in his enumeration to his brother of the duties of a proconsul can be found a single word relating to agriculture, commerce, public works, the improvement of morals, the construction of roads, the building of ships, or the cultivation of arts and sciences. It was not that he ignored their utility and importance, on the contrary, he had written highly in their praise, and had especially extolled agriculture, but in these as in other points he acted against his knowledge and his conviction, and sank the principle of his government to a mere question of collecting the public revenues with less injustice and brutality than Claudius had done. His troubles began in endeavouring to reconcile justice with the interests of the publicans, for he was more determined than ever to maintain his favour with this class as their patron, on the political ground of upholding the influence of the equestrian order, and thus, as he thought, prolonging the existence of the Republic. The programme or edict which he gave out from Rome before leaving Italy regarded no other point but this, and in it he promised to confirm all such conventions between the collectors and the cultivators concerning the gathering in of the tithes on grain, oil, wine, &c., as it was possible to carry out in strict equity. After the

example of his predecessors, Cicero had also fixed the interest for money at 12 per cent. But the publicans hastened at once to demand the removal of this restriction, a concession which the proconsul was obliged to make in the fancied interests of the Republic; nor could he have well escaped doing this, as he had himself been employed by the publicans to obtain the dismissal of Lucullus for enforcing the very same restriction. In fact the history of the proconsul's civil administration presents to us a succession of painful and humiliating concessions against his conscience and his sense of justice, made all too readily. We find him earnestly promoting the cause of the association of publicans in Bithynia with the quæstor of that province. He sends by letter the highest possible recommendation of them, he appeals to his own well known good feeling towards that class, and the gratitude which he owes to the equestrian order for countless services, while he has a particular affection for the publicans of Bithynia who number amongst them men distinguished by the important part which they have played in State affairs. He claims almost the whole of them as his special friends, and so he begs Crassipes, in the exercise of his office of quæstor, to protect them and advance, as he is so well able to do, the interests of their association. All this is too painfully explicit respecting the supposed duties of a Roman magistrate in regard of this iniquitous system, for the reader to wish to know more of it. But such was the effect of external influence in warping the better judgment of the Proconsul, and turning him aside from those high principles which guided his own more immediate action.

In June of the year 50 (B.C.) Cicero rejoiced to feel that the time of his banishment was near its close. And he communicated his joy to all his friends. He waited anxiously at Tarsus the arrival of the quæstor for the following year, caring little whether he left his province in efficient hands or not. A more serious consideration with him was the account he must now render to the Republic of his whole receipts and expenditure. Judging from his character and what has been revealed of his actions during his proconsulate, we may acquit Cicero of any incorrectness or fraudulent design either in his financial statement or his financial administration. He next, as imperator, modestly claimed only the public felicitations of the Senate, and these, after a considerable delay, caused by the opposition of Cato, were at length granted. His success fired the ambition of Cicero to

demand a triumph, but he was not destined to receive it ; and with this failure ends the history of a proconsulship which was in all its bearings a signal failure, and the moral of which we now propose to read.

Cicero has shared the fate of most men of genius and of active and prominent public life, in falling into the hands either of the too ardent panegyrist, or of the equally uncompromising critic. Such is sure to be the result when the estimate of a man's life and character is drawn from only that partial view of him, which his excellencies taken by themselves, or his faults only present, and when the man is not judged of, as he should be, from his whole life, and his whole character. How often does some new friend, whom we have gained, appear to us almost faultless both in friendship and in disposition, until further acquaintance gradually reveals the defects and inconsistencies, which have their place also in forming his character as a whole ; just as, happily, another, whom we at first thought all bad, unexpectedly displays some bright spots amid the general gloom. If we are determined to look at Cicero simply as the great orator and philosopher, we can have nothing for him but praise ; if we are to ignore these claims to greatness when we regard him as the politician and provincial ruler, or make use of their brilliance only to deepen the shadows of his failure and defects by so painful a contrast, then we find as little to admire. And though it is chiefly as the former that he still lives, and deserves ever to live amongst us, yet if we are to know and study Cicero as he was, we must follow him through all the phases of his character, the scenes in which he played his part, the motives and principles on which he acted. His one year's proconsulship was, it is true, but a short and passing episode in his life, and yet, as it reads a fatal commentary for us on the desperate state into which the Roman provinces had sunk, and the Republic itself through them, so does it very materially affect the judgment which we should pass on Cicero himself, and therefore it deserved to have been made more account of by his biographers.

It ought not to be difficult to get at a fair estimate of this great man ; it is chiefly the prestige of his name, the shadowy and mysterious halo with which his genius and his oratory have invested him, the strong opinion of his character which the modern scholar is sure to have formed of him, on one side or the other, which makes one diffident in pronouncing what is

really a compromise between the two, and so, of course, will please neither side. The sources whence to form an estimate are in this case particularly rich, and Cicero himself has been most prodigal in supplying them. The facts of his life are open as the day, they have long been matters of written history, there is no dispute about their authenticity, they stand out in singular clearness and individuality. They group themselves also readily under the successive heads of Cicero as Orator, Philosopher, Politician, Magistrate, Provincial Ruler, Emperor, and Patron of Arts and Sciences; and though our especial study treats of him but as proconsul, it embraces points of character and principle which help to illustrate the man himself under all these heads. Especially connected with this short period of his life, is that clearest and truest revelation of himself which Cicero almost lavishly makes in his private correspondence, and which presents him to us under a new head as the personal and private friend, full of strong domestic affections, and unburdening to the eye and ear of another his every thought and motive. Thus no great man has with more childlike candour admitted us into the secrets of his own breast, his thoughts, feelings, doubts, dislikes, regrets, desires; he has not left the historical student to guess at the interior springs of his external life, he has with his own hand laid them bare. And though in so doing he has armed us with a dangerous weapon against himself and pointed out the very spot at which to aim it, we are all the more disposed to deal gently with his faults: *habemus confitentem reum*. Nay there is a certain greatness in this generous confession of weakness, this disregard of keeping up false appearances within the sacredness of personal friendship; and we begin to love as well as admire him on the discovery how much humility, naturalness, and simplicity there was in his mind, in place of the proud and cold haughtiness of the Roman type.

In order to have a correct and so a fair test of personal character and merit, we must institute comparisons first between a man's actions and his own professed principles, and secondly between the man himself and others of his own time and country, taking in all the circumstances of his position, opportunities, difficulties, and the like. To begin with the former of these comparisons. We have laid this heavy accusation against the Proconsul when narrating facts connected with the civil administration of his province, that he left behind him untouched a system of the most oppressive and devastating misgovernment;



was this consistent with the principles of government which he professed? On the contrary, do we not know how pure and lofty Cicero's philosophical teaching really was, how sound and excellent the maxims which he laid down for the guidance of the wise statesman and upright judge? He maintained that, as the end of the pilot is a prosperous voyage; of a physician, the health of his patient; of a general, victory, so that of the statesman is to make his citizens happy, to make them firm in power, rich in wealth, splendid in glory, eminent in virtue, and he declared this to be the greatest and best of all works amongst men. But it can be effected only, he says, by the concord and harmony of the constituent members of a city, in common interests and mutual confidence in one another. How nobly also does Cicero reason of justice and of the virtues that befit a great magistrate; how bitterly does he stigmatize that spirit of private interest which disregards the safety of the country at large, that reputation for courage which is built up on fraud and which attains glory through ignoble means. Nor can he sufficiently denounce those who, within the bosom of the Republic itself, lavish their gold and organize factions in order to found an aggressive power on the ruins of right and of prudence. To injure one for the sake of being generous to another is pronounced an injustice and a robbery. Such maxims as these are worthy of a true philosopher and statesman, but they pass sentence of condemnation on the whole exterior government of the Republic, and they are at direct variance with the frightful abuses which he did nothing to prevent being repeated by his successor.

Then if we take another head—the great orator's theory of politics, and in especial of the administration of the provinces, after plainly stating to his brother Quintus the duties of a proconsul he as explicitly portrays the relations between the publicans and the allies of the State. He dwells on the serious opposition between their interests, he allows that this is a source of injustice and violent collisions, of which he throws the blame partly on the allies. The virtue, he says, (fairly describing himself), which resists all the temptations of avarice, of pleasure, and of whatever else our human passions draw us to, is bound to be equally proof against the bad faith of a merchant or the cupidity of a publican. For provincial government the one great quality needed is the combination of firmness and self-respect which will admit of no intrigue

nor permit the bare suspicion of it to pass with impunity. After further excellent counsel, the future Proconsul startles us by turning round suddenly against himself and abruptly, in the very same letter, severing practice from principle. I know, he continues, what obstacles these farmers of the taxes oppose to your generous designs, yet to interfere openly with them would be to alienate from us that whole order to which we owe everything, and break the tie that binds them to us, and through us to the public cause. On the other hand, to concede all to them brings ruin on those whom we are bound to protect. This is one difficulty of your position, but in truth it is the only one. But that he fully knew this one to be pregnant with a thousand other difficulties the very next words of Cicero amply testify. We may judge, he says, by that which our own fellow-citizens suffer what sufferings the inhabitants of the provinces must have to endure at the hands of these publicans; the vices of Romans on their own soil tell only too distinctly the fate of allies at the extremity of the Empire. Management is therefore necessary, so as not to meddle with the publicans whose money dealings are ruinous, and yet not involve at the same time the provinces themselves in ruin; to accomplish this requires a virtue not short of divine. It was in fact an impossibility, and in the constancy with which Cicero made himself the patron, the aider and abettor of the publicans and of their usurious associations, he betrayed the most glaring inconsistency both with his theory of government and with his full consciousness of their crimes and vices. As a private correspondent, he harps sadly on these evils; as a lawyer he enlarges on them, that when pleading for his provincial clients he may crush Verres; as a philosopher he denounces them; but as a politician he disguises and palliates them, while as a proconsul he patronizes them in the name of the conflicting exigencies of the State. Perish the provinces rather than the Republic should suffer an imagined loss.

Dr. Newman, in his *Historical Sketch of the Personal and Literary Character of Cicero*, denies that the moral and philosophical uprightness of the author was any aggravation of Cicero's inconsistencies as proconsul, because "the motives and principles of morals were not so seriously acknowledged as to lead to a practical application of them to the conduct of life." Besides which, "Cicero considered it to be actually the duty of a statesman to accommodate theoretical principle to the exigencies of existing circumstances," as indeed he plainly

states in his defence of Plancius. This certainly explains the fact, but none the less does it mar the greatness of Cicero's character, as, for instance, when through fear of disobliging the insatiable Brutus, he so "determined his judgment and steered his course by the state of the political weather" in the atmosphere of which he was living, as to advance two unprincipled merchants to prefectships in Cappadocia, in spite of his conscientious refusal to do the same for Torquatus and even for Atticus, and of his own loudly vaunted resolutions to the contrary. Moreover he himself seemed painfully aware and sincerely ashamed of his inconsistencies, and his friends were equally alive to them, while there remains a still stronger argument against him in the superior firmness and consistency of statesmen of his own, or a slightly subsequent period. Thus Lucullus, as Plutarch tells us, wishing that his province should thoroughly enjoy the advantages of real justice and the execution of the laws, not only fixed the rate of interest, but abolished all usury that surpassed the capital, requiring that he who exceeded should forfeit both capital and interest. For this Cicero demanded his expulsion from office. When Paulus Æmilius, after the submission of Macedonia, formed it into a Roman province, he suppressed the farming of taxes in the hands of the publicans on the ground that the system was subversive of public right, and left the security of the allies without a single guarantee. Cicero cried out loudly against one being touched. What, again, was the policy which Plutarch attributed to Alexander the Great? He regarded himself as raised up to be the ruler and common arbiter of many races, and all of these he strove to combine in a neutral harmony of life and manners, having the world for their country, the honourable for fellow-citizens, and treating the vicious only as aliens. Even Bibulus ventured to be a bolder and firmer reformer of publican abuses, whose terms he rejected as soon as he detected either fraud or violence in them. Cicero had a mind to adopt the words of his edict, yet shrank from being so outspoken. Once more he had in Pliny the younger a provincial ruler like himself, a man of letters like himself, a fellow-orator and an ardent admirer also, whom we quote because, although the empire was of later and more advanced times and knew how to rule its provinces, yet then quite as much, and perhaps more flagrantly, was "the virtuous man a creature of the imagination rather than a model for imitation—a char-

acter whom it was a mental recreation rather than a duty to contemplate."<sup>1</sup> Pliny filled Bithynia with useful institutions, with colleges and corporations of artisans, schools and temples, theatres, baths, canals; while all such improvements Cicero was content to harbour in his thoughts and adorn with his eloquent diction, reserving his action, notwithstanding all the brilliance of his noble intellect and the fervour of his grand aspirations, to the letter of the cruel programme which the policy of his day dictated to him—Roman peace and rule in her province is summed up in two words, *obey* and *pay*.

But now, having thus compared Cicero with others to his disadvantage, we turn gladly to contrast the virtues of his private life and high personal character with the unblushing vices and official brigandage practised by his predecessors and colleagues. As we have already seen, his whole conduct, from the day on which he entered Laodicea to that on which he embarked to leave his province, had been of the strictest and most irreproachable integrity, and his example shines out most brilliantly in front of the dark scenes of corruption and violence crowding the background. Yet "the integrity of his public life was only equalled by the correctness of his private morals," as Dr. Newman remarks, "and it may at first sight excite our wonder that a course so splendidly begun should afterwards so little fulfil its early promise. Yet it was a failure from the period of his consulate to his pro-prætorship in Cilicia, and each year is found to diminish his influence in public affairs, till it expires altogether with the death of Pompey." The truth is, that Cicero never was what is called a man of action: as a politician he had not the grand views of Cæsar, neither had he abilities for administration like Septimius Severus. It was necessity not choice that led to his acceptance of the proconsulship, and though his military successes astonished every one and possibly himself, if we may judge from the elation which they caused in his mind, they were mainly due to the skill and experience of the officers whom he had so carefully chosen, and came rather under the mixed character of military strategy than of either good generalship or prowess. Painfully and strikingly illustrative of his want of energy and decision was his utter indifference to the grand opportunity, which his proconsulship offered him, of carrying out in behalf of those whom he knew to be so oppressed the noble principles and

<sup>1</sup> *Historical Sketch of Cicero*, by Dr. Newman.

measures of government which he had advocated in his speeches and writings. But no; his only happiness was to be in his beloved Rome, which he blinded himself into thinking that he best served by passing from one distinguished manœuvrer for power to another, now quarrelling with one, now flattering and cajoling another, till he lost his influence or esteem with each in turn as frequently as he lost his own sure hold of moral principle, and fed and aggravated the defects and weaknesses of his own character. He could be so true a friend to Trebutius when departing unwillingly for Gaul, as to write to him: "Let there be no weakness, no idle regrets after Rome, after accustomed habits. You leave with an end before you; devote yourself to its pursuit; be courageous and attain to it. How many times has a man been of service to himself and to his fellow-citizens when at a distance from his own country." That same friend to others could be so great an enemy to himself as to belie in action his own sound advice.

Had Cicero shown the least desire or made an attempt to reform his province, to civilize its rough districts, to revive and restore prosperity to even one of those once smiling cities, to sympathize with or help the refined students and philosophers of Tarsus, we then could have excused failure on the fair plea of shortness of office combined with the difficulty of the times and the well-nigh incurableness of the evil; but from all such excuses Cicero has himself debarred us. This much, however, we are bound to grant, that his failure as proconsul, while contributing so largely to our correct estimate of the man, is a far stronger evidence of the irremediable corruption that had eaten out the very root and heart of provincial government under the Republic, a corruption quite as fatal to the permanence of the Republic itself as were the counter-plots of a dozen Pompeys, Antonies, or Cæsars. Had Cicero lived under the Empire to see the provinces delivered from proconsular oppression, and divided from Romans themselves in nothing save the right of citizenship, then allied with them in this also as they had been already admitted to share in their language, their manners, their arts, their gods, and in the end their laws and rights, he would have hailed the fulfilment of his own hopes, the fruits of his own teaching, for undoubtedly his mind and pen helped to prepare the way for that very revolution whose rapid advance his vacillating hand did its best to arrest. Such was the inconsistency of Cicero's whole character and

career. Wonderful for his time in purity of morals, singularly honourable in his motives and desires, admirable in all the relations of private life, almost without rival as an orator and writer, he attained true greatness, but missed the loftier and the heroic standard through an habitual inconstancy and weakness of purpose. This is naturally attended with timidity and insincerity, and not unfrequently with a forgiving and conciliatory disposition towards those who least deserve it. Cicero's moral character was marred by all these faults, and sought to readjust itself in its own good opinion by being incorrigibly vain and laudatory of its own success. Willingly would we pass over his public life altogether, but it tells us plainly what Cicero was: it is his biography written with his own hand, epitomized in his proconsulate of Cilicia, upon which we should hesitate to pronounce this final judgment, did we not use the words of Cicero himself: "I have required thereby, it seems to me, a reputation for integrity. *But I should have gained for myself quite as much honour, had I refused instead of accepting the office.*"

J. G. M'L.



## *Catholic Review.*

### I.—REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

1. *Charles Bianconi. A Biography.* By Mrs. Morgan John O'Connell London : Chapman and Hall.

MRS. MORGAN O'CONNELL has published these reminiscences of her father out of dutiful regard for his express wishes, and because she very modestly and justly concluded that his name was sufficiently known in England, as well as in Ireland, "for some to feel curious as to what manner of man he was—how he strove and prospered and grew rich in the country of his adoption." She has not, as she herself confesses, attempted to write a very detailed or carefully arranged biography, for doing which she had not indeed the necessary materials at hand; but the recollections which she has grouped together in a certain kind of order, fully succeed in giving us a life-like picture of what Charles Bianconi was, and that picture is particularly interesting and instructive. In one respect these memoirs deserve especial praise, namely, the singular truthfulness with which faults and peculiarities are touched upon with equal candour and loving tenderness, the effect of which is, we feel sure, to show far truer esteem and reverence for the dead. We can respect the feelings and the motives which generally induce a wife or daughter to draw a highly coloured picture of the husband or parent whom she has lost, careful only to smooth away every foible or defect, or even wrinkle; but such portraiture neither win the esteem and confidence of the reader, nor do they correctly present to him the friend whom perhaps he knew and loved in the past.

The slight sketch which Mr. Bianconi dictated to others describing his family and his Italian origin is the last thing which could prepare us for his future career; as hopeless of success would have appeared his first endeavours to gain a mere footing and a bare livelihood in the strange country, in which he was to amass a fortune, make his name a household word, and almost entirely sink his nationality. He had been handed over, very much as a ne'er-do-well, to a picture dealer of the name of Faroni, who turned out into the streets of Dublin four Italian lads, halfway through their teens, among people speaking an unknown language, to sell a quantity of cheaply framed pictures. "I shall never forget," says Bianconi, "the ludicrous figure I cut in going into the

streets with a pair of these things in my hands saying, 'Buy, buy,' to every person I met, and when questioned as to the price, I was unable to reply except by counting on my fingers the number of pence I wanted." At the end of eighteen months, the young lad of little more than seventeen had the option of returning home or of striking out life for himself, and it was then that the future points of his character more prominently manifested themselves in the pride and independence with which he chose the latter alternative, and in the first germs of a practical eye for business and special talent for organization which led him forth with his well-assorted box of prints upon his back, ready for a twenty or thirty miles' tramp in the day, determined to persevere till he should make himself both a name and a fortune. The resoluteness with which he plodded on soon drew the attention of kind hearts and helping hands to the curly-headed, bright-eyed, and sprightly Italian boy, and he went on from venture to venture, and from success to success. The wearisomeness of his long and solitary journeys by the road first suggested to him the idea of contriving easier locomotion for the poor peasant class, but while these plans were shaping themselves in his mind he raised himself step by step in social life, from print selling to frame making, from single-handed labour to the direction of others working under and with him. Next his quick intelligence for business converted the "corner shop" of the carver and gilder of Clonmel into a centre of bullion traffic in buying up for Government the hoarded guineas of the peasantry; and with this period of his history the autobiography of Bianconi closes.

The personal recollections of business and family friends form the bulk of the life, supplemented as these are by interesting chapters of his daughter's own reminiscences. Bianconi gave early indication of the great business quality of caution. A certain aunt of provident mind thought that so steady, smart, and clever-looking a young man would do well for her niece Mary Ann, and without any particular excuse for doing so she suddenly turned round upon him and demanded in an authoritative tone, "What is the meaning of your intentions to my niece? Do you propose seeking her in marriage?" "Bedad, m'am," answered the other, "I have no time to get married, but I'll get a good husband for Miss Mary Anne." Which he accordingly did, and so the manœuvrer had a partial success, and the future intended learnt a lesson which made him doubly cautious. The "corner shop" at Clonmel became a centre not only for bullion transactions, but for political agitation as head-centre of the Anti-ascendancy party, and Bianconi became a firm friend and zealous supporter of Daniel O'Connell: this was the first step which threw him heart and soul into the interests of his adopted country.

The chapter on the "Bians," the once famous cars known all over Ireland, was suggested half in jest and half in earnest by Mr. Bianconi himself. Referring to his memoirs, he exclaimed: "*We'll call the book 'Charles Bianconi, Car-man,' and we'll have a grand chapter on the*

*Bians.*" This expresses his deep attachment to and honest pride in an enterprize which was the great work of his life, and ranks him as one of the first to create and develop a wide-spread system of organization which was as prominent a public institution of his day, as are now some of the great publishing and mercantile firms, and large circulating libraries. Each has sprung up from a very small beginning, and has been the outcome of individual effort and individual talent of a somewhat rare order, but in no one did it work out its way under greater difficulties than in the subject of these memoirs. The history of the "bians" in connection with their energetic proprietor and quick-witted drivers gives occasion for many an amusing anecdote.

We can only venture to give one as illustrative both of master and man. Cahir was selected for the first venture of all, as the only town which admitted of the journey being made from Clonmel and back with one horse. The venture was a conspicuous failure, none would change their habits in order to patronize it, and most men would have begun and ended with this first attempt. Instead of this the adventurer started at a cheaper rate an opposition car not known to be his, even by the rival drivers, who raced against each other for the foremost place. "The excitement of the contest, the cheapness of the fare, occasional free-lifts given to passengers, soon attracted a paying public, and before long both the cars came in full. Bianconi had bought a great strong 'yellow horse,' as he called him, to run in the opposition car. One evening his own recognized driver came to him in great pride and excitement: 'You know the great big yallah horse under the opposition car. Well, sir, he'll niver run another yard. I broke his heart this night. I raced him in from beyant Moore o' Barns,' and he'll niver thravel agin.' Mr. Bianconi was obliged to show the greatest gratification at the loss of his beast, but it gave him enough of the opposition car, which there and then came to an end like the poor horse." It is only after reading the chapter on "the bians," that the reader can form any idea of the elaborateness of the enterprizer's huge undertaking, he himself gave an account of the working of the system in three different papers read before the Association for the Advancement of Science. "Accidents occurred very rarely," writes Mr. Hayes. "Once, however, when I was on the car and Larry (a well-known whip-hand) was driving, the car came to great grief. The wheel came off and a spring was broken, and in fact there was a complete smash. Nobody seemed 'one penny the worse' for a roll on a very dusty road, and it was looked upon rather as an occasion for merriment. Larry said it was like the battle of Waterloo to see all his passengers spread out on the ground. Another car was obtained after a short delay, but when Larry arrived at the next stage, the landlady of the little roadside inn came out and exclaimed: 'Oh, dear! sure that isn't the usual car! What's become of the other car?' Larry took some broken sticks out of his pocket, and said: 'There, ma'am, are some of the largest portions of it.'"

The chief turning point in Mr. Bianconi's fortunes was in the year 1826. His cars brought him in a thousand pounds during the Waterford election, which gave him full command over the grain market, and, shutting up his shop, he threw all his energies into the car traffic. In 1827 he married Miss Eliza Hayes, a lady twenty years younger than himself, and his early married life was divided between his cars, electioneering, repeal agitations, and getting into the Corporation of Clonmel. After this he rapidly rose in social position. O'Connell had a high opinion of his abilities and once stated at a meeting for the Repeal: "What better Chancellor of the Exchequer could we require than my friend Charles Bianconi?" During his electioneering days he had correspondence with noblemen and men of political position. From the year 1846 he fixed his home at Longfield, a small property of a thousand English acres, in the county Tipperary, prettily situated and overlooking the river Suir. It is with his residence here that his daughter's recollections are chiefly connected. As he had been twice elected Mayor of Clonmel, so here he was appointed Deputy-Lieutenant of the County, and here he built his mortuary chapel. The bad health of his eldest daughter obliged him to spend some years in Italy, but after her death, followed by those of his son and his son-in-law, it was at Longfield that a paralytic stroke seized him to which he gradually succumbed, though his mind was interested in the details of business nearly up to the last.

His whole life was spent in benefitting the poor, he extended his sympathy and charity to all, and in this, as in everything else, he was a man of ceaseless energy. He was perpetually getting situations for people, in fact the appointments which he secured for men and women, and for young people if deserving and clever, were beyond count, and he never forgot anybody whom he had once befriended, his memory for names and faces was quite royal in its accuracy. The only thing was that, like most men, however large-hearted, who have made their money and pushed themselves into the foremost rank by their own industry, he was exacting to the point of eccentricity, if but a farthing were a matter of actual debt from whomsoever it might be, and in whatsoever cause; he insisted also in carrying out his charitable works according to his own plan. With open handed liberality and the kindest friendship to all of every creed, he was throughout life the staunch and uncompromising Catholic, while it was amongst the members of the priesthood and often of religious orders that his chief, almost his sole, personal friends were chosen. From boyhood he was intimately acquainted with Father Mathew, whose work he seconded in every way, and he had no scruple in giving trouble to others in the cause of charity, especially to Dr. Leahy, the late Archbishop of Cashel. Though fond of talking about his "uneducation" he was a warm supporter of the Catholic University, Dublin. These few points selected here and there from Mrs. O'Connell's sketches of her father's life and character show that Charles Bianconi was far more than a large car proprietor on

an elaborate scale, but a man whose life presents a fine instance of exceeding shrewdness and energy in the business of this world, yet held in check and directed to noble ends by religion, and therefore especially blessed and prospered from Heaven.

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2. *La Dévotion au Sacré-Cœur de Jésus et au Saint-Cœur de Marie.* Par le R. P. Xavier de Franciosi de la Compagnie de Jésus. Sixième Edition, illustrée par M. Imlé. Paris, 1877.

This excellent work attained its full development in the fifth edition. It is at once a doctrinal treatise, an historical survey, and a practical instruction. After an introductory chapter about devotions in general the theological aspect of the Devotion to the Sacred Heart is carefully considered, and the question of the adequate object is simply and briefly treated without any parade of subtle investigation in spite of the innumerable battles of words which have been fought over that famous theme. Then the story is told once more, which to faithful hearts comes at each repetition, like a new message from Heaven. "Being once before the Blessed Sacrament," says Blessed Margaret Mary, "on a day within the octave of Corpus Christi (June 16, 1675), I received from my God extraordinary graces of His love, and felt myself moved to make some return and to give Him back love for love. He said to me: 'You can make Me no better return than by doing what I have so often asked.' Then, showing me His Heart: 'Behold,' He said, 'this Heart which has loved men so much,' &c." A rapid sketch traces the development of the Devotion from the days of openly expressed distrust in its orthodoxy to the two hundredth anniversary of the apparition (June 16, 1875), when the whole Catholic world recited in unison, by desire of the Holy Father the solemn Act of Consecration.

The next chapter contains an analysis of the purpose of the Devotion. It is as Blessed Margaret Mary said, to give back love for love. But this general purpose may be subdivided into Gratitude, Reparation, Imitation. The motives which recommend the Devotion are then discussed.

In a French book treating of the Devotion to the Sacred Heart, which sprang from the soil of France, a little pious patriotism is not only pardonable but becoming. The author has shown both wisdom and good taste in devoting a separate chapter to "*La France et le Sacré-Cœur de Jésus*," instead of giving a national colouring to the whole work. It is true that the Devotion began from France, but true adorers of the Sacred Heart would never wish to localize the possession of so great a gift. It is for all mankind.

In another special chapter the duty of Reparation is enforced. An appendix of some length deals with the kindred devotion to the Holy Heart of Mary. The book ends with a selection of prayers and practices. The illustrations are numerous and of high character, and the work cannot fail to promote the love of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

3. *Mycenæ.* By Dr. Henry Schliemann. London: John Murray.

Dr. Schliemann's book is a perfect museum in itself, so copiously is it illustrated with engravings taken from photographs of the various objects discovered. These may not delineate some of their minute details with that precision of outline which a drawing might present to the eye, but this defect is more than recompensed by the roundness of form which helps us to realize each object as though we had it before us. Without examining this book for himself, it is impossible for any one to estimate the interest or importance of the extensive field of discovery opened out by the explorations at Mycenæ, and not even the inspection of the additions lately made to the South Kensington Museum would supply the want. In perusing carefully the main body of the book itself, constant reference should be made to the valuable Preface written by Mr. Gladstone, which serves as a running comment and criticism on each fresh head of the discoveries enlarged upon. The first part of the work before us is devoted to a description of the locality of Mycenæ, and the history, or rather legendary story, of those prehistoric times, which it is the great labour of the explorer to connect directly with the discoveries which he has made.

Mycenæ lies within the limits of the Grecian Peloponnese, a country in which our interest has been renewed during the comparatively recent war of Greek independence, and which is now somewhat ignobly and tardily mixing itself up with a still more recent warfare, but the whole history of whose real power and importance is long buried in the past. Mycenæ is situated nearly due south of Corinth, midway between it and the Gulf of Nauplia, and but slightly to the east of a straight line from Nemea down to Argos, so that it is a central point in the classical ground of ancient Greece. Another source of interest in these particular excavations is that they claim to have thrown fresh light on the real lives of those heroes and heroines of our youthful studies, whose parentage recedes into the shadowy regions of mythology—Agamemnon and Orestes, Cassandra and Clytemnestra. Hence the book enters fittingly on a history of Mycenæ and of the family of Pelops, of the part taken by the capital city in the Persian wars, and its final destruction by the Argives; though, out of religious veneration, those famous Cyclopean walls of Mycenæ and of Tiryns were spared, which have helped so much to guide the labours of future explorers. It also falls under the domain of history, by comparing recent discoveries with the descriptions of the Odyssey and the Iliad, helped by the accounts of Pausanias and of Strabo, to test the truth of the conclusion arrived at that the chambers now ransacked are the veritable tomb of Agamemnon and treasure-house of his father, Atreus; and that the remains found in one out of the five tombs examined are no other than those of the royal Agamemnon and of two companions, perhaps marshals or heralds, lying beside him.

The bulk of this most interesting volume is occupied in a careful



enumeration and description of each separate antique thus brought to light again, after the lapse of probably three thousand years, and is rather to be studied than discussed in words. In fact we require the combination of illustration with letter-press here given, not only in order to compensate for the want of opportunity, perhaps, to view these works of art ourselves, but also to prepare us for understanding them when we do see them. Everything conspires to make them full of interest for the antiquarian, but no point more than their almost endless variety, and the new forms and types of ornament which they present. They also give the classical scholar an entirely new perception and realization of the well-known descriptions and epithets of Homeric verse. Mr. Gladstone states in his Preface that on three points the very richness and beauty of the articles excavated tend rather to throw doubt as to whether they are really heaped in such profusion about the body of Agamemnon and his compeers. They are accepted as belonging to the prehistoric or heroic age, and two points are in favour of the honour bestowed on them. The fact of the bodies lying within the almost sacred precincts of the supposed Agora, or place of public council, indicates that they were thus marked out for special honour. The nature of the ornaments proves that those whom they adorned were royal personages, but the first difficulty lies in their number, as not fewer than sixteen or seventeen bodies were found in the five tombs; and besides, seven of these wore golden masks, the use of which therefore could scarcely have been confined to royal persons. Then as regards these masks themselves, as used for dead persons, or made of so valuable a material, the discovery seems without precedent in Greek tombs, and is unsupported by any Homeric allusion. It is suggested that possibly "the use of the metallic mask may have been a Phœnician adaptation from the Egyptian custom of printing the likeness of the dead on the mummy-case." Again, the bodies described did indeed lie at the very great depth of twenty-five to thirty-three feet, hollowed for the most part out of the solid rock, and the labour to effect this was a mark of respect. But then we find that the three placed side by side, of whom the middle one is supposed to have been Agamemnon himself, were compressed into a space of only five feet six inches in length, and to the extent almost of mutilation. Besides our ignorance of any custom which would store up so much treasure even in a king's tomb, the circumstances of Agamemnon's death, and the triumph of his murderers, precluded any such mark of respect, unless indeed the piety of Orestes after his return to power supplied this care, that he might the better avenge his father's dishonour. It will thus be seen at once that there are many arguments on both sides in the question of identity. A glance at the engravings which Dr. Schliemann gives us shows how much more advanced in perfection of art was the metal workmanship of that period than any that could be achieved in pottery. The Preface states that while the former were probably of foreign importation, the latter were wrought at home and were of domestic origin. Not only are the designs in metal work rich

and well executed, but the figures of men and animals engraved especially on seals are remarkably full of life and action, although somewhat wild in the proportion of the limbs. There are evidently many other such treasure-houses beneath the soil of Greece as yet undiscovered.

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4. *Life of St. Winfrid or Bonifacius, Martyr.* By the Author of *St. Willibrord*. Burns and Oates, London.

The author who gave us the life of St. Willibrord has done well to supplement it by a biography of St. Winfrid, who was not only an imitator of that early Saxon Saint in devoting himself to missionary life amongst the heathen, but literally followed his footsteps into the same field of labour. The leading incidents in the career of the great Apostle of Germany can best be gathered from the Life itself. Instead of recapitulating them we would rather draw attention to some leading thoughts which they suggest. They present to us first of all a group of instances showing how God almost invariably spreads the knowledge of His truth through a nation by the active help of foreign missionaries and not by the preaching of native converts. As the Apostles failed amongst their own fellow-countrymen and passed forth to the Gentiles, as St. Augustine restored Christianity to England, St. Patrick became the Apostle of Ireland, and St. Columba evangelized the West of Scotland, so SS. Willibrord, Winfrid, Willibald, and Winibald planted the faith in the centre of Europe; and then drew over holy Virgins like St. Walburga, St. Lioba and St. Tecla to found convents on German soil. Another marked feature of those times was that a life of such hard, unrelenting labour was by no means handed over to men of obscure rank whose humble birth, hardy youth and straitened circumstances had early trained them to the endurance of want and fatigue. No, the group we have named, both priests and virgins, were all of noble rank, of delicate nurture, and for the most part of royal descent.

Again in St. Winfrid himself we are reminded of the richness of grace and strength of vocation which God often bestows upon mere children, in verification of His own words that "of such is the kingdom of heaven." The martyr was only five years old when Divine grace began to draw him towards the priesthood, and he must have been in later life forcibly reminded of those bright days as he marked the same grace working in the heart of Gregory, who belonged to the Merovingian royal line, and when a boy of fourteen became the inseparable companion of his wanderings. In St. Winfrid we trace the type of a successful missionary, and the same spirit marked each member of this little band of Saxon saints, for like him they were men of pre-eminent gentleness and amiability, of tact and forbearance, yet withal firm to stand their ground and indomitable in pushing their way through all reverses and obstacles. Notwithstanding their personal independence they were steadfast in their allegiance to the Holy See, Saxons though

they were ; and Winfrid especially ever recurred to Rome for counsel and authority. The missionary saints of England, along with their fearless courage and resoluteness of will, exhibited all the simplicity and gentleness of the spiritual life, they turned away the wrath, softened the ferocity, and attracted the love and esteem of the savage chiefs and rough people whom they boldly confronted, while their letters prove the tenderness of friendship and affection which burned in all purity within their own breasts. We may add that the refined simplicity and chasteness of style in which St. Winfrid's life is written, and the character of the events and narratives selected carry us back readily to the spirit and feeling of the early English period.

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5. *Among the Spanish People.* By Hugh James Rose. In two volumes. Richard Bentley and Son, London.

These two volumes record an attempt which so far acknowledges the correct principle of trying to gain real acquaintance with the moral and social condition of a people by constant daily intercourse with them, and by placing oneself on a level with the poorer classes, entering at the same time into all their feelings and sympathies. When we know that an author is a Protestant, and find him expressing the warmest interest in the welfare of the Spanish peasantry together with a very high admiration of their many fine qualities both of mind and heart, we may feel sure that he has either succeeded to some extent in overcoming his religious prejudices, or that he is actuated by the narrow-minded desire to turn his praise of them against their religion, and only claims them as a fine soil in which to sow true religion, that is Protestantism, instead of "Romish superstition." In the present case the less pleasing alternative is the truer of the two, and Mr. Rose attributes the goodness of the poorer classes in Spain simply to the more generous gifts of nature, and grants nothing to religious influences in a people who have been for centuries leavened through and through with the spirit of Catholicity. While he is incapable of appreciating the religious instincts of the better Catholics he unfortunately makes harvest out of the rapidly spreading indifference of those who have thrown off the restraints of religion and abandoned themselves to their wild and inflammable passions. He extols the virtues, tender feelings, refinement, and superiority in every way of the women, heedless, in his denunciations against their religion, that he is forced to acknowledge the depth of their piety and attachment to the faith. It is a pity that a book which gives many a beautiful touch and anecdote, and might otherwise have afforded much useful information should be so disfigured by wholesale accusations often appended to an individual story, by the uncharitable imputations of all sorts of bad and sordid motives, and the constant withholding of any that are good, and by coarse travesties of religious rites and ceremonies, in the most complete ignorance of their real import or character. Amidst descriptions that

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are not over refined in tone there is a graceful chapter *in memoriam* of the good and Catholic minded Maria Victoria, the late wife of Prince Amadeo, a lady who would evidently have made a pious and beneficent queen for Spain.

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6. *Select Works of the Venerable Father Nicholas Lancicius, S.J.* Translated from the Latin. Vol. I. "The Yearly Eight Days' Retreat and how to profit by it." With a Preface by Father Gallwey, S.J. London: Burns and Oates, 1878.

The name of Father Lancicius is to all who are in any way acquainted with his life and spirit adequate recommendation of any book which treats of Christian perfection. One sentence, written for the perusal of his Superior alone, sufficiently reveals his sanctity. He had never asked St. Stanislaus Kostka for one grace which he did not receive in full. First on the list of heavenly favours gained through the prayers of that glorious young Saint we find what is in fact an avowal of consummated sanctity: "In the first place, God has granted me such strength and constancy of will that I am at all times most firmly resolved, not only to preserve the true spirit of religious life, without falling even into lighter faults, but also to do that which is most perfect in each particular action. And perfection I measure by that standard which the greatest saints have attained to in this life, such as St. Francis, St. Bernard, and others like to them."

The number of those who in Catholic England appreciate the advantage to spiritual life of an annual retreat is constantly increasing, and to all such this well chosen treatise will be most welcome and most profitable.

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7. *The Precious Pearl of Hope in the Mercy of God.* Translated from the Italian by K. G. With a Preface by Father Gallwey, S.J. London: Burns and Oates, 1878.

Hope is a virtue. Good souls are much beset with temptations to despondency. They would like to be saints and they are distressed at their numerous defects. They think that God cannot pardon their infidelity to grace. They appeal to many texts from Scripture to show that they are alarmed not without reason. They know that St. Paul has said: *With fear and trembling work out your salvation* (Phil. ii. 12): that *man knoweth not*, according to Ecclesiastes (ix. 1), *whether he be worthy of love or hatred*; that we are not to be *without fear about sin forgiven* (Ecclus. v. 5); that Pharaoh's heart was *hardened* (Exodus x. 1), that God Himself undertakes to *blind the eyes of the sinner* that he may not be converted (Isaias vi. 10), that Babylon is *forsaken* (Jerem. li. 9), that Esau is *hated* (Rom. ix. 13), that *wide is the gate and broad the way that leadeth to destruction and many there are that go in thereat*, and that *few there are that find the way that leadeth to salvation*.

All this is true, and yet it is a sin and a shame for any Christian to be downhearted, as the reader of the *Precious Pearl of Hope* ought without fail to see.

8. *Holiday Rambles in Ordinary Places.* By a Wife with her Husband. Daldy, Isbister and Co., London.

These slight sketches of wayside travel and adventure are the result of a very novel undertaking to get from place to place by the help neither of coach, rail, nor steamer, but simply of a one-horse chaise. In the hands of few persons could such an enterprize have had better chances of success than of this particular married couple with their female friend, notwithstanding the shortsightedness of the gentleman which his partner so humourously alludes to, or the nervousness of the lady, which is very pointedly dwelt upon by way of amiable retaliation. This private touring on a cheap and easy scale carried our travellers at first through Switzerland and the Tyrol, but their excursions were afterwards confined to the roads and lanes of Yorkshire and Devonshire. When the coaching days began to be considered past and gone, and the public were obliged, whether or no, to take to the railway carriage and impetuous engine, the rival merits, and especially the relative safety of the two modes of travelling were much discussed. Those who regretted the good old days of comparatively safe locomotion, were comforted by a triumphant enumeration of coach accidents, which somehow or other were but little thought of before the new introduction forced one to compare notes. *Holiday Rambles* reveals how a return, even in a small way, to the trial of horse and vehicle *versus* steam-engine and car, renewed the old mishaps of loosened lynch-pins, broken wheels, smashed vehicle, a runaway horse, together with its many physical and moral ailments, and all followed by bruised if not more seriously damaged limbs. However, no very serious accident happened to the enterprising wayfarers, and they were bravely, not to say heroically endured. For fireside reading of a not too exciting character, this cleverly written little volume is capitally adapted; it contains what may be called etchings, or pen and ink sketches in words, which stand very much in the same relation to a more imposing book of travels than an artist's private sketch book, with its numerous and often witty side jottings, does to his more finished and elaborate pictures. We can, therefore, recommend it as full of shrewd and amusing observations, and as entering thoroughly both into the beauty of the scenery which was visited, and into the characters and habits of the people with whom the travellers came into such close personal contact.

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9. *Darwinism tested by Language.* By Frederic Bateman, M.D. With a Preface by Edward Meyrick Goulburn, D.D., Dean of Norwich. London: Rivingtons, 1877.

It cannot be too often repeated, first, that those who, against the deep convictions of all men in all ages, except their own little mutual admiration clique and Lord Monboddoo, think fit to derive men from monkeys, cannot shift from their own shoulders the burden of the

proof; and, secondly, that they never attempt to give any proof at all, but are contented with assertions, either not founded on anything, or founded only on assumptions. If it be kindly granted to them that the Creator having once set His universe in motion, has no power or right to display any further activity, then it may be necessary to accept all their rapid generalizations; if they could succeed in showing up to a certain point, as far as the theory did not clash with revelation, that God, though possessing the power and the right to create fresh life, had not chosen to do so, it would be our duty to accept their conclusions. The principle which they assume will never be granted to them, and the theory which they so loudly assert they have not as yet even begun to establish.

Dr. Bateman's little book is singularly interesting. The wider issues raised in the Preface are narrowed down in the body of the work to the consideration of Language alone as a sufficient refutation of Darwinism. At first Mr. Darwin himself did not push his premisses to their hideous conclusion, but "in his recently published work he accepts the responsibility of the application of his theory to the human race to which he applies all the consequences of his doctrine."

Till the "*Homo Sapiens*" has lost his wits he will make a very determined stand against such a history of his race as Hæckel gives in the purest of unproved assertions.

This primitive man was very dolicephalic and prognathous; he had woolly hair, and a black or brown skin, and his body was more abundantly covered with hair than in any existing race; his arms were much longer and more robust, while his legs were shorter and more slender than the corresponding limbs of his immediate descendant, the *Homo Sapiens* of the present day. When standing, his position was only semi-vertical, with the knees much bent; and he was *without articulate language*.

Dr. Bateman deals with only the last of these wanton insults to immortal man.

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10. *Our Sunday Fireside, or Meditations for Children.* By Rory of the Hill. Burns and Oates, London.

No subject deserves at all times greater attention than of providing a good and instructive Catholic literature for the young, and every fresh effort in this direction deserves our cordial sympathy. Although a good deal has been done of late, we must still own ourselves greatly behind Protestant ingenuity and industry, the chief desideratum being perhaps a Catholic Magazine for the very young, well illustrated and varied in its subjects. There may be a great difference of opinion as to the best method of arousing the attention and interest of young minds and so impressing Catholic principles upon them according to their years. Fairy tales appeal too exclusively to their senses, and, however charming often in themselves, run the risk of acting morbidly on their imagination. Allegories train the imagination in a more refined and healthy way, but require very special gifts and qualities of mind in the composer to be



at all effective, or to make clear and practical to the child the lessons intended to be conveyed. There is a third method, and to our mind the best of all, namely stories descriptive of actual child life, suited to the age, position in society, and general circumstances of the intended reader, and written by those who know the ways of children, can understand and reproduce their thoughts and habits, and have at command the language and illustrations which come home to a child's mind and heart. The Meditations for children published under the head of *Our Sunday Fireside* are of a far more ambitious aim and style, and seem to imply rather interest in children than knowledge of their powers either of comprehending a somewhat long allegorical plot, or of extracting the moral from a story expressed in language really above them. The preface explains what lesson each separate story is designed to teach, but we suspect that the moral could be drawn from it only by young people much older than even the very precocious children who are here given as the narrators of the first five allegories.

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11. *Evidences of Religion*. By Louis Jouin, Priest of the Society of Jesus. New York : P. O'Shea, 1877.

In compendious treatises of theology it is a custom, which dates at least from St. Thomas, to append to the proofs of theses a series of answers to objections. It much conduces to the complete understanding of any point of doctrine that the student should exercise himself in recognizing and confronting the difficulties which can be brought against it. Theology is now so common a subject of conversation, that Catholics must hold themselves "ready always to satisfy every one that asketh a reason of the hope that is in them."<sup>1</sup> Father Jouin has in this volume of *Evidences* thrown together a mass of suggestive argument which will be found very useful by those who in club and counting-house find themselves, in virtue of their Catholicity, promoted to the dignity and responsibility of a perpetual confessorship. They cannot decline the uncoveted honour without being untrue to a glorious vocation and refusing to do a world of good. It remains that they arm themselves for the conflict, and seek to know at least the broad lines along which the battle of the faith must be fought. They may with advantage consult Father Jouin's *Evidences of Religion*.

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12. *The Comprehensive Geography*. Number Three. New York : P. O'Shea, 1877.

Mr. O'Shea gives us an atlas scattered through a book of the most various information, very good in its kind, but specially adapted to Trans-Atlantic schools. Europe sinks into its native insignificance.

<sup>1</sup> 1 St. Peter iii. 15.

## II.—FREE WILL AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

Οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον ἡ ἀποδοῖς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συλλογισμός. Ἄσι γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνοτῆσαι πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἔσω λόγον οὐκ ἀσί.<sup>1</sup>

"Though I honour T. H.<sup>2</sup> for his person and for his learning, yet I must confess ingenuously I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe both I have reason so to do and all others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences that flow from it. It destroys liberty and dishonours the nature of man. It makes the second causes and outward objects to be the rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls of destiny."<sup>3</sup>

## PART THE SECOND.

IN a former article under the present title an endeavour was made to show that of the common psychological arguments against free will, whether in their older or in their newer shapes, not one is of the smallest avail against the testimony of the individual consciousness. Each of them, with a single exception, either proceeds upon some ambiguity of terms, or attacks some more or less grotesque travesty of the doctrine which is really held, or adopts an inductive conjecture which must fail forthwith upon the clear presentment of any one fact to the contrary. I say *with a single exception*, for the favourite assertion of modern psychology is that we *cannot* be conscious of free will, an objection which at least goes to the root of the matter, and is not open to any of the three forms of rejoinder which have just been suggested.

Something has already been said upon this subject, but the assertion seems to me to deserve a rather fuller treatment. The fact is that with philosophers of the school of Mill, Dr. Bain, and Dr. Maudsley, appeals to consciousness are in especial disfavour. The "method of self-introspection", (as if there could be any other psychological method !) is warmly attacked by two at least of the three writers mentioned, and these attacks should be answered in their most general bearings before we can satisfactorily set them aside in relation to one special psychological problem. Dr. Maudsley writes: "To direct consciousness inwardly to the observation of a particular state of mind, is to isolate that activity for the time, to cut it off from its relations, and therefore to render it unnatural. In order to observe its own action, it is necessary that the mind pause from activity, and yet it is the train of activity that is to be observed. So long as you cannot effect the pause necessary for self-contemplation, there cannot be a sufficient observation of the current of activity ; if the pause is effected, then there can be nothing to observe.

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* i. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Hobbes.

<sup>3</sup> Bramhall apud Hobbes, *Works*, vol. v. pp. 110, 111.

... This cannot be accounted a vague and theoretical objection, for the results of introspection too surely confirm its validity; what was a question once is a question still, and instead of being resolved by introspective analysis is only 'fixed and fed.'"<sup>4</sup>

To all this, specious as it may at first sight appear, the answer is not very far to seek. For (1) it is not contended that self-introspection reveals to us distinctly and without change the mental state previous to the introspective act, nor that it at any time reveals to us *all* that is passing in the mind, but only that whatever phenomena introspection does reveal certainly exist.<sup>5</sup> To call a mental state which we isolate, the better to attend to it, "unnatural," is to cast upon it a reproach which is at once gratuitous and irrelevant. Natural or unnatural, a mental fact to which we attend is something about which assertions may be made. (2) Equally gratuitous is Dr. Maudsley's statement about the stoppage of the mind's activity in order that this very activity may be observed. We are assured that reflection is impossible, because—it is impossible to reflect. Direct and reflex intellectual activity cannot be simultaneously at their highest pitch; but that reflection does not involve the stoppage of all intellectual activity, is a truth exemplified in every act of memory or of comparison. (3) But Dr. Maudsley reminds the reader that a sad experience only too plainly confirms his objection. The "introspective method" has produced neither agreement nor progress in psychology, "what was a question once is a question still," and so on. Now granted that libertarians and determinists divide between them (though in very unequal numbers) the field of philosophy, as they have always divided it,<sup>6</sup> if it can be shown that the one party constantly travesties and mis-state the tenets of the other, while the latter unites the suffrages of the entire non-philosophical world<sup>7</sup> and is debarred from progress only by having arrived at a truth incapable of further analysis, what conclusion can be drawn from the dissentience of which Dr. Maudsley speaks? Of course the determinist philosopher would dispute my supposition, but it may suffice to have indicated how wide are the issues opened up by the cited objection, in order to show how entirely out of place such reasoning must always be in a question of fundamental

<sup>4</sup> *Physiology of Mind*, p. 17. Dr. Maudsley's remarks have been ably criticised by Professor Robertson, the Editor of *Mind*, in vol. ii. of that Quarterly.

<sup>5</sup> Reflection cannot reveal all that is passing in the mind at any moment. To know, and to know that we know (*i.e.* to advert to the knowing act), are not the same thing. The last turn of reflection can never be itself reflected on without thereby ceasing to be the last.

<sup>6</sup> The existence of objectors proves nothing until it be shown that these are neither confused nor biassed. To enter into a discussion on this head would evidently be a very circuitous way of arriving at the truth about free will.

<sup>7</sup> There are plenty of fatalists in the world. But is there, or was there ever, a fatalist who would not under a very little catechising confess his substantial belief in human liberty? On the tendency and characteristics of fatalism, the late Professor Ferrier has a fine passage in *Remains*, vol. ii. pp. 13, 14. It were mere sentimental squeamishness to obey the prevalent fashion of avoiding all regard to the consequences of doctrines.

truth. The fundamental questions must, in fact, be first solved before we are in a position to attempt to estimate the value of such criticism.

Mill's attack upon introspection will to some readers seem to have a more philosophic ring. He says: "The elaborate and acute criticism on the philosophy of Locke, which is perhaps the most striking portion of M. Cousin's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, sets out with a remark which sums up the characteristics of the two great schools of mental philosophy by a summary description of their methods. M. Cousin observes, that Locke went wrong from the beginning by placing before himself, as the question to be first resolved, the *origin* of our ideas. This was commencing at the wrong end. The proper course would have been to begin by determining what the ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that consciousness actually tells us, postponing till afterwards the attempt to frame a theory concerning the origin of any mental phenomena. I accept the question as M. Cousin states it, and I contend that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations of consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to follow it—an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas. For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, when those original revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions."<sup>8</sup>

Now with the critical portion of this passage we must in part agree. Locke cannot be blamed for giving prominence to the question, "What is the origin of our present mental furniture?" the primary elements of what Mill and Dr. Bain aptly name the "adult consciousness."<sup>9</sup> But there is another side to the subject. In order even to attempt any psychological analysis, we must, by the conditions of the case, have some means of determining at the outset what it is which we have to analyse. In order satisfactorily to seek an answer to the question, "What is the origin of our present concepts?" we must be able, independently, to find an answer, not in words, but in our internal experience, to the previous question, "What are the concepts whose origin we seek?" At the very least we must have some means of testing the adequacy of any suggested origin, of any proposed set of elements, to afford an explanation of the facts which they profess to account for or to embrace. While, then, it would be foolish to reject Locke's method in order exclusively to follow Cousin, it would be suicidal to repudiate

<sup>8</sup> *Examination of Hamilton*, pp. 145, 146. Second Edition.

<sup>9</sup> To cite a familiar example, Berkeley did good service by analysing the facts of vision, by showing that the supposed visual "perception" of distance is a complex and acquired, not a simple and original fact of mind, and by indicating the elements out of which this complex acquisition is built up. But, in fact, Berkeley's "Theory of Vision" is as fine an example as we could wish for of the success of introspection, a triumph, as Ferrier has called it, in the art of "unseeing false facts."

Cousin's procedure in the hope of attaining the truth by an exclusive adherence to Locke.

So much, briefly, for these attacks upon the general competency of the "adult consciousness." Consider now one or two of the more fundamental facts to which consciousness testifies, but which are more or less habitually and completely overlooked by psychologists of the school of Mill, Bain, Maudsley, and Lewes. The reader will not think that we are wandering too far from our main subject; for, as has been well observed, the real basis of determinism lies in the defective handling, by the opponents of free will, of the earlier portions of psychology. The first of these facts to which I would call attention is the distinction between feeling and reflection upon feeling.<sup>10</sup> Mill said that, when we attend to or reflect upon a feeling, what happens, and the only thing that happens, is that the feeling becomes more vivid. But if the reader will observe his own mental experience, he will probably come across a state or act or fact which may be described as "wishing to attend to a feeling which is not at present vivid." And again, he will find another fact which he may describe as "wishing to turn away the attention from a feeling which is at present vivid," and which tends to be engrossing. Now these two facts are inconsistent with Mill's theory. Any one who finds them in himself may confidently set Mill aside on this point.

Let us observe next the bearing of this distinction between attention and the feeling to which attention is directed, upon the subject of *self-consciousness*.<sup>11</sup> Reflection upon the meanings of our own words will show us that there is no intelligible sense or significance in the phrase, "attention to a feeling," unless the feeling belong to the same person, or individual, or mind, or subject, or *ego*, or self, with the feeling attended to. Or to speak more accurately, the notion of an individual or subject or *ego* is a necessary complement of the notion of reflection on a sensation or a phantasm. As long as we confine our attention merely to facts of feeling, there is some plausibility in the language which talks of experience as a *series*. As long as sensations and ideas (phantasms) alone are in question, we can give a sort of meaning to Mr. Spencer's language about "lateral and longitudinal cohesions of vivid and faint manifestations;" but the metaphor falls short of describing any fact of

<sup>10</sup> Under the term *feeling* I include not merely sensation, but also those faintly reproduced sensations which the schoolmen called *phantasms*, which modern English writers often call *ideas*. If it should seem a stretch of language to call a phantasm or idea a *feeling*, I may remind the reader that the schoolmen assigned phantasms to the "sensitive faculties" of the soul. "Feeling" here = "*affection de la sensibilité*." A feeling may be defined to be "any ultimate non-reflex fact of mind." All thought is reflex in the sense of being engaged upon some already existing mental fact. For the first stage of thought is attention, and the simplest kind of attention is attention to a feeling. Attention to a thought is doubly reflex. The distinguishing character of feeling is that it is non-reflex.

<sup>11</sup> By consciousness in general, in this essay, I understand any immediate apprehension which the mind or subject has of itself or of its own acts and states. By *self-consciousness* I mean the apprehension by the mind or subject, not merely of any mental fact, but in particular of its own existence as distinct from its acts and states.

attention or reflection.<sup>12</sup> The very notion of attending to or reflecting on a feeling, includes the notion of an *I* who reflect or attend, this *I* being distinct as well from the reflexive act as from the phenomenon reflected on, and at the same time forming the ground of connection between the two.<sup>13</sup> Without this conception of an *ego* unchanging amid changing phenomena, and present equally to each of them, all phrases which describe reflexive mental processes are absolutely without meaning.

Having thus won, so to say, the consciousness of self, I have no difficulty in ascribing to self the power of choice. I seem to have a clear notion of what I mean by choice, a notion which cannot be analysed into any simpler elements, but which certainly has no meaning if the word *I* has no more meaning than that which the phenomenists give to it. But Dr. Bain undertakes to analyse this notion of choice. Here is his analysis: "The real meaning of this word, that is to say, the only real fact that can be pointed at in correspondence with it is the acting out of one of several different promptings. . . . It may happen that for a moment the opposing attractions are exactly balanced, and decision is suspended thereby . . . but when the decision is actually come to, the fact and the meaning are that some consideration has risen to the mind, giving a superior energy of motive to the side that has preponderated. This is the whole substance of the act of choosing."<sup>14</sup>

But libertarians deny that this is the whole substance of what they mean by the act of choosing. The analysis overlooks what in their view is the most important element of all, the *Ego*, or self, as distinguished from the motives which draw it one way or another. In Dr. Bain's view choice is a phenomenon, not an exercise of activity, a fact not an act. Perhaps then we ought to conclude that Dr. Bain and other writers on the same side are without this notion of choice,

<sup>12</sup> Mill talked of "a series aware of itself as a series," and admitted that the expression involved a paradox (*Examination*, p. 213). Let A and B be two feelings—the smallest possible series. If Mill's language means anything, A must be aware of B, and B aware of A. What is a feeling that is aware? And is the "being aware" itself a feeling? If so, to say nothing of the want of any bond of unity between A and B, we must add two terms to our series to express A's being aware of B, and B's being aware of A. But it is needless to pursue the absurdity further. Of course in practice this school of philosophy tacitly introduce what they profess to exclude from their reckonings (T. H. Green, *Introduction to Hume's Phil. Works*, §§ 345, 346, 237, &c). "This feeling, and this, and this, *ad indefinitum*, do not constitute a succession except as held together by a conscious something else, present equally to each of them" (T. H. Green, in the *Contemporary Review*, December, 1877, p. 32).

<sup>13</sup> It is sometimes said or implied that we are as immediately conscious of self as of feeling. This is not correct. Self-consciousness emerges in the observation, not of feeling, but of thought or of will. Self-consciousness is so to say doubly reflexive; it involves what Ferrier (*Remains*, vol. ii. p. 251) calls *observatio duplex*. Ueberweg (*Logic*, § 44) is admirable on this subject.

<sup>14</sup> *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 487.



just as some persons have no ear for music, and that consequently it is impossible to come to terms on the subject. This conclusion, however, seems hardly tenable in the case of at least many determinists. Among these there are probably many who would agree with Mill in protesting against the notion that necessity or uniformity or unconditionalness, as applied to the will, implies *compulsion*. Now it is a well known remark of Hume's that "as we can have no idea of anything that never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary consequence *seems* to be that we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning."<sup>15</sup> Upon which Mr. Lloyd observes: "But if this be so, he and his followers must surely have been beating the air. Mr. Mill's stress on the distinction between 'must' and 'does,' and his anxiety to eliminate the notion of 'compulsion' from necessity [*i.e.* from the doctrine of determinism] must be altogether superfluous. To the whole world, as to himself, 'must' can [on this theory] convey no notion which is absent from 'does,' and 'compulsion' no notion other than 'sequence.' And if this is not so, if they have really been opposing a notion, however ill-founded, then we must reverse the order of the argument. 'As we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment,' and yet have some idea of power, either sense or sentiment must have given birth to it."<sup>16</sup>

Hume demonstrated as clearly as, after Berkeley, demonstration could be needed, that no notion of *power* can be got from the observed successions of external nature alone.<sup>17</sup> This the followers of Mill and of Dr. Bain would be forward to admit. The same is true with respect to those mental phenomena of which we are merely passive witnesses or recipients. This too they cannot deny. It remains then that the notion of power is got from our own conscious activity. But Dr. Bain is ready with an answer. Our conscious activity, he tells us, has nothing to do with free will: it is a fundamental distinction between two classes of feelings, the feelings of muscular exercise, or active feelings, and sensations or passive feelings. But unfortunately this theory does not meet the exigencies of the case. I deny that the muscular feelings, taken alone, give me the notion of activity. I have no difficulty in imagining my muscles spasmodically contracted in such a way that the feeling, as feeling, shall not differ from that

<sup>15</sup> *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 61 (Green and Grose), and apud Lloyd, p. 48.

<sup>16</sup> Lloyd, *The Freedom of the Will stated afresh*, pp. 48, 49.

<sup>17</sup> Fetichism, as we all know, and as Comte, Mill, Mr. Tylor, and Mr. Sully would be foremost in telling us, consists in the groundless ascription of human volition to inanimate nature. And while "hitherto this self-derived notion of force," or rather of originating power, "has been groundlessly intruded on the observed succession of nature; now to make way for a theory based on these successions, it is [according to the determinists] to be rooted out of ourselves" (Lloyd, p. 50). But if it be a notion at all, if there be any conception to be rooted out, some foundation must be found for it. Such a foundation determinism fails to supply.

which accompanies voluntary contraction. Yet in such a case I am and feel just as passive as when I have an ordinary sensation of sound or colour. The following criticism by Dr. Martineau of Dr. Bain's theory of organic spontaneity apply especially to the present subject.

"Though Mr. Bain grants us a spontaneity, he plants it where we have nothing to do with it, any more than if our limbs were spasmodically stirred by a galvanic touch. In his zeal to cancel Hartley's prefix of a sensational stimulus, he forgets to leave any antecedent consciousness at the fountain-head at all, and makes the movement come, *psychologically*, out of nothing. The first thing we feel is the series of muscular sensations in the execution of the act: there it is, [accordingly, that our conscious life begins, and the prior word of command for the initiation of the act took place outside. The dynamics of the case are thus quite numb and foreign to us . . . so far as our mental life is concerned, this novelty of Mr. Bain's is therefore inoperative, and lapses back into that emphasizing of the muscular feelings so familiar to the readers of Dr. Thomas Brown." <sup>18</sup>

Again Dr. Martineau asks: "In what, then, really consists the prerogative distinction of the muscular system? It has an obvious and important peculiarity. In our experience of smell, hearing, &c., the first thing that happens is the sensation, which arrives at us out of the unknown, and wakes us up in an unexpected way; and any cognitive act . . . follows on the sensitive [sensible] phenomenon. But the muscular sensations occur in executing an act already ordered by a mandate from ourselves; the signal for them is passed before they arise, and this mental prefix, name it as you will, prevents our being taken by surprise with the phenomenon, and provides an incipient cognitive element at the fountain-head. This inverse order of procedure in the locomotive faculty redeems it altogether from the category of the senses." <sup>19</sup> It starts from a point that is no more 'sensation' than the cognitions in which the proper senses terminate; call it volition, or call it spontaneous energy, it is the putting forth of personal causation." <sup>20</sup>

The notion of personal activity or free choice not being explained, then, by reference to the muscular feelings, since these may be excited under circumstances directly contrary to that notion, we are once more and inevitably driven back upon immediate experience or consciousness. It will be worth while to try whether we can bring this consciousness into any clearer light; not indeed by explaining or analysing it, but by selecting the most favourable circumstances under which to observe it,

<sup>18</sup> *Essays*, vol. i. pp. 256, 257.

<sup>19</sup> Not quite so. For "redeems it altogether from the category of the senses," substitute "constitutes sufficient ground for making a distinct class of those sensations which are thus intimately connected with our will."

<sup>20</sup> *Essays*, vol. i. p. 260. It cannot be too carefully borne in mind that this "putting forth of personal causation," of which Dr. M. rightly says we are conscious, must not be confounded with the *feeling* with which it is connected. It is the ratifying act by which we, so to say, *accept* the feeling, or adopt it, it being thought within our power to put away.

and thus separating it from—and at the same time noting its relations with—certain other facts with which, as has been seen, it is apt to be confounded. Consider what happens when one is tempted to distraction of mind in a case where recollection and the concentration of attention is a grave duty. It may or may not be in our power to put away the distracting thought; this depends mainly or wholly upon the state of the cerebral organs and upon external physical circumstances; but whether we succeed or not in getting rid of the intruder, we know the difference between acquiescing in it and wishing it away or mentally saying *no* to it. It is this power of saying *yes* or *no*, of ratifying or disclaiming, which we feel to be ours, this is the act which we initiate. Dr. Maudsley would say that the act comes up from “depths below consciousness.” A statement accurately descriptive of the original distraction, which came *to* us, rose we know not whence; but an *act* by its very nature comes *from* us, begins with us, is not what it is apprehended to be if it be not our very own. But if we wish effectually to drive away the distraction, it is not enough to wish it away, to say *no* to it; it will at least be useful to fix upon some other thought, to say *yes* to this, and to attend to it, that by strengthening it we may banish its rival. Here again our ratifying act may be effective or not; the effectiveness lies not with us, but the ratifying act, the wish, the determination are ours.

Let us observe next what happens when we “try to remember” something, for example, a man’s name. I fix my attention upon that one among the various thoughts now present to my mind which seems most likely to suggest the required name. The suggestion—if it take place at all—comes about according to the known laws of Association, at any rate, it does not come directly under my control; all that I can do is, from moment to moment, to fix my attention upon one rather than the rest among the thoughts which make up the mental field of view, strengthening thereby the selected idea, and so giving precedence to associations connected with it, over those which would be called up by the thoughts to which I do not attend. This analysis of the effort of memory (in which Aristotle and most of our modern psychologists agree) may suggest how closely connected with *attention* is the real exercise of the will when disentangled from other facts from which, as has been said, it is not always sufficiently distinguished.<sup>21</sup>

If now we pass from the study of the will, as exerted in the guidance of thought to its connection with external movements, we

<sup>21</sup> Throughout this part of the subject I am travelling along the lines laid down by Mr. Travis in an admirable paper called “An Introspective Investigation,” published in *Mind*, vol. ii. Certain peculiarities of expression, which it would take too long to discuss here, have withheld me from quoting his words. His essay is one of the most valuable recent contributions to the literature of Free Will. It is especially precious (1) as the record of a deliberate conversion, on scientific grounds, from determinism to the doctrine of liberty, and (2) as affording independent confirmation from an introspective point of view of a theory suggested to Dr. Carpenter by physiological considerations.

shall find that here too control is exercised through the medium of attention; that while the act of the will is itself always a mere choice, a saying yes or no to the idea of something conceived as within our power, the first and immediate effect of our act of choice, the condition of its external effectiveness, is the fixing of the attention.<sup>22</sup> Take the case of some familiar operation, such as writing. While I sit at my table and write these lines, the thought is suggested to my mind to rise from my chair and walk about. I determine to remain where I am, and am conscious that in choosing to pen these words rather than follow the suggestion to rise I am acting freely. Yet I am certainly not exerting my free will in the formation of each letter, or even of each word. The letters and the words are formed in virtue of thoughts present, and of habits previously acquired, together with attention now kept up. All that I need to do is so far to concentrate attention on the thoughts which I wish to express that these thoughts may suggest suitable words, the words again by associations long since formed calling forth the appropriate movements of the fingers. Here I have been supposing that it has not been necessary to stop in order to find the needful words. When such stoppage is necessary a process analogous to that of "trying to remember" forthwith begins. What has been here said of writing is true of walking, reading, playing a musical instrument with which one may be familiar, and all similar processes.<sup>23</sup>

We may turn now from processes to single movements, or rather to movements which from their comparative simplicity may be roughly regarded as single. It will be best to choose a movement which, on the one hand, is not so easy as to elude observation of its genesis, nor on the other hand, difficult from lack of practice, but a movement which, while easy as regards the manner of its performance, is yet difficult, as having to be performed against inertia, for example the act of promptly rising from bed when one is very drowsy. Reflection, I think, will show that in order to perform such an action it is necessary to fix the attention either on the idea of the movement itself or on that of some consequence or motive connected with it, until there arises a physical impulse to perform the movement, which impulse will act itself out if the attention is kept upon it and away from such feelings as may be deterrent. Conversely, in order to prevent being carried away by a strong impulse, it is necessary to turn the attention away from it, or it will exhibit itself in external acts. When it is said that reflection will show this, an assertion is made which must be tested by every one

<sup>22</sup> This is an aspect of the psychology of will which has not perhaps been sufficiently insisted upon by writers on the subject. In case the view here put forward (which is that—if I understand them rightly—of Carpenter, Travis, Lloyd, and others) should be called in question, it may be well to observe that the possible failure of an attempt to explain the *modus operandi* of the will in connection with the living organism cannot invalidate the fact of its intrinsic liberty, while success in such an attempt will be satisfactory as bringing into intelligible connection two important orders of facts.

<sup>23</sup> Carpenter, *Mental Physiology*, § 14 and passim.

for himself by his own experience. It may be pointed out, however, how simple is this view of the mode of operation of the will, and how it brings under a single description the most diverse instances of voluntary control. The degree of attention necessary, and the degree of decision required in the idea to be attended to may vary indefinitely. In the case of familiar and easy movements that small degree of selective attention which is implied in the mere fact of volition is sufficient to start the appropriate muscles; while if the result to be obtained is to be exceptionally delicate or unfamiliar a greater effort of attention is called for. But in all cases attention is the condition of success, the condition of the external effectiveness of our will.<sup>24</sup>

This truth seems to me to form the real basis of an assertion which has been made by some of the modern advocates of free will, and which, with all respect to those who have maintained it, strikes me as psychologically untrue, and therefore damaging to the cause of the free will doctrine. We may, it is sometimes said, concede to determinists that the will always follows the strongest motive, provided we observe that the will has the power to strengthen the motive upon which it elects to act. Now, such a statement makes the will free only in the selection of motives. But the question at once arises, is then the will motiveless in exercising this selection? Surely in selecting the will must be influenced by reasons *pro* and *contra*, else its actions were indeliberate; but such reasons are themselves motives. Therefore it would seem that, unless we are content to accept determinism, the will cannot, with any meaning, be said to follow always the strongest motive. But it is true to say that movements and successions of ideas are proximately determined by impulse, and that the will has the power to strengthen impulse by attention.

So far I have confided myself mainly on the one hand to the consideration of objections against free will, and on the other to the description of concrete facts which support or illustrate the doctrine, without attempting a systematic constructive treatment, or the adoption, except incidentally, of a scientific terminology. But while we should all agree with Mr. Lloyd in the assertion that facts without a theory are better than a theory inconsistent with facts, it is plain that facts *with* a theory, in other words, facts reduced to a system and described by an orderly terminology, are better from a scientific point of view than facts viewed singly and named at hap-hazard. It will then be worth while, having secured our facts, to draw up a brief statement of at least that part of the general doctrine of will which is more immediately connected with the question of Liberty and Necessity.

WILL may be defined to be the power of self-determination or

<sup>24</sup> Dr. Carpenter has pointed out and urged very strongly the bearing of this truth on the theory of early education. We have to teach self-command to the young. In accustoming them to the control of attention, we are affording them precisely that exercise which is best calculated—apart from supernatural aids—to “strengthen the will.”

choice. Of self-determination enough has been said already. But a word is perhaps necessary in forestalment of an objection which may arise. Many actions, it may be said, are commonly called voluntary which are certainly not actually free, that is, which are not the immediate object or outcome of an act of free choice. Therefore, it may be urged, liberty ought not to be selected as the defining character of will. The answer to this objection is ready to hand. Actions which, not being actually free, are yet styled voluntary, can be rightly so styled only in an indirect derived and interpretative sense; and in precisely the same indirect derived and interpretative sense they may rightly be called free. Such actions are in the first place performed not in opposition to any act of free choice. They are in scholastic phrase free from co-action. Secondly, they are in harmony with the general course of our free acts at the time being. They are actions such that, if we adverted to them, we should probably continue to perform them. At all events they are actions such as under normal circumstances ordinarily fall under the control of the Will. This is what I mean by saying that such actions or movements are voluntary in an indirect derived, or interpretative sense.<sup>25</sup>

Movements are either volitional (*i. e.* directly voluntary) or automatic: volitional, if they are determined immediately by an act of free choice, automatic, if they are the natural result of the previous state of the sentient organism without interference from the will. Of automatic movements some are controllable by the will (whose power in this connection differs in different individuals and varies in the same individual at different times), while others are not thus controllable. Of those which are controllable some take place unnoticed, others are noticed and permitted. We have then the following table:

Movements	{ Automatic	{ Uncontrollable . . . . . }	{ = Involuntary.
		{ Controllable . . . . . }	
	{ Volitional . . . . . }		{ = Voluntary.

The same distribution may be applied to internal processes of thought.

It is important to distinguish between an impulse and a motive. By an impulse I understand any state of feeling or thought known to issue in controllable action or process in so far as it tends to hinder the will from exercising its control. For example, a burst of impatience seizes me. I know that unless I repress this emotion, whether by exciting rival thoughts or in some other manner it will lead to wrathful words or perhaps even to deeds of anger. Yet to exercise this repression will be irksome, will require an effort. Or again, a distracting thought enters my mind while engaged in study. It tends to engross the attention, and if it succeeds will issue in a train of exciting

<sup>25</sup> Dr. Carpenter distinguishes between *voluntary* and *volitional* actions, his class of "voluntary" actions corresponding, nearly, with those which I have described as indirectly voluntary. "Volitional" actions are nearly equivalent to what a Catholic moralist would call "deliberate." It seems more correct and convenient to use the term *voluntary* so as at least to include what he calls "volitional" actions. I see no objection to using *volitional* as equivalent to *directly voluntary*.



reflections. Here are two cases of impulse as distinguished from motive. A motive, on the other hand, I understand to be the apprehension of an *end*. It is also always a thought, and a thought relative to something not immediately present, whereas the strength of an impulse lies in its present characteristics. It is quite true, as before observed, that in order to act *ad extra* upon a motive the will must, by greater or less concentration of attention, produce an impulse. Still the motive and the impulse remain distinct. Some writers have drawn a distinction between impulsive and suasive motives, the distinction being of this kind, that an impulsive motive is one whose force lies in itself, a suasive motive one whose force lies in its reference to something not actually present to the mind.<sup>26</sup> Evidently the thought is fundamentally the same as that which forms the basis of the definitions here adopted. These definitions I venture to prefer. A motive is something which excites the will to action. An impulse, as above described, is something which will issue in action without any intervention of the Will at all. Regarded merely as a present state its relation to the Will is that of an obstacle rather than of a spur. In so far as an impulse suggests farther consequences the thought of these consequences will fall under the definition of a motive. On similar grounds I should prefer the word *impulse* to the word *attraction*, which has sometimes been employed to express (if I mistake not) the same idea.<sup>27</sup> The ground of preference is sufficiently indicated in the contention that the distinguishing feature in the class of influences we are considering is their *present* force not their relation to some object without the mind. It might seem at first sight that an impulse may urge the Will to act (so to say) in its own direction, to adopt with extra vigour the action in which it would have issued even without the intervention of the Will. But a moment's reflection will remind us that exertion beyond the impulse of the moment requires an effort just as much as the checking of the movement to which we are impelled, and equally requires a motive, which motive may or may not be suggested by the impulse in question.

An important aspect of the free will question has been brought into prominence by the writer of the article in the *Dublin Review*,<sup>28</sup> on "Mr. Mill's Denial of Free Will." The reviewer calls attention to the fact that, from the nature of the case, "devout Theists" will be found to exercise free will immensely more often, and frequently too in a more intense form than other men.<sup>29</sup> Christian asceticism teaches a man to value the inward intention rather than the external deed.

<sup>26</sup> Fleming, *Student's Moral Philosophy*, p. 180. He refers to Reid's "animal" and "rational" motives as expressing essentially the same distinction.

<sup>27</sup> *Dublin Review*, vol. xxii. p. 336. The reviewer also uses the word *impulse*, which is adopted and partially distinguished from motive by Mr. Lloyd and others.

<sup>28</sup> Vol. xxii.

<sup>29</sup> Pp. 337, seq. Such statements are naturally distasteful to determinists. Dr. Bain (*Emotions and Will*, pp. 497, 499. Third Edition) deprecates the issue as theological, not psychological. The question is not whether the proposition is theological, but whether it is true.

It teaches him to "watch his heart" to observe his thoughts, and to direct them as often as possible by positive acts to God, the end of his whole being. It brings prominently before his mind the practice of self-control as a most important exercise of the interior life. In short it is hardly necessary to insist that the habit of "recollection" necessarily tends to multiply the daily number of deliberate and choiceful acts. Take on the other hand the case of a man who has no belief in the supernatural. He, too, often resists the greatest present impulse, either for the sake of others or with a view to his own greater advantage in the future. But he does not value the practice of self-control as a constant means of meriting in the sight of an all-seeing Dispenser of reward and retribution. The self-control which he does exercise tends to become habitual, in other words, tends to embody itself in a new set of impulses, and his wish must be so to establish prudential and benevolent impulses in the mind that foresight and benevolence may be frictionless, and there is no tendency to any higher kind of effort.<sup>30</sup> Whereas for the Christian ascetic there are simply no limits to the process of self-perfection. He, too, endeavours to establish and to cultivate virtuous impulses, but each set of such impulses once established becomes for him a platform from which to mount upwards to higher exercises of self-control. Thus it is that in Christian asceticism is found the most constant and vigorous exercise of free will.

The argument against free will from the consideration of human conduct was considered in the first part of the present essay. I will conclude with one or two additional remarks bearing upon this subject. "Determinists," says the writer in the *Dublin Review* already referred to, "often imply this syllogism. If determinism were untrue, there would be no such thing as psychological, social, historical science: but by the confession of all there is such a science; therefore, determinism is true."<sup>31</sup> The answer is easy. So far as there is a science of psychology, of sociology, of history, libertarians give a perfectly consistent account of the matter. For first it is admitted that a very large proportion of every man's life consists of states and processes which are not free at all. And those provide the principal materials of psychology, at all events as it is understood and studied by those who urge the objection we now speak of. Witness Dr. Bain's hundreds of pages on Sensation, Imagination, Association, Automatic Selection of Movements, and on Mental Physiology in general. Secondly, it is admitted that no free action is motiveless (a consideration which excludes from practical

<sup>30</sup> "I suppose that if man could ever succeed in attaining to a perfect harmony with environing nature—including in that word the nature of men and things around him—so as to perceive and act in all relations with the unreflecting certainty and precision of instinct, he would have neither memory, nor reason, nor feeling, nor will, all which imply a persistence of the mental excitation in consciousness, but would act with the automatic regularity, precision, and certainty of a perfect machine" (Maudsley, p. 443). I should not have ventured on such a statement of the logical outcome of determinism born of an exclusive physiology. It is Dr. Maudsley who commits himself to it.

<sup>31</sup> Vol. xxii. p. 357. Cf. Mill, *Examination*, pp. 500, 501.

possibility thousands of contingencies theoretically possible)<sup>32</sup> and that to increase the motives for any particular line of action is, ordinarily, to increase the probability that this line of action will be adopted. From which it follows that concerning the actions of masses of men, certain broad principles may be laid down which are capable of being tested and confirmed by statistics. But this is the utmost to which social science can pretend. If only we are careful to draw as clear a line as possible between vague prophecy and definite fact, the "Science of human nature" will be found to have told us nothing which the advocates of free will might not have willingly conceded in any age. The most scientific among our men of science are the most careful to warn us of the infinite shortcomings of the would-be "science" of human life.<sup>33</sup> To attribute those shortcomings solely to the complexity of the conditions is to defend determinism by unsupported assertions. When we foretell a man's conduct from his character, we do so relying on the knowledge that a whole system of motives and of impulses are habitually present to him, while counteracting motives and impulses are habitually absent.

Those who argue against free will from the consideration of human conduct, sometimes seem to leave out of account the no less important facts of human belief. For example, it has been repeatedly urged by libertarians that the principles of reward and punishment in actual use suppose the belief in free will. To which it has been as repeatedly answered that a theory of reward and punishment is quite possible on determinist principles. This theory is most compendiously and straightforwardly stated by Hobbes. "For my part," he says, "I am too dull to perceive the difference between those rewards used to brute beasts and those that are used to men."<sup>34</sup> To express the same more explicitly, determinists, as holding that the actions of men are determined by motives, reasonably and consistently apply deterrents to prevent the commission or repetition of crimes (not of sins but of injuries to society); and with equal reason and consistency they seek to promote virtuous action (*i.e.*, in their view, action which is for the good of society) by holding out the encouragement of rewards.<sup>35</sup> Reasonably

<sup>32</sup> *Dublin Review*, l.c. pp. 353, seq.

<sup>33</sup> Jevons, *Principles of Science*, vol. ii. pp. 457—459; Cliffe Leslie in *Hermathena*, vol. ii. p. 277. On statistics in connection with free will, see Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 343, 344.

<sup>34</sup> *Works*, vol. v. p. 195. "The means whereby setting-dogs and coy-ducks and parrots are taught to do what they do 'is by their backs, by their bellies, by the rod, or by the morsel.' . . . Does not the Bishop know that the belly hath taught poets, and divines, and philosophers, and artificers, their several arts, as well as parrots? Do not men do their duty with regard to their backs, to their necks, and to their morsels, as well as setting-dogs, coy-ducks, and parrots? Why then are these to us the substance, and to them but the shadow or resemblance of rewards or punishments" (p. 196).

<sup>35</sup> "By the right of nature we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men" (Hobbes, *Ibid.* p. 152. So also pp. 292, 311; Hume, *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 80; Bain, p. 477; Mill, *Examination*, pp. 510, seq.; Maudsley, pp. 414, 415; Sully, p. 40).

and consistently too, they refrain from punishing the insane, who by the nature of the case are not amenable to ordinary motives, and in the instance of whom, accordingly, punishment could fulfil no good end. And this, according to them, is the whole of the matter. Now it would be foolish to deny that this is *a* theory of reward and punishment, and, from the point of view, a consistent one. If men were as the brutes the punishment of men would consistently follow the same laws as the punishment of brutes. But it would be equally foolish to assert that this is *the* theory actually held by mankind, since it entirely removes all foundation from the notion of *desert*. And where the argument is from human conduct it is the theory actually current, not a theory which might be substituted for this, that has to be considered.<sup>36</sup> Dr. Maudsley admits that the present *theory* of punishment is at variance with his own views, but contends that external practice is a more valuable witness.<sup>37</sup> I have shown that external practice in no way tells against the doctrine of free will, while current beliefs—on his own admission—imply the doctrine. So far, then, as arguments from human conduct have any weight in the matter they tell for the defenders of human liberty.

H. W. L.

<sup>36</sup> "On the determinist theory, 'ought,' 'responsibility,' 'desert,' and similar terms have to be used, if at all, in new significations. . . . On the other hand, I cannot deny that the determinists can give to these fundamental terms of ethics perfectly clear and definite meanings: that the distinctions thus obtained give us a practically sufficient basis for criminal law" (Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, p. 50).

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. 414, 415.







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